MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BUSAN PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT

Why “Global Light” and “Country-Focussed” Must Work Together Effectively

Study prepared for Actionaid, Concord, Oxfam, Save the Children and UK Aid Network by:

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1 The views presented here are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the organisations that funded this study
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (BPEDC) of December 2011 identifies global and national, inclusive and mutual accountability for the effectiveness and results of development cooperation, as key priorities. It commits to:

a) “At the level of individual developing countries, agree on frameworks based on national needs and priorities for monitoring progress and promoting mutual accountability” (¶ 35a)

b) “Agree, by June 2012, on a selective and relevant set of indicators and targets through which we will monitor progress” (¶ 35b)

The Post-Busan Interim Group (PBIG) is now deciding how to take these commitments forward.

This study presents evidence from partner countries and civil society organizations on progress in inclusive mutual accountability, and challenges to further progress. In addition to desk research, it draws on 3 country case studies (Ghana, Mozambique, Rwanda) and a survey to which 22 countries responded. Based on these, it recommends the best approaches and tools to advance “light-touch” global accountability and accelerate progress at national level. In particular, it analyses links between global and national progress, and shows how a “light” – but strong - global framework must exist for accountability at country level to advance.

1. Progress and Challenges in Promoting National-Level Mutual Accountability

The Paris Declaration and UN Development Cooperation Forum surveys show very limited progress on national level mutual accountability, with only 15% of countries holding donors accountable as a group, and only 4% holding donors individually accountable. This study’s survey of the most advanced countries shows 93% see a strong Paris Declaration framework as having been essential to getting agreement on national MA, and to designing and agreeing the indicators and targets for donor monitoring frameworks. In addition, 86% see it as vital to agreeing a monitoring process, and 67% to building government capacity to monitor/analyse. All countries which tried to go beyond Paris indicators (to include AAA or nationally-relevant indicators) said this was much more difficult, indicating that “a Busan framework needs to be as broad as possible to avoid donors excluding things which are vital to national development.”

The main challenge to further national-level progress is identified by partner countries, CSOs, donor officials and independent monitors as “lack of political commitment by donors”. Secondary factors are capacity of the relevant government agencies, and technical/definitional issues. None of the groups consulted see lack of political commitment by partners as key.

2. Progress and Challenges in Promoting Stakeholder Inclusion

Latest Development Cooperation Forum analysis suggests only 6% of countries have seen high progress in including non-executive stakeholders in national-level processes, on development and aid results. In this study, partner governments and civil society coalitions reported that in countries where MA is most advanced, inclusion is stronger. CSOs participate in lower-level technical working groups in 82% of countries, and speak at annual high-level forums in 82%. However, they provide analytical inputs in only 50%, and participate in agenda-setting structures in only 18%. While CSOs are reasonably well-represented (in 91% of countries), as are private
sector organizations and parliament (67%), trade unions (50%) and women’s groups (43%) are much less present, with community groups (17%) barely represented at all. There is a strong need to ensure that stakeholder groups are represented on agenda-setting committees, to increase their technical/analytical inputs, and to broaden representation beyond CSOs.

CSO respondents see the main challenge to further progress as lack of political will by partner (90%) and donor (89%) governments. Their own capacity/resource constraints are also vital (60%), but lack of interest by many CSO coalition members is less important (40%). The global framework needs to measure MA progress using a strong inclusion indicator to overcome these barriers. Another key factor will be making MA results more transparent: currently results are discussed with CSOs in 56% of countries, accessible by internet in 40%, made available to media in 38%, and presented to parliament in only 25%, severely limiting transparency on aid results.

3. Recommendations for Post-Busan Monitoring Negotiations

Partner country respondents reaffirm their commitment to advance national-level MA, with their top priority being to reinforce indicators and targets for monitoring. When asked what they need most from PBIG negotiations to make this happen, 96% emphasize that the crucial pillar is a strong framework of indicators and targets to replace the Paris Declaration (though there should be room to add indicators at national level, tailored to country circumstances). They also emphasize the need for the global process to agree strong measures to provide technical support to build their monitoring and analysis capacity.

The other key priority is to continue with a regular global survey and international top-level meetings to discuss progress in making aid more effective in producing development results. Several respondents stress that changes in policies, business practices and performance incentives at donor HQs have proven crucial in ensuring more rapid change by a few donors, as emphasized also by the Paris Declaration Evaluation. These are much more easily provoked by global monitoring and discussion which attracts top-level discussion. The alternative of aggregating national-level results will not work – partly because it will receive less attention at top level, and partly because (as MA is occurring in only 20 countries, and assessing performance by individual donors in only 4) its results will be much less informative/useful.

In terms of priority issues to monitor, partner governments and CSOs share 13, listed below in the recommendations. Additional priority areas for CSOs are human rights and civil society space (both linked to the enabling environment). Respondents give lower priority to some Paris/Rome issues on harmonisation (joint donor missions/analysis) and project implementation units, arguing they can be covered by programme-based approaches/country systems.

It is vital to note that half to two-thirds of these indicators could be monitored via existing data and processes including: the UNDCF/UNDP MA and transparency survey, DAC reporting, IATI, PEFA and CPIA. Only around 1/3 to half would require a post-Busan survey. In addition, further improvements in national-level aid information management systems (AIMS) and national MA processes, could render global surveys unnecessary by 2015.
Partner country governments and stakeholders recommend 6 key steps for PBIG negotiations to take to reinforce prospects for successful national-level mutual accountability:

- **Recommendation 1.** Agree an ambitious framework which includes the most critical commitments prioritised by partner country governments and CSOs, ie:
  - Mutual accountability for results of development strategies and aid
  - Multi-year forecasts and in-year predictability of disbursements
  - Strengthen and increase use of country systems (M&E, PFM and procurement)
  - Use of Programme-Based Approaches, especially focussing on budget support
  - Inclusive national processes for assessing aid impact on development results
  - Transparency of aid
  - Untying of aid
  - Reducing Fragmentation and Division of Labour
  - Aid oriented to gender equality
  - Enabling Environment for Civil Society
  - Aid being on-budget/on-plan
  - Reducing Conditionality
  - Coordinated capacity-building rather than technical assistance
  - Human Rights

- **Recommendation 2.** Ensure that this framework is implemented in a “global light” way, by maximizing use of existing data and survey processes, including regular UNDCF/UNDP MA and transparency surveys, DAC reporting, and IATI/PEFA/CPIA assessments; and a light global survey every two years; and accelerate progress on automatic reporting of indicators to national-level AIMS and national-level MA processes so as to reduce the survey over time.

- **Recommendation 3.** Establish an architecture which continues regular global surveys of progress on making development cooperation more effective in achieving results, and regular ministerial-level discussions of the results of these surveys.

- **Recommendation 4.** Establish a global code of conduct containing basic standards for engagement by all development cooperation providers and partner stakeholder groups in national MA processes, with a strong emphasis on partner country leadership.

- **Recommendation 5.** Establish a facility overseen by the Global Partnership’s Building Block on Accountability and Results, to support capacity building for monitoring and analysis of donor and partner government performance, to act on demand from partner country governments, global stakeholder organizations such as IPU/AWEPA, Better Aid and ITUC, and national-level representative stakeholder coalitions.

- **Recommendation 6.** Deepen and annualise the monitoring of progress being conducted by the UN Development Cooperation Forum, by including the monitoring of accountability for development results, and of inclusion of non-state actors, based on a further-refined mutual accountability indicator to be included in the post-Busan framework.
1. Introduction

Over the last decade, approaches to accountability for effective development cooperation have evolved to appreciate that mutuality between donors and partner country governments (since the 2005 Paris Declaration) and inclusion of all national partner country stakeholders (since the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action) are indispensable. Yet the Paris Declaration Evaluation and UN Development Cooperation Forum surveys have shown that progress has been very slow.

The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (BPEDC) of December 2011 again identifies mutual accountability and inclusive partnerships as key priorities. It commits to:

a) “At the level of individual developing countries, agree on frameworks based on national needs and priorities for monitoring progress and promoting mutual accountability” (BPEDC, 35a)

b) “Agree, by June 2012, on a selective and relevant set of indicators and targets through which we will monitor progress” (BPEDC 35b)

A Post-Busan Interim Group is currently deciding how to take these commitments forward.

This study\(^2\) presents evidence from partner countries and civil society organizations on progress in inclusive mutual accountability, and challenges to further progress. In particular, it analyses the links between global frameworks and national level progress, to assess how a “light” global framework and accountability focused at country level can best work together.\(^3\)

In addition to desk research, it draws on three country case studies (Ghana, Mozambique and Rwanda) and a survey covering an additional 23 countries, to which 22 countries responded.\(^4\)

Based on these, the study recommends the best approaches and tools to advance “light-touch” global accountability and ensure continued progress at national level.

\(^2\) Commissioned by Action Aid, Concord, Oxfam and Save the Children via the UK Aid Network, and written by Matthew Martin and Richard Watts of Development Finance International, and Gideon Rabinowitz of UKAN.

\(^3\) This study is limited to national-level processes and does not include community-level processes.

\(^4\) These countries were chosen for being the most advanced in their national MA processes, as identified by the UN DCF, because the aim was to see what had helped them make this progress. As of 16 April, the survey had been sent to 55 potential respondents in 23 countries, and 33 from 22 countries had replied.
2. Progress and Challenges in Promoting Mutual Accountability

2.1 What Progress Has Been Made?
The UN DCF’s 2010 and 2011 surveys provide the most comprehensive analysis of progress in national mutual accountability. They have assessed 105 countries, with sobering results. As Table 1 shows, only 15% of countries have basic mutual accountability in the sense of collective indicators and targets for donors as a group. The DCF shows that holding donors individually responsible for targets is most effective in changing their behaviour, but this occurs in only 4 countries, though 9 more are moving in this direction. In addition, the DCF found that only 9 countries had donor indicators which were broader than the Paris Monitoring Survey indicators.

Table 1: DCF findings on mutual accountability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Mutual Accountability</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only collective donor indicators + targets in place</td>
<td>16 (15%)</td>
<td>89 (85%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual donor indicators + targets monitored</td>
<td>4 (4%)</td>
<td>101 (96%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor targets beyond the Paris indicator</td>
<td>9 (9%)</td>
<td>96 (91%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2 What Caused the Progress?
The survey conducted by this report focused on the impact of a global monitoring framework, with conclusive results (figure 1). The existence of the Paris Framework was
- Vital to designing and agreeing the indicators for donor monitoring frameworks (93%), to getting agreement that mutual accountability at national level was desirable and feasible (87%), and to designing and agreeing the targets related to those indicators (80%);
- Very important (73%) to agreeing on a process and frequency of national-level monitoring, and important (62%) in ensuring support for building government technical capacity to monitor donors.

One partner country response outlines the importance of the Paris framework clearly;

“The Paris framework was crucial to getting donors to agree that they should be monitored.”

Figure 1 - In what way did the Paris monitoring framework help you to negotiate the donor commitments / indicators / targets included in your national Aid Policy?
In relation to establishing indicators for national monitoring, those respondents whose frameworks tried to include indicators going beyond the Paris Declaration suggested it was easier to agree indicators for in-country frameworks that are part of the Paris framework, as opposed to other commitments under Paris (100%), and Accra or other in-country policy issues (85%) (see figure 2). There was marginally more flexibility to include Accra Agenda and national indicators than to include PD commitments which were not part of the PD framework.

One typical quote from a partner country was that:

“All three were more difficult, but especially things which were in Accra without precise commitments, like transparency and multi-year predictability. We managed to push donors to agree most of the indicators we wanted, on the grounds that the issues had been strongly mentioned in PD or AAA. But we had to drop detailed indicators on things which were important at national level, like reducing counterpart funds, because donors insisted they went beyond PD/AAA. This means that the Busan framework needs to be as broad as possible to avoid donors excluding things which are vital to national development.”

Figure 2 – It was more difficult to secure agreement from donors to include in national monitoring framework donor commitment/indicator/targets on:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paris commitments not addressed in Paris Monitoring Survey</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accra Agenda for Action commitments</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy issues you have prioritised outside of international agreements</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3. What are the Obstacles to Further Progress?

The main challenge identified in making further progress at the national level (figure 3) is lack of political commitment by donors (scoring 3.5 out of 4, indicating that virtually all respondents rank it as the most important obstacle). This was summed up well by one respondent:

“The commitment of donors varies a lot, with a handful of donors being very committed, but the majority lack interest even in getting information right for the monitoring process.”

5 It should be noted that 59% of countries did not even try to include indicators beyond the PD ones, as their monitoring frameworks were designed to be “localisation of the Paris framework”.
The other key challenges are the capacity of the relevant government agencies (2.7 out of 4) and technical issues with indicator definitions (2.4 out of 4). Political commitment by partner governments is not seen as a major obstacle (1.8). It might be thought that this reflects a bias by partner country officials, but responses received from 5 donor coordinators and independent monitors in the countries which are most advanced in their national MA frameworks, also identify lack of donor political commitment as the most important (and as becoming even more important since 2010), and lack of partner commitment as least important.

Figure 3 - What are the key challenges to progress in monitoring donors at national level?
(4=most challenging and 1=least challenging)

3. PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES IN STAKEHOLDER INCLUSION

3.1 What Progress Has Been Made?
The DCF latest analysis (forthcoming, 2012) suggests that in only 6 countries (6%) has there been a high degree of progress in including non-executive stakeholders (parliaments, CSOs, women’s groups, trade unions and private sector) in national-level processes, on both development and aid results; in 70 (66%) there had been moderate progress, but mostly in relation to holding partner governments accountable for development results, rather than donors accountable for aid results; in 29 (28%), no progress had been made on either.

The DCF used four criteria to judge the degree of inclusion: i) whether stakeholders are included in lower level technical and sector working groups; ii) whether they are given speaking slots in annual top-level MA forum; iii) whether they provide technical analysis and reports to the forum; and iv) whether they are on the steering group deciding work programme and agendas. In this study, we asked civil society coalitions engaged with national accountability processes to assess progress based on these criteria. It found a low level of inclusion overall, and very low levels of analytical inputs or participation in agenda-setting bodies.

The survey conducted by this report – of the countries whose MA is most advanced - found that civil society groups participate in lower-level technical or sector working groups in 82% of countries, and speak at the annual high-level forum also in 82%. However, they provide formal analytical inputs in only 64% of countries; and in only 28% do they participate in agenda-setting structures such as steering groups (see figure 4). These results are encouraging in that they...
indicate that, where national MA structures are strongest, civil society inclusion is much higher. However, they still show that there is a strong need to ensure that civil society is represented on the agenda-setting steering groups; and to increase civil society technical/analytical inputs.

Figure 4: In What Ways Are CSOs Included in National-Level MA?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participating in Technical Working Groups</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attending and Speaking at High Level Forum</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present Analysis to High Level Forum</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of Steering Group</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In terms of the types of non-executive stakeholders included in national MA processes (figure 5), the survey found that national CSO coalitions are the most frequently represented (91%), followed by private sector organizations and parliament (67%), trade unions (50%), women's groups (43%), and community groups (13%) are barely represented at all. One respondent also noted that the partner Government plays a central role in selecting which CSOs are invited to take part:

“Often one or two people are appointed by the ministries to represent CSOs, not necessarily the most qualified. Despite proposals by CSOs to create a structured dialogue, the government can appoint whoever it wants”

Figure 5: Which Non-Executive Stakeholders are Most Included in National MA?

3.2 What are the Key Obstacles to Further Progress?

The main obstacles to further inclusion – according to CSOs – lie in lack of political commitment by partner governments in 90% of countries, and donors in 89% (figure 6). CSOs also highlight their own capacity and resource constraints (60%) (not surprisingly given that the DCF study found that current capacity-building efforts are focused on governments), and stress lack of interest by CSOs (40%).

This issue is highlighted by these CSO responses;

“Neither donors nor Government wants CSOs to take active part”

“CSOs are often left out and donors do not actively seek CSO participation.”

“Continual references to the texts of Acra and Busan, and pressure from the donor community, have been essential to making inclusion a reality”.

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The survey also explored the degree to which there is transparency around the results of aid monitoring processes, a key factor in helping to promote deeper accountability and behaviour change and to encourage broader stakeholder engagement (figure 7). In barely half of cases are results discussed with CSOs, in 40-45% of cases they are shared with the media or made available on the internet; and in only 25% of cases are they presented to parliament. These results suggest that opportunities are being missed to ensure that aid accountability maximises impact on effectiveness.
4. CASE STUDY FINDINGS: WHAT HAS MADE THE DIFFERENCE?

The three case study countries (Ghana, Mozambique and Rwanda) were chosen as being two of the countries with the most advanced MA processes (Mozambique and Rwanda have targets for donors which are monitored on an individual donor-by-donor basis), and a third (Ghana) which has been making efforts to establish a process with similarly high standards.

Their findings give important additional evidence on what makes the difference in progress on national-level MA and non-state actor inclusion. The key findings may be summarized as follows:

4.1. GHANA

Ghana has had considerable problems agreeing a national mutual accountability framework. In 2003 it established a Multi-Donor Budget Support (MDBS) agreement which, after the Paris HLF, added targets for donor reporting and predictability (and achieved more predictability and a large cut in policy conditions for government).

Since 2008, Ghana has been developing an aid policy and performance assessment framework for donors. The wish by government and donors to adapt the Paris Declaration to local circumstances, and have a clear policy before the Accra HLF, was a key driver in this process.

However, agreement has been complex, with pushback by some donors against many proposed indicators on the grounds that they were not in the Paris Declaration framework (even if they were in the text of Paris or Accra). In addition, before both Accra and Busan HLFs, the process ground to a halt due to uncertainty as to what global framework might exist as a reference point after the HLF. Ghana is hoping that a PBIG-agreed strong global monitoring framework will reinvigorate national processes.

In terms of inclusion, CSOs played a central role in preparations for the Accra HLF and are engaged closely in MDBS meetings. Political will of Government has increased, with formal invitations now sent to CSOs with increased notice, allowing better preparations. Support from donors has also increased, including MDBS preparatory meetings, better information sharing and lobbying for CSO engagement. CSO coordination has improved with the formation of the Ghana Civil Society Aid Effectiveness Forum. However, technical and financial resources remain too limited for civil society to play its full role in holding government and donors to account.

4.2. MOZAMBIQUE

In Mozambique there has been a monitoring framework for budget support donors since 2005. Since 2007 it has assessed individual performance of donors on an increasingly wide range of issues. The Rome and Paris agreements (and especially the Paris survey) were vital to inspiring the process, and to achieving consensus on indicators. Indicators initially focused on Rome and Paris commitments, but have broadened to cover Accra issues such as predictability.

Factors that have helped to achieve this progress include: a group of progressive donors who led in making (and fulfilling) commitments; independent consultants who conducted donor monitoring in 2004-09 and used political insulation to promote more progressive approaches; and, more recently, leadership by Government in bringing non-budget support donors into the framework (which was a very problematic issue) and conducting the monitoring exercises itself.
The G20 group of CSOs has been playing an increasing role. Since 2007, multi-stakeholder Development Observatories have submitted formal reports to the Joint Annual Review meeting between Mozambique and its donors. However, their content is limited to development results and monitoring/evaluation processes, and does not cover donor performance.

The key factors assisting progress have been support from donors, insisting on a close relationship with CSOs as part of their dialogue with Government; and political will from Government to establish the Development Observatories and increasingly invite CSOs to Joint Review meetings with donors. However, CSOs remain extremely under-resourced both technically and financially if they are to play a serious role in holding donors as well as government accountable.

4.3. RWANDA

Rwanda designed an Aid Policy in 2008 and a donor performance framework in 2009. Though the policy went beyond Paris indicators, its genesis was in the PD and in the wish to have a clear policy to present to the Accra HLF. The initial monitoring framework was entirely limited to PD indicators, as donors refused other suggestions. However, over the years, it has widened through government determination and mutual agreement to cover far more Paris, Accra and other nationally-relevant issues, and now holds donors individually accountable for their performance against these indicators.

Factors that have helped to achieve this progress include strong Government leadership; engagement with a group of like-minded donors who were prepared to make more ambitious commitments; the Paris monitoring survey, which promoted the principle of individual donor accountability and the initial indicators; and the Accra Agenda, which allowed a discussion at national level on “updating and broadening” the framework.

Civil society representatives are invited to play a role in a number of the key aid coordination and monitoring forums, including the annual government-Development Partners Retreat and the biennial government-Development Partners Meeting. CSO groups are not represented within the Development Partners Coordination Group (DPCG) Secretariat, which is hosted and managed by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. The DPCG plays a key role in setting out the national agenda on aid effectiveness, including for the DPR and DPM. All members of the DPCG (PSs of sector Ministries, DPs, and civil society organisations) therefore guide the national process of aid accountability and coordination. However, CSOs do not consistently contribute analytical inputs to these processes, in part because of technical and resource constraints especially when it comes to incorporating perspectives from local communities.

Factors that have helped to achieve the progress so far have included increased support from Government for engaging with civil society, and improved coordination amongst CSOs in engaging with these processes.
5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POST-BUSAN MONITORING NEGOTIATIONS

This final section makes a number of recommendations based on partner country government and non-executive stakeholder views, for a post-Busan monitoring architecture and framework.

5.1. Planned Next Steps by Partner Countries

Partner countries reaffirmed their commitment to moving ahead with advances in national-level MA. The top priority is reinforcing indicators and targets for monitoring donors as part of MA (3.1 out of 4), closely followed by strengthening aid policies to include the new Busan commitments (2.9). Strengthening inclusiveness of the monitoring (2.3) and putting in place a regular monitoring analytical process/discussion (2.25) are also important, ranking in the top two priorities for 40% and 30% of respondents respectively.

Figure 8 - What Next Steps Are Planned to Advance National-Level MA?
(4=top priority and 1=lowest priority)

5.2. Priorities for a Post-Busan Monitoring Architecture

Partner country governments and stakeholders were almost unanimous in their emphasis that the most important element of a post-Busan monitoring architecture will be agreement on a strong framework of donor indicators and targets to replace the framework used for the Paris Monitoring Survey, This is not surprising, given that our study has shown this framework has been critical to their ability to design and implement monitoring at the national level. They also strongly emphasised the importance of the global process agreeing on providing technical and financial support to build their capacity to undertake national monitoring and analysis.

The other key priority is to continue with a regular global survey and international top-level meetings to discuss progress in making aid more effective in producing development results. Several respondents stress that changes in policies, business practices and performance incentives at donor HQs have proven crucial in ensuring more rapid change by a few donors, which then translate into change in national-level MA indicators, as emphasized also by the Paris Declaration Evaluation. These are much more easily provoked by global monitoring and discussion which attracts top-level discussion. The alternative of aggregating national-level results will not work – partly because it will receive less attention at top level, and partly because (as MA is occurring in only 20 countries, and assessing performance by individual donors in only 4) its results will be much less informative/useful.
5.3. Priority Issues to Address in a Global Monitoring Framework

In terms of priority issues to monitor, partner countries and CSOs have identified 13 top priorities, almost all (11) of which are shared by partner governments and CSOs (see green boxes in figure 9). Additional high priority areas for CSOs are human rights and civil society space (both closely linked to the issue of the enabling environment). Partner countries and CSOs gave much lower priority to some Paris/Rome issues revolving around harmonisation (joint donor missions/analysis) and project implementation units, arguing that these would be covered by stronger indicators on programme-based approaches and use of country systems. These are therefore not included in Figure 9.

Figure 9 – Priority Post-Busan Framework Indicators (Partner Countries and CSOs)
It is very important to note that most of these indicators would not need to be monitored through an additional global survey.\textsuperscript{6} Table 2 below shows how the 13 indicators listed above (which expand to around 15 if some are disaggregated) might be monitored in a “global light” way, while still being included in a framework in order to facilitate strong progress on national-level MA. It indicates that:

- Ten indicators could be monitored via existing global data and processes. These include:
  - the mutual accountability/transparency survey by UN Development Cooperation Forum and UNDP. This already covers national mutual accountability, transparency, and inclusiveness, and could be expanded to examine results frameworks and conditionality.
  - existing DAC reporting which covers untying, gender focus through gender markers, fragmentation and PBAs/budget support through CRS data, multi-year forecasts through Survey of Forward Spending Plans (this would need disaggregating by recipient country);
  - the IATI databases for global-level transparency;
  - PEFA, CPIA and other processes for assessing the quality of country public financial management and procurement systems (which would be widened to M&E systems).

- Only 5 indicators (aid on budget, in-year predictability, use of country systems, capacity-building, and enabling environment) would require a post-Busan survey, with possibly two more (PBAs and transparency at national level) requiring validation of DAC data via a survey. This would imply a very globally light process – which would nevertheless be essential to cover the many partner countries which have no national level MA in place.

- In addition, further improvements in national-level aid information management systems (AIMS) – notably more comprehensive aid quality and impact indicators, and better reporting by donors – as well as national MA processes could render global surveys unnecessary by 2015.

\textbf{TABLE 2: POSSIBLE METHODS TO MONITOR POST-BUSAN INDICATORS}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>How to Monitor</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MA for results of development strategies and aid</td>
<td>DCF MA Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-year forecasts of disbursements</td>
<td>OECD Survey On Forward Spending Plans disaggregated by recipient country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-year predictability of disbursements</td>
<td>Post-Busan Survey, eventually AIMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen country systems (PFM/procurement/M&amp;E)</td>
<td>PEFA/CPIA assessments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing use of country systems</td>
<td>Post-Busan Survey, eventually AIMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme-Based Approaches, esp. budget support</td>
<td>Improved DAC reports, eventually AIMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive national processes for assessing results</td>
<td>DCF MA Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency of aid</td>
<td>IATI process/reporting on national AIMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Untying of aid</td>
<td>DAC reporting process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing Fragmentation and Division of Labour</td>
<td>DAC reporting process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid oriented to gender equality</td>
<td>DAC gender markers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enabling Environment for Civil Society</td>
<td>Fragmentation – DAC database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid being on-budget/on-plan</td>
<td>Post-Busan survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing Conditionality</td>
<td>Analysis of national PAFs/DCF MA survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinated capacity-building</td>
<td>Post-Busan survey, eventually AIMS</td>
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\textsuperscript{6} We note that the proposed indicators above and the methods suggested for monitoring them are broadly in line with those cited in the proposal produced for PBIG by the UK and Rwanda on 17 April. Our ideas are slightly more ambitious in the use of existing global processes, and could be refined by further discussion.
Finally, partner country governments and stakeholders were asked to define the key way(s) in which the post-Busan negotiations can best support national-level MA. The answers, as reflected in the quotes below, were equally clear, reflecting a strong faith that the PBIG outcome will be helpful to their national MA and that only a strong global framework can ensure progress on successful national-level attainment of development results through effective aid.

“We need a very strong global framework with 12 indicators including a strong one on how countries and donors should hold one another mutually accountable, as well as regular global reporting of progress, and global assessments of what works best in MA.”

“Donor politicians need to get the message that strong global monitoring is essential”

“The negotiations on post-Busan priorities must give us a global monitoring road map to follow and define the best approach at country level with increased inclusiveness.”
6. CONCLUSIONS
This study, based on the views of partner country policymakers and leaders of national CSO coalitions, highlights the key role the post-Busan monitoring negotiations must play in reinforcing prospects for successful national-level mutual accountability, in 6 ways:

- **Recommendation 1.** Because the Paris monitoring framework has been such a critical factor in progress on national mutual accountability, **agree an ambitious global framework which addresses the critical commitments prioritised by partner country governments and CSOs**, ie:
  - Mutual accountability for results of development strategies and aid
  - Multi-year forecasts and in-year predictability of disbursements
  - Strengthen and increase use of country systems (including PFM, procurement, M&E)
  - Use of Programme-Based Approaches, especially on budget support
  - Inclusive national processes for assessing the impact of aid and development strategies
  - Transparency of aid
  - Untying aid
  - Reducing Fragmentation and Division of Labour
  - Aid oriented to gender equality
  - Enabling Environment for Civil Society
  - Aid being on-budget/on-plan
  - Reducing Conditionality
  - Coordinated capacity-building rather than technical assistance
  - Human rights

- **Recommendation 2.** To minimise the time and staff burden on all side, **monitor many of these indicators via existing data and processes** including: the UNDCF/UNDP MA and transparency survey, DAC reporting, IATI, PEFA and CPIA. Only around 5 indicators would require a post-Busan survey, with possibly two more requiring validation of DAC data via a post-Busan survey. However, further improvements in national-level aid information management systems (AIMS) and national MA processes, could render global surveys unnecessary by 2015.

- **Recommendation 3.** To reinforce headquarters-level and political commitment to accelerating progress, **establishing a global architecture which continues regular global surveys of progress on making development cooperation more effective in achieving results**, based on the strong global monitoring framework, and regular ministerial-level discussions of survey results.

- **Recommendation 4.** To reinforce political commitment by all donors to participate in national-level MA processes whenever partner countries suggest them, **establishing a global code of conduct containing basic standards for engagement by all development cooperation providers in national MA processes**, with a strong emphasis on partner country leadership.

- **Recommendation 5.** To overcome major capacity constraints, **establishing a facility overseen by the Global Partnership’s Building Block on Accountability and Results**, to support capacity building for monitoring and analysis of donor and partner government performance, based on demand from partner country governments, global stakeholder organizations such as IPU/AWEPA, Better Aid and ITUC, and national-level representative stakeholder coalitions.

- **Recommendation 6.** To continue to learn lessons and to track progress on inclusive national-level MA, **deepening and annualising the monitoring of progress already being conducted by the UN Development Cooperation Forum**, by including the monitoring of accountability for development results, and of inclusion of non-state actors, based on further refinement of a mutual accountability indicator to be included in the post-Busan framework.