Farzana Bibi puts furniture on a platform as she is worried floods will soon reach her village, Khan Chandi, Southern Punjab.

©Caroline Gluck, June 2011.

The floods that hit Pakistan in 2010 were the worst in the country’s history. The humanitarian response achieved remarkable successes in minimising the immediate loss of life and providing relief to millions of people. However, it could have been better: more than 800,000 families remain without permanent shelter and more than a million people remain in need of food assistance. These unmet needs must be addressed as a matter of urgency.

As Pakistan faces another monsoon season and the likelihood of more disasters, the country is not prepared. Many factors which have hampered the relief and reconstruction effort are still present, such as an inadequate disaster management system and a lack of emergency relief co-ordination and leadership. These institutional challenges must be resolved as soon as possible. The government and donors need to invest heavily in measures to reduce disaster risks such as better early warning systems, flood control, and more resilient housing. They should also tackle the underlying social inequalities which leave people vulnerable to disasters through a pro-poor national development plan. Spending on risk reduction and preparedness not only saves lives and livelihoods but hugely reduces the economic impact of disasters.
Extent of the 2010 floods

Source: OCHA
Acronyms

ADB  Asian Development Bank
CBDRM  Community-based disaster risk management
CCI  Council of Common Interests
CNIC  Computerised National Identity Card
DCO  District Co-ordination Officer
DDMA  District Disaster Management Authority
DFID  Department for International Development (UK)
DIPECHO  Disaster Preparedness ECHO (a programme of the European Commission’s humanitarian aid department)
DNA  ‘Pakistan Floods 2010: Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment’ (report by the Asian Development Bank, World Bank, Government of Pakistan)
DRM  disaster risk management
DRR  disaster risk reduction
ERRA  Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority
ERWG  Early Recovery Working Group
FATA  Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FFC  Federal Flood Commission
GAM  global acute malnutrition
GoP  Government of Pakistan
HERR  Humanitarian Emergency Response Review
HFA  Hyogo Framework for Action
IDP  Internally displaced person
IFI  International financial institution
KPK  Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
NDMA  National Disaster Management Authority
NDRMF  National Disaster Risk Management Framework
PDMA  Provincial Disaster Management Authority
PDMC  Provincial Disaster Management Commission
PKR  Pakistani rupees
PMD  Pakistan Meteorological Department
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF  United Nations International Children’s Fund
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
WAPDA  Water and Power Development Authority
WFP  World Food Programme
WHO  World Health Organisation

‘Clusters’  Refers to the co-ordination mechanism for delivering humanitarian aid. This is arranged around sectors such as ‘food’ or ‘water and sanitation’ which are called ‘clusters’.

Currency equivalent: $1 = 85.89 PKR (www.xe.com as of 12th July 2011)
Summary

The floods that hit Pakistan in 2010 were the worst in the country’s history. An estimated 20 million people were affected, with 1,985 killed and another 2,964 injured. Some 1.6 million houses were damaged or destroyed, and more than 5 million jobs were lost. Damage to agricultural crops, irrigation systems, and infrastructure was massive. Economic growth was stunted by 2 per cent over the past year.¹

Responding to an emergency of this magnitude would have stretched any government. However, much was achieved by Pakistani officials, civil society organisations, the international aid community, private and institutional donors, military actors, and private individuals to minimise the loss of life, to provide food, water, shelter, and cash to millions of flood-affected people, and to prevent major outbreaks of disease. The ongoing socio-political, environmental, and economic volatility in Pakistan increased the challenges of delivering a response of this scale.

One year on from the floods, there are huge gaps in the post-flood recovery needs and hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis remain without permanent shelter. Millions are estimated to be food insecure. Many who did not have seeds and tools, or couldn’t access land, missed the chance to plant and harvest crops. With little work available and rising food prices, their ability to sustain themselves through the recovery is in question. Women have struggled to access assistance and continue to be disproportionately affected. Thousands have not returned to their villages and remain in pseudo camps in urban areas with no assistance, nor provision for their integration into society. The UN Appeal has a shortfall of $600m intended to support early recovery activities, and funds are required in critical areas, such as housing and agriculture, to get people back on their feet.

Resilient communities struggling to recover are now facing another monsoon season and the likelihood of yet more disasters in the future as climate change increases the prevalence of extreme weather conditions. Pakistan is simply not sufficiently prepared to cope. Much of the country is still not covered by early warning systems, and flood protection infrastructure, such as river embankments, protection walls, and water-courses, was crippled by last year’s disaster and remains unrepaired. Even with less rainfall this year, the risk of flooding remains high and many villages are already under water.

Minimising the potential impact of floods before they strike and delivering an effective, adequate, impartial, and timely humanitarian response have been hampered by long-term neglect of social inequities, insufficient preparation by the government for disasters, an inadequate disaster management system, a lack of emergency relief co-ordination and leadership, and the overlapping mandates of different actors.

The floods have demonstrated a vital need to re-examine the underlying drivers of vulnerability that turn natural hazards into human disasters and hamper swift recovery.² These include widespread malnutrition, deep levels of poverty, inadequate access to education, landlessness, discrimination against women and minorities, and conflict dynamics that hinder humanitarian access to certain populations. Unless these factors are addressed through a nationally co-ordinated, pro-poor reconstruction and development plan, they will continue to undermine efforts to improve Pakistan’s resilience to future disasters and its ability to develop. Attention to supporting the resilience of the most vulnerable communities is critical to success in reconstruction efforts.
Significant and sustained investments must be made by the Government of Pakistan (GoP), and supported by donors, if this situation is to change. Agreed international targets for disaster risk reduction (DRR) include allocating a minimum of 10 per cent of all humanitarian funding, post-disaster reconstruction, and recovery projects to DRR and 1 per cent within broader development budgets. All public development policies should now systematically integrate DRR and climate change adaptation principles to adequately meet the challenges of the changing environment. This should be done in line with the country’s commitments under the Hyogo Framework for Action.3

In recent years the Pakistani authorities have taken positive steps in creating a disaster management framework and institutions – but much more needs to be done. Pakistan already has policies; now it is critically important to translate these into effective disaster management systems, particularly at the community level, that minimise risks and help people to help themselves when faced by crisis. This requires sustained investment. Domestic resources must be mobilised through urgent widening of the tax base (currently only 2 per cent of the population pay income tax) without disproportionately impacting on the poorest.4

Improved measures to reduce the risk of disasters occurring not only prevent avoidable deaths, damage, and distress; they also represent immense value for money. In the period 2005–2009, disasters are estimated to have cost Pakistan at least $5bn.5 Reconstruction after the floods is predicted to cost up to $10.9bn, almost one-quarter of the national budget.6 However, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank estimate that an initial investment of just $27m by the government would greatly reduce losses from future disasters. Pakistan has allocated more than this sum to pay for National Assembly expenses in the last two years alone.7 This initial investment, followed by sustained allocation of resources, could include reorganising the existing parallel disaster management bodies, providing them assistance and hardware support in the 30 most vulnerable districts and longer-term flood risk mapping.8

Ahead of future crises, clarity is urgently required on the roles and responsibilities of government actors at the district, provincial, and federal levels, particularly in light of the devolution of responsibilities mandated by the 18th Amendment to the constitution.9 However, disasters and emergencies do not respect local boundaries. Pakistan needs to be able to respond in a nationally-led and co-ordinated manner when large-scale disasters occur.

Strong donor leadership is also required to ensure that progress is made in strengthening DRR and climate change adaptation measures in post-flood reconstruction. Sustained, multi-year funding should be made available to help develop Pakistan’s domestic disaster preparedness. At the same time, the evolving demands of a rapidly growing population, whose development needs are not being met, must be acknowledged, and development assistance should continue.

Relations among the UN agencies and between the UN and the GoP have also been put under stress by the swift transition from one co-ordination system to another over the course of the response. This transition led to a change in who was in charge overall, and in key sectors such as housing. UN agencies need to address the future of humanitarian co-ordination in Pakistan by re-orientating themselves to take a much more integrated approach in partnership with GoP structures.
This report does not offer a comprehensive evaluation of the response to the floods to date but it examines their impact, particularly on the most vulnerable communities, and the role of the country’s institutional structures for disaster management, before presenting suggestions on what steps are necessary to make the people of Pakistan safer during future disasters.

**Recommendations**

**The Pakistan Federal Government should:**

- Ensure that the unmet early recovery needs of flood-affected people are addressed by investing adequate resources, particularly for housing and agriculture support.

- Save lives and money by investing the initial $27m needed in DRR measures, including reorganising and strengthening disaster management authorities, and mapping future flood hazards. This would avoid incurring the repeated costs of far more expensive emergency responses. This should be followed by sustained long-term investment to reduce risks including at least 1 per cent of all national development funding allocated to DRR, which could be drawn from increased tax revenues.

- Define the mandates, roles, and responsibilities of government bodies responsible for preparedness, disaster management, and reconstruction at the federal, provincial, and district levels. This should ensure effective coordination between GoP institutions and with international actors throughout the response, recovery, and reconstruction phases.

- Update the National Floods Management Plan, simplify and improve early warning systems, designate safe breaching locations, and mitigate risks by repairing flood protection systems urgently.

- Reduce vulnerability to crises. The GoP should urgently co-ordinate a pro-poor reconstruction and development plan that is transparent and accountable and that includes reforms necessary to address underlying vulnerabilities of women, landless people, hard-to-reach communities, and minorities. This must be based on DRR and climate change adaptation principles.

- Listen to the concerns of the Pakistani people by ensuring that affected communities and civil society, particularly women, are consulted on preparedness, response, and longer-term reconstruction.

**Provincial governments should demonstrate commitment to disaster management and reconstruction by:**

- Championing the new roles and responsibilities of Provincial Disaster Management Authorities (PDMAs). Provincial governments should invest resources to provide permanent staff who are well trained and clear on their roles and responsibilities.

- Prioritising disaster preparedness, ensuring that realistic contingency plans are in place and that key flood protection infrastructure is adequately repaired and maintained.

- Investing at the community level by initiating community-based disaster risk management (CBDRM) programming that results in greater participation and local ownership of CBDRM initiatives.

- Holding local government elections to ensure representation and improve accountability to local communities.
• Showing long-term vision by ensuring that reconstruction and development plans prioritise DRR and climate change adaptation, and by putting the needs of the most vulnerable communities, particularly those of women, at the heart of these. Investment in sustainable livelihoods and local economies will help achieve this goal.

International donors should enhance the cost-effectiveness of aid by:

• Consolidating existing relief expenditure by meeting current gaps in the early recovery and reconstruction phases in all areas of the country, based on need.

• Placing DRR and climate change adaptation principles at the heart of their country strategies for both relief and development, in line with the Global Platform on Risk Reduction including allocating at least 10 per cent of all humanitarian and recovery spending to DRR.

• Supporting the GoP to fulfil its obligations under the Hyogo Framework for Action by building domestic capacity and supporting increased investment in CBDRM. To ensure sustainability, donors should make longer-term commitments with multi-year funding.

• Supporting the GoP’s leadership in humanitarian and early recovery response, while encouraging accountability to affected people and the need for great improvements in co-ordination, particularly at district level.

The UN should demonstrate its ability to learn lessons and look ahead by:

• Re-orientating its approach to ensure greater integration, flexibility, and co-ordination between the cluster system and the GoP in future responses, outside of conflict situations.

• Ensuring that all staff are aware of and understand DRR, as well as core humanitarian principles and standards.

• Ensuring effective co-ordination with federal-, provincial-, and district-level disaster management structures and committing to strengthen and institutionalise these structures with resources and technical help.

NGOs should help build Pakistan’s long-term resilience by:

• Reducing vulnerability through mainstreaming DRR principles into projects and building capacity on DRR within local organisations

• Strengthening the links between emergency and reconstruction, response and preparedness programming, and developing accountability mechanisms to ensure that they are demonstrating best practice.

• Committing to full transparency and accountability in their operations by publishing their financial reports.

Pakistani media can support efforts to reduce the impacts of future disasters by:

• Raising awareness of the importance of disaster preparedness, response, and recovery by making this part of their regular coverage, particularly on television.
Challenges to recovery

‘Things have got much worse since the floods … When you send the children to the shops with 10 rupees ($0.12) the shopkeeper throws the money back at them because you can’t buy anything these days for 10 rupees ($0.12). Sugar prices are very high. Now we have to pay 180 ($2.10) rupees for a kilo of cooking oil. It used to be much less before – maybe 130 rupees ($1.52) … Our house was destroyed but we have no materials to rebuild.’

Dadli Kehar, mother of seven, Hashim Kehar village, Sindh, June 2011

When unusually heavy and persistent monsoon rains hit Pakistan in July 2010, causing massive flooding throughout the country, millions of people were made homeless and in need of emergency assistance and long-term help to recover. Emergency relief efforts achieved notable successes in preventing loss of life and major outbreaks of disease, delivering millions of dollars’ worth of humanitarian aid to flood-affected people. However, with no finalised reconstruction plan in place and many challenges of coordination, the recovery and reconstruction effort has struggled to address their needs and underlying vulnerabilities. One year on, and with another monsoon season now under way, flood-affected families face many challenges on the path to recovery that leave them even more vulnerable to another disaster.

Demand for housing outstrips supply

The overwhelming demand for housing support is a defining feature of the current post-flood situation. An updated and consolidated gap analysis of needs presented to donors on 4 May 2011 indicated that although 351,980 houses/shelters had been provided, 827,380 houses were still required. The UNDP’s Strategic Early Recovery Action Plan urged that priority should be given to providing 227,050 houses to people in areas of greatest vulnerability. This requires an additional $175m investment from the government or donors.

Rebuilding houses to flood- and earthquake-resistant standards is the best use of limited resources. However, one of the key challenges identified in the UNDP analysis is the difficulty involved in getting all actors providing housing support to follow technical guidance to ‘build back better’. This is a key concern, because if aid is being provided in an environment where DRR measures are not being prioritised, the impact and effectiveness of that aid will be limited. In addition, there is a massive disparity in the value of housing interventions, ranging from $300 to $2,500 per family, for example, which has led to tensions at the community level. Prices of construction materials have not been controlled, and a combination of profiteering and inflation has caused costs to soar. Before the floods, kiln-fired bricks cost PKR 2.50 ($0.03) each, but in some flood-affected parts of Sindh province now they cost PKR 5.50 ($0.06) each, and now 16 per cent general sales tax has been added to bricks by the latest budget. It is therefore important that the Government of Pakistan (GoP) fulfil its commitments to lead co-ordination efforts to minimise overlaps or gaps in aid provision by relief actors, private philanthropists, and multiple donors and to ensure that aid is targeting the most vulnerable people.

‘The flood reconstruction presents the single most important opportunity for promoting growth and poverty reduction.’
National Flood Reconstruction Plan, 23 February 2011

‘When the children go to the shops with 10 rupees ($0.12) the shopkeeper throws the money back at them because you can’t buy anything these days for 10 rupees ($0.12). Sugar prices are very high. Now we have to pay 180 rupees ($2.10) for a kilo of cooking oil. It used to be much less before – maybe 130 rupees ($1.52) … Our house was destroyed but we have no materials to rebuild.’

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Many goods that should have been distributed to flood-affected people last year will be distributed in July. According to a District Co-ordination Officer (DCO) in Sindh province, speaking in June 2011, these items include 400 tonnes of rice and 5,000 blankets. ‘Of course it is useless to distribute blankets in this hot season, but we have to, because we have been instructed by the provincial government to do so. In fact these should have been given to the district government immediately after the floods so that people would have got some relief.

Reconstruction status unclear

There is no clear picture of the status of overall reconstruction work after the floods. The report ‘Pakistan Floods 2010: Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment’ produced by the GoP, the World Bank, and Asian Development Bank (ADB) – the DNA report – presented three reconstruction options, with the most expensive aiming to build back better and safer with special emphasis on housing, irrigation, and infrastructure for future flood protection. However, the National Flood Reconstruction Plan, co-ordinated by the new Flood Reconstruction Unit in the Planning Commission, opted for the cheapest option, citing ‘the current financial constraint being faced by Pakistan’. Although the plan acknowledges the reconstruction task as an opportunity to promote poverty reduction, a large part of the funds needed is envisaged to come from the reallocation of development budgets of federal and provincial governments. Development budgets were hard hit after money was reallocated for the emergency response last year, and no plans have been published as to how these funds will be replenished.

Under Pakistan’s continuing devolution process, provinces have gained greater powers and responsibilities and are now largely taking the lead in reconstruction efforts. Decision making on inter-provincial issues now takes place at the Council of Common Interests (CCI), a body with the Chief Ministers of all the provinces headed by the Prime Minister. Despite the publication of the draft National Flood Reconstruction Plan in February, its status remains uncertain as it has yet to be approved by this body. This raises the risk of divergent standards and allocation of resources across provinces. Each province set up new reconstruction bodies, bypassing the PDMAs – the Special Reconstruction Cell in Punjab, the Steering Committee in Sindh, the Flood Cell in Balochistan, and the Provincial Rehabilitation and Reconstruction and Settlement Authority in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK).

There have been some attempts to improve accountability. For example, the National Flood Reconstruction Plan suggests, ‘A website to be developed to facilitate transparency: information flow on flood reconstruction activities, results of M&E of projects and progress of various flood related development works – but this has yet to happen. Punjab’s is the only provincial-level flood reconstruction plan currently available on the national Planning Commission website and contains only limited information.

Punjab and Sindh provinces have taken the approach of promoting model villages. Punjab has reported to the Flood Commission Inquiry that 89 model villages are being constructed. The Government of Sindh plans to build 1,000 villages of 200 houses each by the end of the year, while other actors, many of them foreign governments (e.g. Turkey, Iran, Canada), are being asked by Provincial Authorities to build as many houses as they want, but with little co-ordination, standardisation, or regard to DRR principles. While the extension of housing and basic services to model villages is welcome, such initiatives can only hope to be successful by prioritising the meaningful participation of communities in their design and by critically assessing their indirect impact on livelihoods, tribal customs, and women’s mobility. Reconstruction planners must recognise that the key to disaster resilience lies in involving affected communities as well as state structures in these processes.
Cash compensation – progressive but inadequate
The GoP’s flagship reconstruction support scheme – the Watan cash card system – has pledged cash compensation to 1.6 million households whose homes have been damaged. The potential of the Watan system is huge, and cash could be delivered to affected communities swiftly in future emergencies if its shortcomings can be resolved. Unfortunately, there have been multiple allegations of corruption, discrimination, and difficulties in access, particularly for women. Implementation has been slow and not enough information about the process has been made available to communities for them to fully understand it. As of June 2011, only the first instalment of PKR 20,000 ($233) per household had been distributed – not even enough to rebuild the most basic mud and timber house.

The Supreme Court has stated that the ‘Government is directed to ensure payment of balance of remaining amount, which is approximately PKR 80,000 ($932) per family as early as possible’. According to press reports, distribution of the second instalment was due to commence in mid-July 2011 – one year after the initial disaster. However, the government says there is insufficient funding to provide this second payment to everyone who is registered, so the policy is now to only distribute PKR 40,000 ($466).

Each province is introducing its own eligibility criteria to determine remaining needs, based on a housing damage assessment – which perversely creates an incentive not to rebuild. All efforts should be made to ensure the most vulnerable have access to the scheme and recommendations from the Protection Cluster Working Group report should be incorporated into Provincial decision making on distribution. As progressive as giving cash to people directly can be, it should not be seen as a panacea. DRR and climate change adaptation measures are unlikely to be addressed, or co-ordinated, through cash-based schemes, particularly when money is given in a piecemeal and unpredictable manner. Longer-term strategies for revitalising local economies, providing livelihoods, and helping communities to build back better are urgently needed.

Residual displacement
Although the vast majority of flood-displaced people have returned, though often to ravaged communities, many have been unable to. They regularly cite interlinked livelihood, debt, and protection concerns as reasons for remaining homeless or for seeking alternative solutions such as resettling permanently in the areas where they have been staying. There are no reliable figures for how many people fall into this category nationwide. A recent study in Sindh reported that there were still 37,000 displaced people living in 300 camps in the province in June 2011. With an estimated 1.7 million people living in debt bondage in Sindh, there is the bleak prospect of a return to feudal working conditions. Urban economies are also a strong draw. Support to internally displaced persons (IDPs) has been negligible from the Government and the International Community and arguments for minimising aid dependency have often overridden their constitutional rights to choose where to live.

Malnutrition crisis
Widespread malnutrition is a dormant humanitarian and development crisis in Pakistan. It is a sign of the deep poverty that leaves people more vulnerable to disasters and weakens their resilience when disasters strike. Although the situation was clearly precarious before the floods, it has now been dangerously exacerbated. Preliminary data for 2011 shows global acute malnutrition (GAM)
rates of between 13 per cent and 19 per cent nationwide. World Health Organisation (WHO) guidelines set the GAM threshold at 15 per cent for humanitarian emergencies. The province of Sindh, arguably the worst affected by the floods, has GAM rates of up to 22 per cent, higher than both the South Asian average of 19 per cent and the current level of 16 per cent in Sudan.

Beyond the humanitarian response, nutrition has to become an openly discussed political priority – to be addressed through all essential services such as health and education, as well as through relevant development projects.

**Increasing food insecurity**

It is estimated that the food-insecure population in Pakistan after the floods could be as high as 94 million people. Already nearly two-thirds of people spend between 50 per cent and 70 per cent of their income on food, making them vulnerable not only to rising prices but also to the next flood or earthquake. The removal of subsidies and the imposition of higher taxes on agricultural inputs in the budget for FY2011/12 risk further increases in the prices of basic commodities such as sugar, wheat, and rice. The cost of agricultural inputs, such as seeds, has risen sharply. Pakistan is set to become the fifth most populous country in the world by 2050, and its ability to feed its own people will be critical in supporting this burgeoning population. A 10 per cent rise in domestic food prices could push an additional 3.47 million people below the $1.25 a day poverty line, leaving them highly vulnerable in the face of further crises. The government should make tackling hunger a top priority and build resilience by creating jobs, adapting to climate change, investing in DRR, and extending social protection.

**Vulnerable groups**

Poor people are hit the hardest by disasters. The impact often depends on their proximity to hazards and their levels of vulnerability: who people are, where they live, and how they make their living can all determine how well they will be able to cope with, and recover from, shocks. Women, minority groups, landless people, and those in hard-to-reach areas have been some of the most disproportionately affected by the floods.

**Women**

Due to endemic discrimination, women have struggled to access adequate assistance, basic services, and protection throughout the period of flood response and reconstruction. When the floods struck, 92 per cent of women in Pakistan were registered for Computerised National Identity Cards (CNICs) in the name of a family patriarch or other male relative. Government cash compensation was based on possession of a CNIC card, which immediately created barriers for women without their own cards, although efforts were made to accommodate them through women-only queues and increased independent registration of women. A one-person, one-ID card system would overcome this problem.

Women have also been hindered in rebuilding their houses because they lack documentation to prove their property rights, especially widows and female-headed households who already face difficulty in claiming inheritance and land after leaving their homes. Women’s economic status has taken a huge blow in the aftermath of the floods, since the worst-affected sector, agriculture, is a major source of employment for women in rural areas. Government agricultural inputs, a key part of the response, while not directly omitting women, have limited their ability to access assistance by not taking systematic steps to reach women directly.
Kathia village in Sindh province has been flooded eight times since 1942. ‘Even when there is no river flood, our village is inundated owing to flash floods,’ says 70-year-old Mohammad Budho, who lost his only son in last year’s floods. ‘Our village was first inundated in 1942, then in 1944, 1956, 1972, 1976, 1995, and in 2007. But last year’s floods were unprecedented. The waters took away everything from us. The villagers lost around 100 animals.’

Now the floodwaters have receded, but the local economy remains moribund. ‘We can’t decide whether to cultivate land or not,’ says Mohammad. ‘We are still insecure. No repair and maintenance work has been carried out. What if the next flood inundates us again and destroys our lands?’

Because of this fear, people have not yet started rebuilding their houses. ‘We haven’t enough resources to construct our homes again and again,’ says Mohammad. ‘We can’t afford to lose what we have now. We are just waiting and watching to see what will happen after two months.’

Hard-to-reach communities

It has been a struggle to get relief to many of those affected in remote or hard-to-reach communities. For example, in Dera Ismail Khan District, KPK, the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) estimated that 84,000 families were affected. However, according, to UN OCHA, as of January 2011 only 24,000 households had received humanitarian assistance. The area hosts large numbers of people displaced by conflict and borders the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), where the majority of operations against militants are undertaken. International aid agency staff are not currently permitted to travel there; similar access issues restrict agencies from working in Balochistan, which is being left ever further behind in terms of development. Northern areas of Swat district in KPK are also problematic due to the heavy snows that cut off mountain communities for months during the winter. In March 2011, 10–15 per cent of the affected population were receiving no health services at all, due to the inaccessibility of some areas.47

Landless

Settlements are illegal in the kachha riverine areas of Sindh and South Punjab, yet these areas are home to hundreds of thousands of people. Of the 2.6 million kachha houses in Sindh, 753,000 – close to 30 per cent – were completely or partly destroyed by the floods.48 Most of the people living in these areas are poor, with no legal ownership of land. Access to most citizen-based entitlements, including the Watan cash compensation scheme, is linked to having secure access to residential land.49 The situation of people in these areas has been further complicated by a recent decision of the Supreme Court based on the findings of the Federal Flood Commission (FFC), which stated, ‘All such illegally constructed structures on government lands which had been destroyed by the recent floods are not allowed to be re-erected.’50

If provincial authorities pursue a policy of resettlement, meaningful consultation with affected communities should be prioritised and safeguards put in place to minimise impacts on the most vulnerable communities.51 The DNA report urges the government to ‘[adopt] a rights-based development
approach to reconstruction’\textsuperscript{52} and cautions against hasty efforts to clear settlements in flood-prone or kachha areas. Importantly, it argues that:

‘[O]pportunities exist to provide … titles to land when reconstructing houses for the landless, distribute land among the landless including women when restoring livelihoods, regularize informal settlements and provide basic infrastructure, when reconstructing records including land records, establish computerized and transparent recording systems.’\textsuperscript{53}

**Box 2: The vital importance of land ownership**

Ghulam Sarwar Soomro, a mother of eight from Meean Sahab Union Council, was awarded 2 acres of land before the floods under the Sindh Government Land Redistribution Scheme. She said, ‘The good thing about having land is that my children could have enough food and be happy. I could provide all their needs.’

While she was displaced, her land was occupied by a powerful landlord. She continued: ‘It’s up to fate if I’ll get my land back. I know the landlord is very powerful and if he wants to stop us, he can. Right now the land is in his custody and if he says he wants the land, he’ll take it…’

Provincial governments should seize the opportunity to increase the resilience of landless communities to future crises by providing access to land titles, and thus to agricultural income – one of the most important safeguards against poverty and vulnerability to shocks. In rural Sindh, an estimated 60 per cent of people are landless, while just 2 per cent of households own more than 45 per cent of the land area.\textsuperscript{54} In Pakistan as a whole, just 3 per cent of women own land. Existing examples of good practice, such as the Sindh Government Land Redistribution Scheme, which provides state land to landless women, are in danger, as many landlords have seized or staked a claim to land allotted to women after they were displaced by the floods. The provincial government’s reconstruction plans should reinforce and scale up such initiatives, and the should be replicated across other Provinces, with budgets allocated to give landless people legal titles and the resources to rebuild houses that are flood- and earthquake-resistant.

External actors providing housing should be aware of the challenging power dynamics related to housing, land, and property (HLP) rights both before and after the floods, and should prioritise the needs of the most vulnerable people at all times, minimising the future risk of dispossession or eviction. Thus far, HLP rights have been largely sidelined in reconstruction efforts by both the GoP and the international community.\textsuperscript{55}

**Response and co-ordination challenges**

The NDMA took an early lead in the flood response and the Pakistan Army, experienced and capable in responding to disasters, also swung quickly into action, saving thousands of lives by leading rescue operations, as well as providing food, water, and shelter. International actors followed the lead of the NDMA. When the floods began, the UN cluster system set up in 2009 to co-ordinate the humanitarian response to displacement caused by conflict was still in place. The clusters expanded their scope, with support from the GoP. Despite huge challenges, the humanitarian community, led by the GoP and the UN, came together to implement a response that targeted 14 million people in need of assistance. The food cluster, for example, provided food aid to 8.8 million people.\textsuperscript{56}
On 4 February 2011, the NDMA announced that the cluster system would be disbanded due to the ‘end of the emergency’ and that Early Recovery Working Groups (ERWGs) and sub-working groups would be formed. UNDP worked closely with NDMA to roll out this new co-ordination framework by providing useful guidance through presentations to all stakeholders on how the new system would work. However, with more prior consultation and more time for the transition, which happened within one month, much confusion on changing roles and responsibilities could have been minimised. Co-ordination faced new challenges with consequent impacts on aid delivery, as many aid actors struggled to understand the new structures in the wake of this decision. Some substantive issues did not receive sufficient attention, including the implications of the end of the emergency period for IDPs. New provincial level meetings are a positive development. However, these can be difficult to reach for many actors working in the most affected rural areas and steps to facilitate their attendance would be welcome. At the district level, co-ordination is repeatedly raised as a major concern by humanitarian actors in the field and overburdened district officials.

The fragmentation of co-ordination structures in the middle of the response has also resulted in anomalies such as the UNDP having a lead role in humanitarian co-ordination, and parallel co-ordination systems in KPK for humanitarian and early recovery activities. Furthermore, despite assurances that DRR would be mainstreamed throughout the ERWG system, only one DRR meeting has been held at the federal level since February. DRR was rightly identified as a cross cutting issue in the Early Recovery Framework. This should be systematically integrated to create community ownership particularly at the district levels.

The GoP must lead and drive the process of addressing residual needs and reconstructing the country, as outlined in the NDMA and UNDP-led Early Recovery Framework. All UN agencies should support the GoP by reinforcing the co-ordinated approach that the framework insists upon. The key to ensuring that the ERWGs and sub-groups are effective is that government departments must accept that it is their role to co-lead the groups and respond in a disaster. In addition, many aid agencies will need a radical shift in their approach, for example by actively seeking line ministry buy-in and ensuring local civil society is meaningfully consulted in coordination. This will enable them to support more effectively the GoP’s commitment to ensuring that people come out of these floods better off and more resilient.
Is Pakistan prepared for another disaster?

‘My team is strong and I have involved all the technical persons of various district departments and our response would be very good … But the district government does not have enough resources to face these sorts of emergencies at such a big level. It’s the responsibility of the provincial government to support us.’

District Coordination Officer, Sindh Province, June 2011

The need for better preparedness is recognised at all levels. On 23 June Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Yusuf Raza Gilani, called a first ever meeting to assess flood preparedness and co-ordination ahead of the 2011 monsoon season. He emphasised that District Disaster Management Authorities (DDMAs) must be made more effective, and suggested that tiers of this authority go down to the most local administrative unit (tehsil) levels.

By early July 2011, the Punjab government had issued an emergency flood warning and flooding had already started in Sindh. Some parts of KPK were accessible only by 4x4 vehicles because infrastructure has not been repaired and normal snow melts have raised river levels. The NDMA and UN OCHA have estimated that between two and five million people may be affected by floods in the current monsoon season. Despite official assurances that repairs to critical flood protection bunds would be completed before the start of the season in July, media reports and evidence on the ground suggest that this is unlikely, particularly in Sindh, the worst-affected province. Even moderate flooding could have devastating effects on some communities. This leaves people who still trying to recover from last year’s crisis fearful. Many are planting only limited crops in anticipation of yet more flooding.

Oxfam’s partners throughout the country say that the highest priority in preventing suffering and loss of further assets and livelihoods is to ensure that the flood protection bunds are repaired. Yet, repair work is proceeding at a slow pace and quality is sometimes called into question. In Sindh, the ADB granted a loan of PKR 20bn ($233m) for the repair of bunds and key irrigation infrastructure, but the money was slow to be released. Both Punjab and Sindh provinces have seen protests against the slow pace of embankment repairs. There has been no micro-level register or survey of flood damage and there is little real understanding at the community level of which repairs have been prioritised to prepare for this year’s monsoon. Mixed claims from various government departments about the status of repairs has obscured the reality of where the most vulnerable communities are, and little has been done to map these locations. Rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure and the construction of storm water drainage around critical community infrastructure such as schools and hospitals should be prioritised. Sindh’s minister for irrigation has openly acknowledged that the approach being taken is not to ‘build back better’, admitting that ‘even if the repairs could be completed by the deadline, the levels of the bunds would be increased by only 2/3ft – rather than the 6ft recommended by engineers.'
Across Pakistan, people are anxious that the lack of progress in repairing the flood protection embankments is leaving them vulnerable to further disaster as 2011’s monsoon season begins. Villagers in Ghotki, Qadar Pur UC in Sindh province, told Oxfam that their flood protection embankment had been breached in mid-June. People here had been growing wheat, vegetables, and fruit. ‘The embankment was broken last year but not repaired by the government. Local people themselves paid 700,000 rupees ($8,153) to get it repaired, but this didn’t work. Now more than 100,000 people in over 100 villages could be affected’ community members report.

In the village of Muhammad Yousif Chachar, also in Sindh, Irshad Ahmed, 25, a mother of five, was growing sugar cane and wheat this year and was almost ready to harvest her crops when her land flooded. She was flooded last year too. She says, ‘This year we knew the water was coming and the biggest problems are yet to arrive. We are dismantling our homes because the water is coming. Two or three houses here are already under water.’

Idress Rajput, a consultant hired by the Sindh government to supervise repair and maintenance work on embankments, was reported as saying, ‘Even if we try hard, only 33 per cent of the work will be completed by the end of June, the remaining 67 per cent work will be completed next year’ (Daily Kawish, 11 May 2011).

Contingency planning

UN OCHA and the NDMA co-chaired contingency planning workshops across all provinces to gather inputs, and it is to their credit that a floods contingency plan was agreed upon and launched by the end of May 2011, ahead of this year’s monsoons.

The working assumption of the document produced by this working group was that, in the event of another emergency, the full cluster system would be reactivated. Given the swift dismantling of that very system earlier this year, there is clearly a need to incorporate lessons learned to avoid similar problems in future emergencies and to ensure that changes in co-ordination structures do not once again distract from the substantive issues on the ground. ‘No surprises’ should be a guiding principle. The contingency plan made little reference to these changes in the operational context, nor did it reference the ongoing early recovery structures put in place under the leadership of the NDMA and UNDP.

The 2010 floods have clearly put a spotlight on the case for disaster risk management (DRM) and flood contingency planning at all levels, especially at the local level. In most of the districts where Oxfam is operating, people are not even aware of the existence of the local DDMA. Even in areas where contingency plans are being framed, the participation of local communities or of civil society is minimal.

With many residual flood-displaced communities settling near urban areas, contingency plans must adapt to this new reality and ensure close linkages with local authorities responsible for urban management. Rapid urbanisation was already occurring in Pakistan and, with such a high rate of population growth, those responding to climate-related disasters have to increasingly turn their attention to Pakistan’s towns and cities that lie in earthquake or flood-prone areas, particularly along the coast.

Contingency plans should be simple, realistic, and based on reliable data relating to vulnerable areas: how many people may be affected, and the resources required in the event that they are. They should be informed by local knowledge and drawn up with the meaningful participation of local
communities, particularly women, who know best the local hazard risks and their own coping strategies. Emergency shelter provision should be pre-positioned in disaster-prone areas to minimise displacement into schools. Elected and representative local governments, currently absent, would improve accountability to communities.

**Contingency for conflict**

The problems caused by natural disasters in Pakistan are further complicated by conflict-related insecurity. KPK and FATA are highly volatile areas where complex emergencies, involving a combination of IDPs and refugees from Afghanistan, coincide with frequent and large-scale natural disasters, including earthquakes and floods. The population of KPK and FATA is likely to continue to need humanitarian assistance for some time to come, and recent military activity is likely to increase the size of the population in need of assistance.

Contingency plans were prepared for conflict scenarios in FATA now the military operation in Kurram Agency is ongoing. Previous operations in the north of Pakistan suggest that large numbers of displaced people can be expected. These areas, although not affected by floods, are already hosting IDPs and are largely inaccessible to international aid workers. The GoP, as the primary duty bearer, must be prepared to provide assistance via civilian institutions to people who are displaced, including those who chose to stay off-camp. If it is unable to do so, it should ensure access for the safe delivery of humanitarian relief by external agencies, who must strive to maintain operational independence, sustained humanitarian access, and ensure the freedom of movement of the IDPs.

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“We don’t have any idea about the contingency plan from the government … we have our own plan to develop small walls in the field but we don’t have resources.”

Meeting with Shamis u Din, Koroni Hasas Abad village, Charsadda, KPK, June 2011
Historically prone to disasters, Pakistan has been flooded 67 times since 1947. The state has taken welcome steps to set up disaster management structures and led a series of emergency responses. After the 2005 earthquake, the Pakistani government signed the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) and committed to update its relief-oriented disaster management system to one that encompasses preparedness and mitigation through to reconstruction. Despite budgetary constraints, the GoP has reported strong and growing institutional commitment to the HFA’s priority action areas. Nonetheless, gaps between policy and ground-level reality were exposed by the floods.

Despite the efforts of many hard-working government and aid agency personnel, the response to the 2010 floods was weakly co-ordinated and poorly prioritised. This was due largely to the gross underfunding and lack of capacity of national-, provincial-, and district-level disaster management institutions. The response was further undermined by different disaster relief bodies working in parallel, and often with overlapping mandates. The absence of a functioning local government system also contributed to a muddled response, with no single body in charge and little accountability to communities. While these structural problems remain unaddressed, the prospect of better-resourced, well co-ordinated, and timely responses in future emergencies seems distant.

Parallel structures and overlapping mandates
The National Disaster Management Act 2010 gives renewed legislative commitment to the national disaster management framework reaching down to village level through federal, provincial, and district management authorities. This disaster management framework, brought into existence in 2007, was meant to be fully functioning by 2010, with the old relief machinery – involving provincial relief cells and emergency relief cells at federal level – absorbed into it at appropriate levels.

However, the new disaster management bodies at provincial levels in Punjab and Balochistan were not functioning when the floods struck in July 2010, and so the existing relief agencies began work in parallel with the NDMA and newly established PDMAs in line with the 2010 Act.

In Punjab, the provincial relief commissioner responsible for relief operation in the old relief system became first responder, as the PDMA was not yet in place. The positions of provincial relief commissioner and chairman of the Punjab PDMA are still held by a single civil servant. This is potentially damaging to the stand-alone identity of the PDMA and to their evolution into overarching provincial authorities responsible for all aspects of disaster management. The envisaged national framework, under the NDMA, is outlined in Figure 1.
However, a number of government departments have responsibilities that impact on disaster management and work in parallel, with overlapping mandates and varying degrees of co-ordination (see Annex 1). This confusion is further exacerbated by the devolution of powers to the provinces under the 18th Amendment, passed just weeks before the floods hit and constitutionally required to be implemented before 30 June 2011. Resource allocation and roles were being worked out alongside the flood response.

It is particularly important that certain departments are integrated into the disaster management structure, especially the Pakistan Meteorological Department (PMD). Currently, the PMD can predict weather patterns up to only four days in advance; weather radar systems are limited and they do not cover important coastal areas of Balochistan that are vulnerable to cyclones and often neglected. Increased investment in early warning systems could save countless lives and prevent large-scale damage. This should go hand in hand with increased co-operation with the World Meteorological Organization, making use of its data to prepare weather forecasts and flood warnings.

The Federal Flood Commission’s role in the flood protection system also needs strengthening. At the moment there is a lack of clarity among even FFC officials about the commission’s responsibilities in its role in vetting public sector development programmes. The FFC’s co-ordination with provincial irrigation departments seems weak and needs to be reinforced. Meanwhile, the Emergency Relief Cell (ERC), housed in the Cabinet Division, continues to exist despite its role being taken over by the NDMA. The recommendation of the Cabinet Committee in 2009 to absorb the ERC into the NDMA should be implemented without delay to improve the performance of the disaster relief machinery, save money, and prevent duplication of roles.
Part-time role of other line ministries
Other government departments, such as Communication and Works, Health, Food, Agriculture and Livestock, and Planning and Development, also play significant roles in disaster response, especially at provincial and district levels. However, their roles are not clearly defined and their involvement is usually confined to response, rather than active engagement in disaster risk management. Provincial governments could support the NDMA, UNDP, and the World Food Programme (WFP) as part of the One UN pilot project on DRM, to ensure that there are emergency response focal points in each line ministry who receive training on DRR, humanitarian principles, and the dilemmas that face decision makers in emergency response.

Proliferating bodies
In recent months the mandate of the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) has been renewed and expanded to include reconstruction activity in post-earthquake scenarios throughout Pakistan. ERRA will now be known as ‘The National Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority’ and its PKR 246m ($2.86m) budget far exceeds that of the NDMA – PKR 94m ($1.09m) – in this year’s allocations. The anticipated relationship between the NDMA, as the apex federal body dealing with all types of disaster in Pakistan, and the new NRRA requires further clarification from the GoP.

Multiple legal frameworks
This time of change also provides a unique opportunity to review and harmonise the multiple legal frameworks governing disaster management in Pakistan. Current legislation includes, for example:

- ERA Act, March 2011
- National Disaster Management Act 2010
- Punjab Emergencies Service Act 2006
- Local Government Ordinance 2001
- National Calamities Act 1958
- Civil Defence Act 1952.

Local government: the missing link between disaster management authorities and local communities
As the immediate public service provider and first interface between the state and citizens, local governments should be at the heart of DRR strategies. Holding local elections and adopting a responsive governance approach that welcomes local initiatives and supports community-based programming would demonstrate the success of the de-centralised model. During the 2010 floods, the absence of elected local government machinery slowed down relief efforts and posed challenges for local ownership of reconstruction. As a result, District Co-ordination Officers (DCOs) – who are subject to rotation and often not from the local area – were tasked with leading and co-ordinating the disaster response as an additional responsibility on top of managing day-to-day administrative affairs of the district. Feedback from the field makes it quite plain that DCO-headed DDMAs are not functioning effectively. However, there are some exceptions where DCOs have shown great leadership and have saved lives – for example, in Layyah, South Punjab, where Oxfam has been working with partner organisations on community-based disaster risk management (CBDRM) for the past several years (see Box 4). It is important that PDMAs support district governments to come up with clear and concise district-level plans that ensure the full participation of communities at risk.
Box 4: Decisive DCO leadership

Oxfam’s partner, Doaba Foundation, has been active in community-based disaster risk reduction in the city of Layyah, South Punjab since 2005. According to Doaba’s Executive Director Liaqat Tamimi, when the agency alerted the local DCO to the floods last year, he promptly gathered district officials and members of civil society organisations together at the first protective embankment to address the situation. Seeing that water levels at the Chasma barrage were too high and threatened to damage the city, the DCO inspected the bund protection points, then called the army to protect the first of these and to fortify the second. This prompt action and the leadership shown by the DCO prevented Layyah from being inundated.

Disaster preparedness post-devolution

The 18th Amendment and the 7th National Finance Commission (NFC) Award together will ensure an increased transfer of federal funds to the provinces, giving them considerable financial leeway to strengthen and fund DRM measures at provincial and district levels. Considerable lobbying efforts should be mounted by civil society and media to encourage provincial governments to fund and strengthen their disaster management authorities.

There are no specific allocations for DDMAs at the moment in district budgets, as they are not separate entities but rather consist of representatives from each of the relevant departments of the district government, with the DCO leading. Many humanitarian actors and government officials themselves are concerned by this. Current proposals include a minimum of 2 per cent of the district budget to be allocated to DDMAs to set up independent and permanent staffs. The PDMAs are in the process of finalising financial appropriations with a provision for this target. However, there are concerns that poor and disaster-prone districts such as Rajanpur and Muzaffargarh in Punjab and Naseerabad in Balochistan may miss this target if not supported adequately by provincial governments. Investing over the long term really works. The Kashmir earthquake of 2005, which killed over 75,000 people, was not much greater in magnitude than Japan’s Great Hanshin earthquake of 1995, which killed 6,000 people. Why the difference? Since the 1950s, Japan has consistently spent around 1 per cent of its annual budget on disaster counter-measures.

‘There is a need for a stronger DDMA at district level. The district government has no resources to manage any emergency.’

Executive District Officer, Sindh.
What needs to be done?

Make DRR a political priority
The biennial review of the Hyogo Framework for Action in Geneva in May 2011 called for ‘increased investment in local action’. As outlined by Pakistan’s Prime Minister, there is an urgent need to move quickly on the country’s obligations to HFA at the district and union council levels. One significant way in which Pakistan could demonstrate its commitment would be to implement the Safer Cities, Schools and Hospitals campaign being run by ISDR. This was due to be launched in March 2011 but has been delayed.

Box 5: The Hyogo Framework for Action
In 2005, 168 governments agreed to adopt a ten-year plan known as the Hyogo Framework for Action. The Framework is based around the following five ‘priorities for action’ by 2015:

– Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation;
– Identify, assess, and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning;
– Use knowledge, innovation, and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels;
– Reduce the underlying risk factors;
– Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.

A fully functioning, well-resourced, and integrated disaster management system
Better-funded civilian disaster management authorities, equipped with permanent, trained staff with clearly delineated roles, would go a long way towards improving the system. Clarity on the ongoing constitutional changes as they relate to disaster management, reconstruction, and future humanitarian responses is urgently required, including recognition of the need for inter-provincial, national and regional co-operation on large-scale disasters. Different approaches in each province are a possibility, but all should outline how any decisions to alter or streamline relief agencies fit within the National Disaster Management Framework. This provides a strong opportunity for the overlapping roles of other departments to be reconciled. Mandates, roles, and responsibilities should be agreed upon by all actors involved at the district, provincial, and national levels and disseminated widely ahead of future emergencies.

Increased and sustained funding for disaster management
Pakistan should invest now to save lives and scarce resources later, avoiding the need for emergency taxation measures such as the recent floods tax. The government has recognised the limitations of providing relief by signing up to reducing underlying risk factors through the HFA and global targets to commit 1 per cent of all development funding to DRR. In general, public investment dwarfs humanitarian aid and can have a major impact in reducing risk if spent well. Disaster risk reduction principles should be incorporated into public investments to ensure that cost-effective measures
to reduce risks are included in all projects. Preparation pays: protecting development investments by donor governments and minimising impacts on livelihoods, businesses, and the economy generally.

Recent steps to broaden the domestic tax base are welcome, as currently only 2 per cent of the population pay income tax. However more attention must be paid to developing progressive tax measures which harness contributions from businesses and from those who can afford to pay. Measures passed in the latest budget, such as the revised general services tax which now adds 16 per cent onto the cost of a number of basic commodities, is likely to disproportionately affect the poorest people at the same time as they are trying to rebuild their livelihoods. Progressive tax strategies must continue to be pursued.

Disaster management authorities – at federal, provincial, and district levels – should be provided with adequate, sustained funding and dedicated staff. The DNA recommends an initial outlay of $27m into DRM by the GoP, which would include short-term steps to analyse the existing parallel bodies and propose assimilation, technical assistance, and hardware support for disaster management bodies in 30 most vulnerable districts and longer term flood risk mapping. This should be followed up with sustained investment to extend the reach of such initiatives and the implementation of recommendations. With more resources now at their command, provinces must take active steps to invest in DRM and to adequately resource PDMAs and DDMAs. Budget allocations of the suggested 2 per cent minimum for DDMAs would indicate their commitment to this principle.

Strategic donor commitment for DRR in the long term
Aid does not just help to rebuild lives after floods and earthquakes – it helps to stop needless deaths before disasters strike. In Bangladesh, for example, international aid has helped local people protect themselves from natural disasters. Although the country’s population has almost doubled in 40 years, the toll from the biggest cyclones has plummeted. By 2007 the number of people killed by cyclones in Bangladesh had fallen to around 2 per cent of the number killed in 1991, saving 135,000 lives a year. When Cyclone Sidr struck in November 2007, an estimated 3.2 million Bangladeshis were evacuated from coastal areas and more than 2 million were already in special shelters. Pakistan now has a chance to move in this direction. The international community needs to assist the GoP to extend its disaster management reach and co-ordination. Its financial assistance package must be informed by the principle of enhancing civilian capacities at national, provincial, and district levels.

The donor group on DRR, which includes the World Bank and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), could lead on implementing the targets set at the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction in June 2009 and reiterated at the 2011 Platform, which indicated ways to reduce the number of deaths caused by disasters. Key among these is the establishment of clear national and international financial commitments to DRR – for example, to allocate a minimum of 10 per cent of all humanitarian reconstruction and recovery funding, and at least 1 per cent of development funding to be allocated to risk reduction measures, and at least 30 per cent of climate change adaptation funding to DRR.

Pakistan’s urgent recovery and reconstruction needs present an opportunity to look beyond the immediate and to insist upon systematic DRR and climate change adaptation to safeguard aid investments and to protect Pakistanis’
from future disasters. Donors should make such funding, particularly in the housing sector, conditional on the inclusion of DRR and climate change adaptation principles, with due attention paid to land and property rights and to gender considerations. Given the history of flawed development projects that have exacerbated disaster risks, donors must insist upon community participation in reconstruction efforts.

The International Development Committee in the UK queried how DFID’s massive increase in aid to Pakistan was going to improve disaster preparedness and response. DFID should respond by accepting the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR) recommendation to put DRR at the centre of its work and announce a new approach to DRR funding in light of these findings, and encourage other key donors, including the USA, Japan, and non-traditional donors outside the OECD, to do the same. Co-ordinated efforts across the donor community would enhance any individual approach, and the current divide between humanitarian and development funding decision making could be bridged in-country by formalising IFIs attendance in humanitarian donor meetings from the outset of disasters. Greater efforts to build domestic capacity necessarily entail a longer-term commitment involving multi-year funding, and donors should consider fundamental shifts in financing to ensure steady investment in DRR to help Pakistan achieve its commitments under the Hyogo Framework.

**Think ahead**

Mindsets at all levels have to change from a reactive to a preventative mode for all types of natural disaster, with more emphasis on domestic response preparedness and localised sustainable risk reduction measures in line with the principles laid out in the National Disaster Management Framework and the HFA. Some achievements have been made with the establishment of the NDMA and the PDMAs. National and regional media, together with civil society, have a crucial role to play in terms of awareness raising, filling gaps in information dissemination, and monitoring DRM structures at all levels.

**Make early warning systems less complex and more effective**

A well co-ordinated but less complex early warning system for floods (including flood forecasting and monitoring and dissemination of information to communities) is essential. The current flood management system only meets requirements for the Indus River flood plains in Punjab and Sindh. No system exists in KPK or Balochistan for forecasting or monitoring the flash floods that have become more frequent in these upstream areas are highly fragile and degraded, and require urgent attention in terms of rehabilitation. The national flood risk management strategy must address these gaps. Mapping out breaching points in embankments for safe release of flood water and designating them with a legal status would also provide predictability and accountability.

**Adapt to the changing climate**

Both Pakistani government officials and the UN have stated that climate change was one of the major contributing factors to the devastation caused by the 2010 floods. Sustainability concerns must be mainstreamed within reconstruction and development plans. Better understanding among local communities of the interdependence of local ecosystems, livelihood practices, and the risk thresholds that they face is also required. The Ministry of Environment recommends that Pakistan take immediate action on ecological degradation, including tackling the massive levels of deforestation,
improving early warning systems, and building disaster-resistant infrastructure; the Ministry can provide leadership to other departments in this regard. Commentators suggest that, to succeed, such initiatives should be taken in parallel with meaningful incentive structures.

**Effective humanitarian co-ordination**

Pakistan is a sovereign state with both the logistical capacity and the willingness to respond to humanitarian crises. From the outset of any response, the UN and NGOs must support its capacity to do so, and ensure this is based on humanitarian principles providing assistance based on need. Cluster lead agencies and sector working groups should actively encourage leadership and participation from government line ministries. In the event of further disasters, a multi-stakeholder transition plan should be prioritised from the outset. This process should be led by UN OCHA and should clearly acknowledge that moving from the humanitarian phase to the early recovery phase is not always a linear process; it should also outline how these phases would transition into a development framework.

**The international community needs to increase its accountability to communities**

Accountability mechanisms could be developed with local civil society to ensure that future responses address people’s needs and that this can also be monitored and documented. Coordination mechanisms should be opened up to civil society, and effective mechanisms put in place to report abuse of aid and means to obtain redress widely disseminated. Media have an important role to play in this regard by monitoring the quality and speed of the response and representing local communities’ perspectives to policy makers. INGOs and the UN should respond to the concerns of national NGOs by investing in building their capacity and by mitigating the defection of staff to better-paid positions within their own organisations by designing secondment programmes or collaborating with national NGOs on alternative solutions.

**Meaningful participation by communities and civil society, particularly women, is essential in all aspects of relief, recovery, and reconstruction**

The restoration of representative local government is vitally important in ensuring that community concerns are responded to. This would ensure that PDMAs and DDMAs are invested with political ownership. There are positive signs already. In some flood-affected districts, collaboration between civil society and DDMAs is growing, but this needs to be institutionalised and entrenched at all levels. Lessons must be learned from previous infrastructure projects funded by IFIs that have had devastating consequences for communities. The Left Bank Outfall Drain Project, the Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project, and the Taunsa Barrage Emergency Rehabilitation and Modernisation Project, in particular, serve as stark reminders of the implications of failing to consult communities when assessing social and environmental impacts. Assertive Pakistani media are well placed to act as a bridge to government by airing the concerns of affected communities and monitoring how their input is reflected in official policies. A participatory consultation workshop, called by the Federal Government in partnership with the provinces, to review the progress of the National Flood Reconstruction Plan would be a good starting point.

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‘At the first sign of floods, 20 trained volunteers helped in the evacuation of 60 families to three pre-identified villages in safer areas. Later, during the search and rescue process, the injured were given first aid treatment.’

Neleem Union Council, Pakistan-Administered Kashmir
Ensure that gender is truly mainstreamed from preparedness to reconstruction

Gender considerations should be mainstreamed into emergency preparedness, response, and reconstruction both by the GoP and the international community. This has been recognised in the National Flood Reconstruction Plan, which stresses ‘ensuring community participation, gender equity in the reconstruction priorities and women’s participation in the reconstruction work’. However, as yet there is little evidence of this approach actually being adopted by the GoP. The UN could ensure that agencies with a particular mandate on gender – such as UNFPA, UN Women, and UNDP – are fully involved, providing a strong gender analysis and perspectives on preparedness from the outset of any response.

Learning from community-based DRR

There is evidence that CBDRM is taking hold in Pakistan. Addressing the Global Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction in May 2011, the director of the NDMA described how, in order to build community resilience, the body has identified 50 of the most vulnerable districts and has begun building community capacities at grassroots level through union councils, in a comprehensive CBDRM programme. Initiatives of this sort must be supported by provincial governments, must be scaled up, and must prioritise the meaningful participation of women in particular.

Experience shows that the most effective response to disasters involves the people who are most affected. A small cluster of local communities from Pakistan-Administered Kashmir has set an inspiring example. Integrating mitigation tools and methods, village disaster management plans have been developed to minimise the impact of unforeseen disasters. Communities have enhanced their ability to respond through search and rescue and first aid trainings, and mock drills have been conducted to ensure preparedness and to strengthen early warning systems at community level. Disaster management committees have been established within communities and linked with DDMAs. The remarkable resilience and responsive approach of these villagers reinforces the need to build communities that can absorb shocks and recover. The solutions and the willingness to do so exist, and the GoP could scale up such projects across Pakistan.

Box 6: Communities building disaster management

‘We were warned about impending floods by people appointed by Oxfam and its partners. We gathered our important documents and food rations and were relocated to a safer area under their guidance. They gave us training, and as a result we kept our hopes high despite the fact that we have much less income and faced a great loss.’ Zarina Bibi, Vice President, Sehar Development Organisation, Kash Pura

‘The protective barrier that we had built valiantly fought the flash floods for three days … Up to 70 houses, 16 shops, a mosque, and the main road escaped destruction because of the retaining wall.’ Nazir Hussein, President, Chandni Development Organisation, Changan

‘The effectiveness of these trainings is mostly for women, because in emergencies men are mostly out at work and females are at home with their children … If they are not aware, how will they save lives? When the floods came I had already received training … I warned those people whose houses were near the river to evacuate as their lives could be at risk if the water level rose. Then we moved them to safer houses.’ Qasim Jann, Joint Secretary, Azim Development Organisation, Lawat Pian

‘Simple and inexpensive preparatory measures, particularly those implemented by communities themselves, can be extremely effective in limiting damage and saving lives when disaster strikes.’

DIPECHO Pakistan

‘The real heroes of our recent disasters are the millions of Pakistanis who stepped up to help their families and communities. Pakistan urgently needs damage mitigation strategies to lift the burden from their shoulders. Donors and the international community must ensure that resources reach those working on the ground to make disaster risk reduction a reality in Pakistan.’

Lieutenant General (retired) Nadeem Ahmed, then chairman of the NDMA, February 2011
5 Conclusion

The effects of the 2010 floods will haunt Pakistan for a long time to come. Many development gains made in recent decades were wiped out and communities were ravaged. The GoP and the international community mounted their largest ever humanitarian response, which has delivered vital assistance to millions, yet many of these investments stand to be lost in the 2011 monsoon season, due to inadequate funding and co-ordination of repairs to flood protection systems. Communities stand to lose everything – again.

Pakistan is highly disaster-prone, with two major disasters in the past five years alone, yet major losses are not inevitable. Excellent management policies exist to minimise the impact of disasters, but they are not being implemented on the ground, and during the floods huge gaps became apparent. This is not good enough, and it undermines efforts to help the economy to grow, to minimise food insecurity, and to improve social and political stability. The GoP must act now to save lives and resources in the future. Investments in civilian disaster management at national, provincial, and district levels will reap real benefits. Bringing communities into decision making processes will be crucial in ensuring sustainability. Hazards may be inevitable in Pakistan, and they will get worse due to climate change, rapid population growth, and poor urban management. This means that there will be more disasters. The question is: will Pakistan be prepared?
Notes

1 Federal Finance Minister, budget speech, June 2011.


3 In 2005, 168 governments adopted a ten-year plan known as the Hyogo Framework for Action. This is based on five ‘priorities for action’ by 2015 that aim to make countries better prepared and more resilient in relation to environmental shocks.

4 In the past four years, Pakistan has missed every tax and spending target. Total tax revenues declined to 9.8 per cent of GDP in FY2011 from 10.2 per cent in FY2010, and the country has one of the lowest tax-to-GDP ratios in the world. The reform agenda outlined by the Government of Pakistan (GoP) in its 2012 budget aims to simplify the tax structure and broaden the tax base, in line with the recommendations of the World Bank’s tax policy report. ‘Pakistan’s FY12 budget – Resource constraints bite’, analysis by Standard Chartered Bank, 7 June 2011.

5 Figure is taken from the ADB Post Earthquake Damage Needs Assessment, 12 November 2005, which estimated reconstruction from conflict at $5.2b, and the ADB Post Cyclone and Floods Damage Needs Assessment in Baluchistan and Sindh 2007 which estimated a further $674m. Although not a natural disaster, also note the financial burden of reconstruction from conflict outlined in the ADB Post Conflict Damage Needs Assessment December 2009 was $1.08b.

6 This figure is taken from ‘Pakistan Floods 2010: Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment’ by the Government of Pakistan, the World Bank, and Asian Development Bank, November 2010. The new budget for FY2011/12 is $43bn, as announced by the Federal Finance Minister in June 2011.

7 National Assembly expenses allocated for 432 MPs amounts to $36m in the 2009/10 and 2010/11 budgets.

8 Pakistan Floods 2010: Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment’, op.cit. (Annex 2 on DRM)


10 About 58 per cent of the overall housing damage was sustained in Sindh, followed by Punjab (20 per cent), and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (14 per cent). National Flood Reconstruction Plan, p.44.


12 Informal discussions with key donors, Islamabad, June 2011.

13 Oxfam uses the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN ISDR) definition of DRR: ‘The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lesserened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events.’

14 Oxfam advocacy field visit to Dadu, April 2011. The District Co-ordination Officer (DCO) reported being lobbied strongly by communities for inputs from certain agencies.

15 The Federal Floods Commission report in June 2011 indicated that the Planning Commission has a core portfolio of priority projects worth PKR 277bn ($3.23 bn) over the next three years, but notes that this is conditional on external funding from donors (p.xxi).

16 Option 1, costing PKR 578bn ($6.8bn) proposes the replacement of lost infrastructure and the restoration of livelihood, trade, and business activities; Option 2, costing PKR 630bn ($7.4bn) represents ‘build back better’; while Option 3, costing PKR 758bn ($8.9 bn) involves building back better/safer with special emphasis on housing, irrigation, and infrastructure for agriculture and for future flood protection.

17 National Flood Reconstruction Plan, op.cit. p.iii.

18 Ibid., p.10.

19 The government sharply curtailed the federal Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) to 3.5 per cent of GDP (‘ADB Outlook for Pakistan 2011’). Balochistan, plans to spend only 19 per cent of its budget on development in this fiscal year, 10 per cent less than last year. By contrast, Punjab plans 33 per cent, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa 34 per cent, and Sindh a little over 25 per cent. The Express Tribune, 22 June 2011. http://tribune.com.pk/story/193413/budget-2011-12-rs164-5b-outlay-for-balochistan/

20 The 18th Amendment to the Constitution was passed just weeks before the floods hit. It enshrined a devolution process passing powers to the provinces from the centre that is set to radically alter the country’s governance structures.

21 Interview with Planning Commission Reconstruction Unit, July 2011

22 Only 17 per cent of reconstruction work will be carried out by the federal government; the rest will be done by the provinces. Presentation on the implications of the 18th Amendment, Amjad Bhatti, School of Political and Strategic Communications, Islamabad, May 2011.


24 http://www.planningcommission.gov.pk/


26 Discussion with Sindh Planning Department, 29 March 2011.

27 The Watan card scheme is a government compensation package originally worth PKR 100,000 ($1,164) per flood-affected household, delivered via ATM machines. http://watancard.nadra.gov.pk/
As a government institution, Pakistan Post provides a viable option to deliver cash (which is insured in transit) to those most in need. The system is already in place, rural populations in particular are familiar with it, and access could be increased this way. Analysis provided by consultant for the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) in Pakistan, June 2011.

Ibid.

Conversations that Oxfam and its partners have had with flood-affected people have highlighted cases where landlords have forced people to return to their land as bonded labourers and have taken debt repayments from Watan card funds. The majority of people who have returned are finding it difficult to build back damaged or destroyed houses due to the lack of resources and the difficulty of getting landlords’ consent.

Briefing Paper on Flood-Displaced Women in Sindh Province, Pakistan, International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), June 2011.


Article 15 of the Constitution of Pakistan states: ‘Every citizen shall have the right to remain in, and, subject to any reasonable restriction imposed by law in the public interest, enter and move freely throughout Pakistan and to reside and settle in any part thereof.’ Additionally, the IASC Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement make it clear that IDPs should have a choice in the selection of options.


South Asia is the worst region globally for acute and chronic malnutrition. UNICEF’s annual State of the World’s Children report publishes up-to-date malnutrition figures. http://www.unicef.org/sowc/

By 2009, almost 50 per cent of the population, or 83 million people, were food-insecure, up from 38 per cent in 2003. In the aftermath of the flooding, a UN-led assessment of the impact of the disaster on progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) tentatively suggested that this number could have risen to almost 94 million.

http://www.wfp.org/countries/Pakistan/Overview

Pakistan & Gulf Economist, April 2011.


In 2010–11 Pakistan recorded the lowest GDP growth rate, 2.4 per cent, of any country in South Asia, but its population grew by 2.1 per cent, the highest rate in the region adding more pressure on meagre resources the country has. http://tribune.com.pk/story/181448/last-in-economic-first-in-population-growth/


Pakistan is ranked the third most dangerous country in the world on the basis of ‘cultural, tribal and religious practices harmful to women’. Pakistan is not on the list merely because of its high rate of physical violence towards women – it is because ‘basic human rights are systematically denied to women’. http://www.trust.org/trustlaw/news/special-coverage-the-worlds-most-dangerous-countries-for-women


Pakistan Humanitarian and Early Recovery Overview (HERO), 17 March 2011.

Pakistan Floods 2010: Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment’, op. cit.

The incomplete coverage of the kachha areas has been acknowledged by the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA), which has said that it will take measures to address this gap. It is also widely reported that durable construction was barred by law in the kachha areas. ‘Pakistan Floods 2010: Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment’, p.157.

Supreme Court Decision on the Flood Commission’s Report, 7 June 2011.

The ADB’s recent publication, ‘Involuntary Resettlement Safeguards. A Planning and Implementation Source Book’ (March 2011), provides more guidance. It states that assistance should be extended, even to those without formal legal rights. (p.5). http://www.adb.org/documents/policies/safeguards/i-good-practices-sourcebook/default.asp


Ibid., p.42.


Guidelines on the HLP concerns were signed off by the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) last year, but these are not widely known or applied, as they were never translated into practical recommendations of use to implementing organisations.

Pakistan Humanitarian and Early Recovery Overview (HERO), op.cit..

The NDMA determined that the emergency phase should end on 31 January 2011 for most of the country, and on 31 March for five remaining districts. The GOP, with the support of UNDP, would lead and co-ordinate the recovery phase in only the 29 most affected districts.
Similar protests have since March in Sindh.

Leakages plugged by the villagers; no irrigation staff available on the site.

1) 2km wide breaches in Shank Bund in Ghotki. Administration unable to plug breaches. Villagers have started moving to safer places.

2) KK Bund in Kandhkot eroded by river water. Repair work not completed.

3) Haibat bund in Kandhkot not strengthened. Two gas fields might be flooded if bunds not repaired.

4) Nara Canal at Tajjal Minor (District Khairpur) being eroded. 300 villages will be flooded if the bund is breached.

5) 36-foot breach in Begari Canal in District Jacobabad. Three villages under flood water.

6) Land erosion by the River Indus near Piyalo. Hundreds of acres of agricultural land under water. Villagers state that repair and maintenance work on the Ultra bund is slow and unsatisfactory.

7) Leakages in Rohri canal at Naushehro Feroz district. Four villages under water. Villagers migrating to safer places. Leakages plugged by the villagers; no irrigation staff available on the site.

Reports received from Oxfam GB field teams trying to access Kalam, June 2011.

Pakistan Inter Agency Contingency Plan for the Monsoon Season, May 2011.

A bund is a flood defence embankment (similar to a levee or dyke) built alongside a river course.

An inter-provincial meeting chaired by the Water and Power Minister concluded that ‘restoration works were far from satisfactory’ and called for all work to be completed by 15 July. Provinces each reported how much of the necessary repair work they had completed: Sindh 62 per cent, Gilgit Baltistan 60 per cent, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 65 per cent, Punjab 85 per cent, and Balochistan 80 per cent. Pakistani-Administered Kashmir reported hardly any work completed to date. http://www.dawn.com/2011/07/01/provinces-fail-to-prepare-for-monsoon.html

Irrigation infrastructure in Sindh suffered the greatest damage (49 per cent of the total), followed by KPK (25 per cent), Punjab (12 per cent), and Balochistan (11 per cent). Overall, 44 per cent of the damage was to canal systems, 36 per cent to flood embankments, 10 per cent to barrages and headworks, 7 per cent to drainage systems, and 3 per cent to other infrastructure. National Flood Reconstruction Plan, p.28.

Reports from CBHA partners and Oxfam field staff in Sindh, June 2011.


Interview with ADB, 6 April 2011.

The Tribune Express, 26 June 2011. people protested against the slow pace of repair work on dykes in Southern Punjab. Similar protests have since March in Sindh

Daily Kawish, 8 June 2011.

hCT Inter Agency Contingency Plan for the Monsoon Season, Pakistan’, May 2011, p.6.

Oxfam case study reports on DDMAs in Sindh and KPK, June 2011.

The last census conducted in Pakistan was in 1998. Another was due in 2008, but has been delayed to date. http://www.planningcommission.gov.pk/nda/areas_of_growth.htm

hCT Inter Agency Contingency Plan for the Monsoon Season’, op cit., p.6.

Inter Agency Contingency Plan for KPK and FATA, April–October 2011.

Refer to UN lessons learned from the response to Mohmand displacement, FATA earlier in 2011, which outlined key standards for UN HCT in the event of a similar scenario (Kurrum). For more details on humanitarian relief to conflict-affected IDPs in Northern Pakistan during previous conflicts and the challenges of providing impartial aid, see Oxfam briefing paper, ‘Missing Pieces: Assessing the impact of humanitarian reform in Pakistan’ (2009), http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/conflict_disasters/missing-pieces-humanitarian-pakistan.html

A review of disaster management policies and systems in Pakistan, World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, 2005.


Patchy information is available on Balochistan, but integrated information is hard to obtain. The Balochistan PDMA is so underfunded that it does not have a website. The UN Humanitarian and Early Recovery Overview (HERO) published in March 2011 does not cover Balochistan in any detail, as it does KPK, Punjab, and Sindh.

Floods Commission Report, op.cit.

The new Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Act came into force in March 2011.
It made this call against a backdrop of limited and fragmented implementation of the Framework and said that Oxfam is working on CBDRM with partner organisations in 50 vulnerable villages in South Punjab.

The Sindh PDMA has put in a request to the provincial government for a grant of PKR 500m ($5.82 m) to be used to train emergency responders in the province. The Government of Sindh has recently proposed to the Sindh Assembly the amalgamation of its relief department, the DDMAs, into a new department called the Rehabilitation Department, and placed the Sindh Ministry of Rehabilitation and Disaster Management (Laal Baloch, ‘Merger of four relief, disaster departments planned’, The Dawn, 23 June 2011).

The GoP has not faced much criticism for the implementation of the Framework, probably since it has been widely understood that there was no money available. However, it is widely expected that the DDMAs would receive 2 per cent of the district budget for disaster management, as Muzzafar Shujra, Sindh’s minister for rehabilitation, quoted in The Dawn, 8 May 2011.

Different financial frameworks for different types of disaster are being considered and both the provincial and (if required) federal governments would contribute to solidify DRR and other disaster-related frameworks. However, 2 per cent is the minimum figure that every district is expected to put aside.

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It made this call against a backdrop of limited and fragmented implementation of the Framework and said that a paradigm shift was needed. Only when we do join hands – listening, forming partnerships, involving everyone, building clear understanding of needs and resources and working together to secure them – will we achieve consistent and effective ‘investment in local action’. Global Network for Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction. http://www.globanetwork-dr.org/voices-from-the-frontline-2011/vfl-2011-final-report-web-version.html


The Humanitarian Response to the Floods, International Development Committee, 10 May 2011.

The HERR calls for DFID to ‘[e]nsure that building resilience is part of the core DFID programme in at risk countries, integrating the threat from climate change and other potential hazards into Disaster Risk Reduction’, March 2011.

Climate change will cause more frequent and extreme floods in future, and this needs to be taken into account in reviewing structural designs and maintenance requirements. National Flood Reconstruction Plan, p.28. See also Nathaniel Gronewold and Climatewire (2010) ‘Climate change, deforestation and corruption combine to drown Pakistan’, Scientific American, 13 October 2010. http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=climate-change-9

The ADB has indicated interest in the strategic integration of climate change adaptation into its Environmental Impact Assessment processes. However, the ADB’s assistance to Pakistan, even though it is over a ten-year pipeline, is likely to fall under the Emergency Lending Policy, which means that some of the requirements of safeguard policies could be cut short. ADB Annual Meeting, Haro, 3–6 May 2011.


Pakistan will be forestless by 2025 under current degradation rates. Sustainability concerns must be internalised in national project planning. Moreover, stringent but practically implementable rules and regulations to ensure sustainable development practices must be developed. A key measure in this regard would be to mandate ex-ante integrated assessments of all national development policies. Moeed Yusuf, Dawn (Islamabad), 16 August 2010. http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/theneurpaper/editorial/after-disaster-strikes-680.

Most examples of governments tackling DRR come from nations or cities where popular pressure and political reforms have made local governments more accountable and responsive to their citizens. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, ‘World Disasters Report 2010’. The Sindh government’s decision in its 2011 budget to increase funding for local government from PKR 120.8bn ($1.4bn) to PKR 135bn ($1.57bn) is a welcome step. The Tribune Express, 11 June 2011.

For example, the Left Bank Outfall Drain Project aimed to provide enhanced drainage for irrigated agriculture on the left bank of the Indus River. Following a complaint by local communities in 2005, the project was investigated by the World Bank Inspection Panel. The Panel found that the Bank had failed to follow its own resettlement policy in preparing for the
possibility of displacement, and that the project had resulted in loss of life and damage to livelihoods, heightened risks of flooding, increased salinity of agricultural land, and reduced and contaminated water supplies.

109 National Flood Reconstruction Plan, op.cit.

110 Amir Mohyuddin, Director, NDMA. http://www.preventionweb.net/globalplatform/2011/programme/statements/

111 Following the 2005 Kashmir earthquake, in 2007 Oxfam launched a wide-ranging three-year project funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to support the recovery and rehabilitation process in Neelum, Bagh, and Haveli districts. Implemented by local partner Strengthening Participatory Organization, the project is currently targeting 30 villages and reaching out to over 10,000 direct beneficiaries and 30,000 indirect beneficiaries in the region. Women comprise 80 per cent of the beneficiaries.

112 For more examples of DRR success stories, see Oxfam’s short video ‘Lessons of Experience’. Parts 1 and 2 available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z2DNgz7cuyQ and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vHfdAddh36Q
Annex 1: Key departments with a role in disaster management in Pakistan, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Issues/gaps</th>
<th>Action required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal Flood Commission (FFC)</td>
<td>Set up in 1977, the FCC is the lead agency designed to support the provincial irrigation management system. It also reviews flood management plans.</td>
<td>The FCC did not activate any kind of flood overview committee during the 2010 floods. The FCC has not developed an integrated national flood management plan.</td>
<td>The FCC needs to ensure better co-ordination with provincial irrigation departments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Meteorological Department (PMD)</td>
<td>Established in 1947, the PMD is responsible for generating weather forecasts. It gathers and analyses data from its various observation stations around the country, and transmits data to the Flood Forecasting Division. The PMD generally issues its first monsoon warning in June.</td>
<td>The PMD predicted a normal monsoon season in June 2010. The PMD’s weather radar range does not extend to coastal areas of Balochistan. It has limited capacity, with weather forecasting predictions of only four days in advance. Weak linkages with international meteorological organisations.</td>
<td>Increased investment in early warning systems and expansion of radar systems to areas currently not covered, such as Balochistan. Enhance its capacity to predict weather far in advance of disasters. Enhanced collaboration with international meteorological organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flood Forecasting Division (FFD)</td>
<td>A subsidiary of PMD, the FFD receives and analyses hydro/meteorological data, and prepares and disseminates flood forecasts and early warnings.</td>
<td>Weather forecasts are often inaccurate, as was the case in the 2010 floods.</td>
<td>The FFD needs to update its weather forecasting system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA)</td>
<td>Set up in 1958, WAPDA is responsible for the development and maintenance of reservoirs to develop water and power resources. It contributes to flood management by collecting flood data at various locations in the Indus river system and sharing it with the FFD.</td>
<td>WAPDA needs to enhance its collaboration with the FFD to improve the accuracy of early warning systems.</td>
<td>WAPDA needs to actively develop more water reservoirs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Indus River Commission (IRC)</td>
<td>The IRC receives river flow and rainfall data from India, which is then fed to the FFD for forecasting purposes.</td>
<td>The IRC’s contribution to flood warning system depends upon India. However, this relationship may be affected by political tensions between the two countries.</td>
<td>The positive cooperation between India and Pakistan regarding early warning should be strengthened further by exchange visits and more direct information exchange between the irrigation authorities of both the countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Relief Cell (ERC)</td>
<td>Set up in the 1970s and housed in the Cabinet Division, the agency co-ordinates relief provision.</td>
<td>The ERC is still functioning although it was made redundant after the formation of the NDMA.</td>
<td>The ERC should be merged into the NDMA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dams Safety Council</td>
<td>The Dams Safety Council was set up in 1987 to undertake periodic inspection of dams and to suggest enlargement, modifications, or repairs.</td>
<td>Minor yet important player in technical issues related to dams, which have a bearing on the flood management system. Lack of community voice in the current structures.</td>
<td>Needs to involve communities in dams and barrage safety plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil Defence Department (CDD)</strong></td>
<td>Created through the 1952 Civil Defence Act, the department assists other response agencies in relief and rescue efforts.</td>
<td>Under-resourced as a 1 per cent dedicated budget for CDD in each district at local government level has been discontinued. Limited rural outreach.</td>
<td>CDD can greatly help the GoP in fulfilling HFA obligations by enhancing its role in awareness-raising. CDDs need to be well capacitated to meet its potential.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Pakistan Army</strong></td>
<td>The Pakistan Army is constitutionally obligated to come to the aid of civilian authorities in times of disaster. Because of its extremely well-resourced capacity, the army has played a major role in all disasters.</td>
<td>Too much reliance on the Army’s support in relief and rescue can potentially harm the development of well-resourced and credible civilian disaster management authorities.</td>
<td>Better co-ordination between the Army and civilian disaster management structure, limited to rescue and relief.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This paper was written by Arif Azad and Helen McElhinney. Thanks are due to Oxfam colleagues who contributed to its development, particularly Shaheen Chuhtai, Javeria Afzal, Noreen Khalid, Neva Khan, Wajihah Anwar, Ifitkar Khalid, Michel Anglade, Mubashir Akram, Caroline Gluck, Rebecca Wynn, Kate O’Rourke, Debbie Hillier, Michael Bailey and Aimee Ansari. This report is part of a series of papers on Pakistan written to inform public debate on development and humanitarian policy issues.

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