HAITI LIVELIHOODS AND DISASTER RISK REDUCTION PROGRAM EVALUATION

EVALUATION OF STRATEGIC INTERVENTIONS 2011-2014

Gardy Létang, Jolette Joseph and Vikerson Garnier
FIDEX (Firme d’Audit et d’Expertise Comptable)
December 2015
As part of our commitment to accountability and learning, Oxfam will share conclusions and recommendations from evaluations. Internally, we will share with relevant stakeholders, ensuring that they have an opportunity to participate in discussion of those results in meaningful ways. We will also publish the evaluation reports on our website in accessible language.

As a rights-based organization, accountability, particularly to the communities we seek to serve, is of the highest importance to us. Accountability requires Oxfam to regularly and honestly assess the quality of its work, share evaluation findings with primary stakeholders, and apply the lessons learned in future work.

This is an evaluation of Oxfam America’s Livelihoods Program and DRR/Humanitarian Program Implementation Plans. The program has been operating in Haiti since 2011 and this evaluation covers the work undertaken between 2011 and 2014.

The main evaluation activities took place between May and August 2015. The evaluation was carried out by the Firme d’Audit et d’Expertise Comptable (FIDEX) through a competitive process and reflects the findings as reported by them as validated with stakeholders. The evaluation was managed by Dieudonné Raymond, MEL Officer, Oxfam America Haiti, and commissioned by Ashley Tsongas, Interim Director, Learning, Evaluation and Accountability Department, Oxfam America Boston.

For additional information regarding the evaluation Terms of Reference, please refer to the report appendices.
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PREFACE

This evaluation work is the result of a collaborative effort from the different stakeholders of programs implemented by Oxfam USA and partners between 2011 and 2014. The evaluation team appreciates the motivation of the various actors involved in this exercise, whose collaboration provided access to the data that informs the discussions in this report.

The evaluation team is most grateful to those who contributed to the mission's success despite the multiple constraints faced. We specifically thank:

The leaders and members of the implementing partners of the Livelihoods Program projects and activities in the Artibonite region, in particular: Asosasyon Irigan Lyankou-Latibonit (AILA); Association des Irrigants Bas-Maître Rive Droite (AIBMRD); Association des Planteurs pour le Développement de l’Agriculture dans l’Artibonite (APDAL); Association des Parents et des Professeurs d’École de Liancourt (APPEL); Fédération Nationale des Producteurs de Riz Haïtien (FENAPRIH); Mouvement d’Aide aux Femmes Liancourt-Payen de la Commune de Verrettes (MAFLPV); Service Œcuménique d’Entraide (SOE); Association Haïtienne pour la Promotion d’un Développement Autonome (PRODEVA); and Réseau Coopérative pour Commercialisation et Production Agricole Bas Artibonite (RACPABA).

The members of sectoral state institutions (agriculture, drinking water and sanitation, risk, and disaster management) for their insight on relevant issues, in particular: Mr. Previlmond MontFleury and Mr. Jean Jeannot Luma, directors of the Verrettes and Petite-Rivière de l’Artibonite Communal Agricultural Bureau (BAC) respectively; Mr. Luckecy Matthieu, Coordinator of the Departmental Technical Civil Protection Unit in Lower-Artibonite; and Mr. Fritz Gérald Guillaume, Director of the Communal Agricultural Bureau (BAC) Coordination Service at the Artibonite Valley Development Agency (ODVA).

The leaders and members of implementing partners of the Risk Management/Humanitarian Preparedness Program project and activities, in particular: Artibonite Department Local Emergency Response Team (ELRUDA); Liancourt, Ogé, Villard and Bellanger Risk and Disaster Management Local Committees; Verrettes, Grande Saline, Marchand-Dessalines and Petite-Rivière de l’Artibonite Communal Risk and Disaster Management Committees; and the Institut de Technologie et d’Animation (ITECA).

To the Oxfam USA team for their collaboration and availability throughout the process.

To those who are not mentioned here, our sincere thanks.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AIBMRD:</td>
<td>Association des Irrigants Bas-Maître Rive Droite</td>
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<td>AILA:</td>
<td>Asosyasyon Irigan Lyankou-Latibonit</td>
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<td>APDAL:</td>
<td>Association des Planteurs pour le Développement de l’Agriculture dans l’Artibonite</td>
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<td>APPEL:</td>
<td>Association des Parents et des Professeurs d’École de Liancourt</td>
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<td>ASEC:</td>
<td>Communal Section Assembly</td>
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<td>BAC:</td>
<td>Communal Agricultural Bureau</td>
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<td>CAED:</td>
<td>External Aid Coordination Framework for the Development of Haiti</td>
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<td>CAPOSOV:</td>
<td>Caisse Populaire Solidarité de Verrettes</td>
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<td>CBO:</td>
<td>Community-Based Organization</td>
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<td>CCGRD/PC:</td>
<td>Communal Risk and Disaster Management/Civil Protection Committee</td>
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<td>CERFAS:</td>
<td>Centre de Recherche, de Réflexion, de Formation et d’Action Sociale</td>
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<td>CFP:</td>
<td>Centre de Formation Professionnelle</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLGRD/PC:</td>
<td>Local Risk and Disaster Management/Civil Protection Committee</td>
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<td>CNBH:</td>
<td>Haiti National Building Code</td>
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<td>CNSA:</td>
<td>National Food Security Coordination Unit</td>
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<td>CP:</td>
<td>Civil Protection</td>
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<td>CTC:</td>
<td>Cholera Treatment Center</td>
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<td>CTD:</td>
<td>Departmental Technical Coordination Unit</td>
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<td>DANA:</td>
<td>Damage Assessment and Needs Analysis</td>
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<td>DINEPA:</td>
<td>National Directorate for Water and Sanitation</td>
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<td>DPC:</td>
<td>Civil Protection Directorate</td>
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<td>DRR:</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<td>DTM:</td>
<td>Displacement Tracking Matrix</td>
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<td>DWS:</td>
<td>Drinking Water and Sanitation</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELRUDA</td>
<td>Artibonite Department Local Emergency Response Team</td>
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<td>FENAPRIH</td>
<td>National Federation of Haitian Rice Producers</td>
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<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
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<td>FONDESSA</td>
<td>Fondation Dessalines</td>
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<td>GRIAC</td>
<td>Groupe de Réflexion et d'Initiative pour l'Action Citoyenne</td>
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<td>GTSAN</td>
<td>Groupe Technique Sécurité Alimentaire et Nutrition</td>
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<tr>
<td>HAS</td>
<td>Hôpital Albert Schweitzer</td>
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<td>HTG</td>
<td>Haitian Gourde</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>INFP</td>
<td>Institut National de la Formation Professionnelle</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>IPC</td>
<td>Integrated Food Security Phase Classification</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITECA</td>
<td>Institut de Technologie et d'Animation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAFLPV</td>
<td>Mouvement d'Aide aux Femmes Liancourt-Payen de la Commune de Verrettes</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARNDR</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development</td>
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<td>MFI</td>
<td>Microfinance Institution</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSPP</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Health and Population</td>
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<td>MTPTC</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communication</td>
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<td>NFI</td>
<td>Non-Food Items</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>ODVA</td>
<td>Artibonite Valley Development Agency</td>
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<td>OREPA</td>
<td>Regional Water and Sanitation Office</td>
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<td>OUS</td>
<td>Oxfam US</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAPDA</td>
<td>Plateforme Haïtienne de Plaidoyer pour un Développement Alternatif</td>
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<td>PCM</td>
<td>Project Cycle Management</td>
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<td>PEA WG</td>
<td>Public Education and Awareness Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIP:</td>
<td>Program Implementation Plan</td>
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<td>PRA:</td>
<td>Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite</td>
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<td>PRODEVA:</td>
<td>Association Haïtienne pour la Promotion d’un Développement Autonome</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSDH:</td>
<td>Haiti Strategic Development Plan</td>
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<td>RACPABA:</td>
<td>Réseau Coopérative pour Commercialisation et Production Agricole Bas Artibonite</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDM:</td>
<td>Risk and Disaster Management</td>
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<td>RGA:</td>
<td>Revenue Generating Activity</td>
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<td>RGA:</td>
<td>General Census of Agriculture</td>
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<td>SNGRD:</td>
<td>National Risk and Disaster Management System</td>
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<td>SOE:</td>
<td>Service Œcuménique d’Entraide</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOFA:</td>
<td>Solidarite Fanm Ayisyèn</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRA</td>
<td>Improved Rice Growing System</td>
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<td>SRI</td>
<td>System of Rice Intensification</td>
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<td>SRT</td>
<td>Traditional Rice Growing System</td>
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<td>TEPAC:</td>
<td>Communal Water and Sanitation Technicians</td>
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<td>TFP:</td>
<td>Technical and Financial Partner</td>
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<td>UAA:</td>
<td>Utilized Agricultural Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD:</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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<tr>
<td>UTC:</td>
<td>Cholera Treatment Unit</td>
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<td>WASH:</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
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GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMINOLOGY

**Accountability**
Relationship between a rights-holder or a legitimate claim and the agents or agencies (duty-bearers) responsible for fulfilling or respecting that right by acting or desisting from particular actions. Accountability relates to the responsiveness of the "duty-bearers" and the voice of "rights-holders" to articulate their needs and claim their rights.

**Coherence**
Evaluation of the strategies developed in light of the organization's mandate and principles, national and regional plans, and plans of cooperation actors in relation to livelihoods and humanitarian preparedness and risk management.

**Coverage**
The need to reach a large group of people exposed to crisis (natural disaster, food shortage, etc.) risks.

**Effectiveness**
Measuring the extent to which the project objectives have been achieved in light of the project outputs.

**Efficiency**
Measuring the qualitative or quantitative results achieved against the resources deployed. This means analyzing the objectives in relation to the funds invested: overall project administration and management of invested funds, overall budgets, and staff and implementation management (budget, task distribution).

**Feasibility study**
Study conducted during the appraisal phase to ensure the proposed project is well-founded and likely to meet the needs of target groups/intended beneficiaries. It should detail the political, technical, economic, financial, institutional, environmental, socio-cultural, management, and gender aspects of the project's operational design.

**Impact**
Assessment of a project's effects on its broader environment and contribution to broader sector goals as outlined in the overall objectives. This includes intended and/or unintended, positive and/or negative, micro, meso, and/or macro level social, economic, technical, cultural, and environmental impacts on individuals, gendered relations, age groups, communities, and social and institutional dynamics.

**Participation**
Appropriateness to local culture and customs, participation of local actors, and partners in project management cycles and accountability. This includes measures to ensure that operations are
respectful of people's dignity and human rights: a) level of participation by the various beneficiary groups in the different partnership structures and b) involvement of deconcentrated state bodies, as well as gender equity.

**Relevance**
Appropriateness of a project's objectives to the actual issues, needs, and priorities of target groups and intended beneficiaries which the projects is meant to address, as well as to the physical and political implementation environment. Program actions and activities meet local needs and priorities of different socio-economic groups (particularly the most vulnerable: humanitarian response): a) in relation to the issues addressed, geographic priorities and b) in relation to specific expected results consistent with the actual issues and needs expressed by the beneficiaries and how they are interrelated at all levels.

**Resilience**
The capacity of a system, community, or society potentially exposed to hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing, in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of function and structure.

**Stakeholder**
Any individual, group of people, institution, or corporation likely to be linked to a given project or program. Stakeholders can—directly or indirectly, positively or negatively—affect or be affected by project or program processes and outcomes.

**Sustainability**
Measuring whether the activity's benefits are likely to continue once the project is completed: positive impact after implementation.

**Vulnerability**
The characteristics of a person or group in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural or man-made disaster.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PROGRAM OBJECTIVE

OXFAM USA (OUS) has commissioned the Firme d’Audit et d’Expertise Comptable (FIDEX) to conduct a joint evaluation of two Program Implementation Plans (PIP)—a) Livelihoods and b) DRR/Humanitarian Preparedness—implemented by OUS with the support of several actors over the 2011-2014 period in the departments of Artibonite, Nippes, and Ouest, Haiti. Each PIP is built around a number of projects/actions, most of which have been implemented by local partners, such as community-based organizations (CBO), civil society organizations (CSO) in collaboration with local authorities, and sectoral state institutions.

The strategy adopted by Oxfam USA (OUS) and the actions implemented through both programs are, for the most part, aiming at long-term change. They have, whenever possible, worked to promote partnership, involve primary change agents, enhance and promote female leadership, build technical and economic capacity, and advocate for local production and policy change at the national and international levels, among others.

The Livelihoods PIP implemented in the Artibonite region built upon innovative livestock and agriculture (production, processing) initiatives to increase farm productivity and to strengthen household economies and the capacity of families to address food insecurity. This PIP placed special emphasis on disseminating new production techniques. Its actions primarily focus on a value chain approach. The innovative (rice production, processing, onion conservation) techniques and the various forms of support given (credit, training, etc.) are highly appreciated by community actors and state institutions. Actions have been implemented primarily by local partners (local NGOs, producer organizations, state institutions).

The DRR/Humanitarian PIP builds on local emergency preparedness and response capacity building to facilitate reconstruction, risk mitigation, and crisis response in order for communities to be better prepared and to prevent natural hazard-related disasters.

OBJECTIVES

In accordance with the Terms of Reference (ToR), this evaluation was commissioned to measure how well the PIP objectives were achieved in order for Oxfam, partners, and donors to be able to effectively measure the program outcomes and identify lessons learned. It specifically assesses:

- How relevant and effective the partnership working strategy is, identifying its strengths and weaknesses as specifically related to the capacity of the Artibonite Department Local Emergency Response Team (ELRUDA); and
- How sustainable program activity outcomes are and, objectively, what the impacts are of the different program activities and particularly what changes have occurred or are occurring in the quality of life of primary change agents.

At a deeper level, the analysis focuses on:

- the approach taken and the participation process;
- community ownership of projects and actions and involvement in project management;
- the level of involvement of women and youth in the various actions;
- the scope of technical innovations and the quality of final products; and
• lessons learned.

METHODOLOGY

The evaluation findings were obtained through a participatory methodology used with the different stakeholders involved in both PIPs. These include state actors and sector regulatory institutions, implementation partners, local authorities, and direct beneficiaries/primary change agents. The data collected was complemented with data from secondary sources (e.g. project reports, sector planning document, evaluation reports, sector statistics).

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS/CONCLUSIONS

The Livelihoods PIP’s implementation has brought about a number of changes in the lives of primary change agents (at the individual, community, and organizational levels). The evaluation team’s main findings in this respect include:

• Strengthened technical and economic capital of partner organizations and the farmers they support, with an increased role of community service providers, largely due to the new skills developed and tools provided to perform their work better;

• Enhanced women’s role in public/economic sphere, decision-making within households, and their organizations;

• Local actors have access to new effective System of Rice Intensification (SRI) techniques for rice production and techniques for onion production (yield gains, input cost savings), processing (better quality milled rice), and marketing and to loan offerings tailored to local production conditions and realities through better repayment frequencies and interest rates that reduce usury;

• Increased rice yield/ha by more than double in some farms using SRI, improving their farm-based income and storage capacity to wait for price recovery and support household sustenance;

• Increased farm incomes using new conservation techniques while reducing post-harvest losses and getting around crop sales revenue losses in periods of abundant (low-priced) supply; and

• Strengthened partner organizations’ technical and productive capital needed to diversify their income sources, strengthen the producers' production system, build their service provision capacity, and increase their visibility with state agencies and financial institutions.

Program activities have had positive impacts on farm productivity, but did not provide any solutions in terms of the competitiveness of the goods produced, making it difficult for producers to penetrate markets and even to commercialize those goods. They did not help solve the issue of guaranteed access to fertilizers and seeds or to irrigation water in the very long term. In terms of marketing, they did not lead to the creation of new rice and onion distribution channels, which could ensure better price controls for producers and enable them to improve their income-generating potential. Moreover, given the implementation period and the lack of strategic management, these actions are not sufficient to solve the issue of partner organizations’ dependence on external funding to operate and maintain project gains, which is a challenge to sustainability.

Mitigation actions have helped develop internal consistency, synergies, and coordination links between both PIPs, with positive impacts on the ground. The satisfactory results achieved with the Livelihoods PIP are in part linked to the DRR/humanitarian PIP actions. Dredging operations have not only helped reduce the risk of crop and house flooding, but also enabled better access to irrigation water within irrigated areas/production blocks. Furthermore, policy and community dialogue helped trigger other more sustainable strategies for taking ownership of social water management.
The DRR/Humanitarian PIP actions have, just as the Livelihoods PIP actions, brought about changes at the individual, community, and organizational levels in target areas. Following are the main findings drawn from this PIP by the evaluation team.

The coordination mechanisms implemented jointly with the Departmental Technical Civil Protection Coordination Unit of Lower Artibonite and the logic of developing institutional partnerships with decentralized Risk and Disaster Management structures helped ensure the overall consistency and alignment of this PIP. This strategy has enabled greater consistency between OUS' work and sectoral priorities as defined through periodic action plans, ensuring greater complementarity with the actions carried out by other actors.

New capacities and skills have been developed locally for taking ownership of community response to and preparedness for risks of epidemic and hydrometeorological events. However, their capacity to respond to adverse events is still low and limited by weak logistical and financial resources and the lack of supplies needed to conduct rapid emergency operations.

The communal and local committees that were created and/or strengthened are capable of rapidly mobilizing and deploying on the ground for conducting post-crisis assessment operations. They are key assets to help make the actions of other humanitarian actors more operational. In that sense, their work remains complementary to that of other actors, especially humanitarian actors, who will be deployed on the ground during emergencies to conduct rapid responses aimed at saving lives and alleviating suffering. Their work is also an asset for designing the more structuring actions performed by rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development actors, especially those involved in risk mitigation and prevention.

The operational capacity of most structures is limited by the lack of involvement, especially by elected local and municipal authorities, who nevertheless play a decision-making (coordination) role in such structures. It remains a challenge for them to weave together the political and protection agendas. Most of the mechanisms they put in place do not ensure the transparency of committee operations, which would encourage other members to participate actively.

House reconstruction (28 houses/28 families) helped create intra-community linkages (creation of solidarity groups) facilitating construction operations for the benefit of different types of beneficiaries, including widows, in conditions that they would never achieve through participation considering access constraints and their low economic capacity. This helped restore the dignity of earthquake-affected families and develop a sense of equality (identical houses for everyone) within the community. Some technical elements of the house design chosen are more contextually appropriate (construction techniques, rainwater harvesting) than others (biodigesters, type of roofing).

Actions carried out with the Artibonite Department Local Emergency Response Team (ELRUDA) and local management structures (health and source management committees) helped ensure the operation of the water supply (rehabilitated sources, water distribution points, chlorine dispensers, wells) and sanitation (waste collection bins, latrines) structures. The effects are still limited as the structures lack financial and logistic resources and still depend on external funding for their supply. This poses a challenge in terms of sustainability.

MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to improve the quality of program delivery and the intended outcomes of the Livelihoods PIP, the evaluation team made the following recommendations.
• To make projects more locally appropriate, improve the feasibility analysis of the technical options considered during the project identification phase, especially for activities that are complex;
• OUS, in support of partner organizations, must seek to multiply the effects of SRI through producer training and multi-level awareness raising (state actors, operational actors, regional and local state support agencies, central-level political authorities);
• Continue to support women's empowerment at the community level and across partner organizations;
• Support partner organizations with operational infrastructure and production and processing equipment in order to develop an empowerment strategy;
• Support the occupational integration of young people and help them improve their know-how;
• Seek efficiency through the choice of equipment made available to partner organizations in order to ensure the cost-effectiveness of its use, internal capacity to cover their maintenance and replacement costs;
• Strengthen SRI research/extension partnership with the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (MARNDR);
• OUS must reinforce its SRI research activities and continue disseminating the resulting findings at a broader scale;
• OUS and state partners should implement a reliable yield monitoring system with partner organizations and producers;
• Partner organizations should help build the organic fertilizer value chain and scale up initiatives piloted by APDAL and the Groupe de Réflexion et d'Initiative pour l'Action Citoyenne (GRIAC);
• Help develop credit management expertise among partner organizations; and
• Continue providing technical, administrative and financial support to agricultural advocacy partner organizations while increasingly encouraging the development of harmonious working relations with sectoral state institutions and local authorities.

For the DRR/Humanitarian PIP, the evaluation team made the following recommendations:
• Work to strengthen community management and ownership of wells by the communities served and local well management structures;
• Support the development of a capacity-building and empowerment strategy for ELRUDA, including support to the development of institutional partnerships with sectoral actors to better advance its technical potential in the field of water, sanitation, and hygiene/WASH for the benefit of communities and of new forms of strategic partnership and finance, mainly the public-private partnership model;
• Help raise community awareness of works management, including incentives for user contribution in order to ensure the operation of those works with community funding;
• Support ELRUDA to increase the effectiveness of the existing warning, communication, and response system in concertation with CCPCs, CLPCs, and CBOs in order to ensure more effective integrated risk management at the local level;
• Support the strengthening of harmony and cohesion in local and communal RDM structures (CCPCs and CLPCs);
• Facilitate policy dialogue between water user organizations and ODVA to redefine a model of shared responsibility for dredging operations between ODVA and irrigation organizations to ensure effective social irrigation water management;
• Make adjustments to the proposed house design to make it better adapted and replicable in different environments and/or contexts: rural and suburban;
• Support the structuring of the solidarity groups in place in order to make them operational and provide communities with outreach organizational structures capable of initiating positive bottom-up change; and
• Document the working approach that values the development of local technical skills through training local artisans and enhancing women’s role in the construction sector as it relates to the different tasks and steps involved in construction.

INTRODUCTION

ACTIVITY OVERVIEW

Oxfam USA (OUS) started working in Haiti in the post-earthquake context. Initially, it contributed to the provision of emergency first aid through Oxfam affiliates. In 2011, OUS established an office in Haiti and began to develop a recovery program building on the work of the other Oxfam affiliates and other actors working in Haiti. Two three-year Program Implementation Plans (PIP) built around a vision of change were thus developed.

Both PIPs (Livelihoods and DRR) revolved around:
• Supporting sector coordination, promotion and advocacy;
• Improving rice production, processing and marketing;
• Supporting disaster risk and emergency response preparedness.

In an effort to provide the most integrated response possible, OUS conducted both PIPs from 2011 to 2014. These are the Livelihoods PIP, which focuses on providing livelihoods to communities from a food security perspective, and the Risk and Disaster Management, Humanitarian Preparedness PIP, aimed at helping communities respond to crises.

OVERVIEW OF ACTIVITY GOALS

The Livelihoods PIP’s primary goal was to improve livelihoods and food security with a particular focus on the rice value chain in the Artibonite Valley. The vision of this plan of action was to support livelihood strengthening so that “men and women farmers in the rice producing areas of Artibonite Valley will have improved their livelihoods and lessened their vulnerability to shocks because they actively influence, and are supported by, improvements in the production and marketing system in the rice value chain and others, and improved local, national, and international policies and practices.” Specifically, the program sought to “increase domestic rice production in order to enhance the country's food security and improve producer incomes by improving the productivity and capacity of rice production enterprises and through an advocacy campaign for raising interest in the local value chain.” To achieve such changes in the rice value chain, OUS took a coherent approach based not only on promoting and defending the interests of local production, but on supporting the strengthening of this value chain (processing, production, etc.). Figure 1 (see next page) provides a summary of this PIP in terms of intended impact, change and outcomes.

The DRR/Humanitarian PIP focused in turn on humanitarian preparedness and disaster risk management. Its goal was to “reduce the vulnerability of populations in the Lower Artibonite and prepare them to respond by themselves to low-level emergencies.” Other actions related/complementary to the DRR/Humanitarian PIP have been implemented in other parts of the country and are included in the evaluation. They include housing reconstruction for households whose homes were swept away by the earthquake in Gressier, advocacy on the right to housing and cholera response following hurricanes Sandy and Isaac in 2012 in the region of Nippes. Figure 2 provides a summary of this PIP in terms of intended impact, changes and outcomes.
GOAL: By 2015, men and women farmers in the rice producing areas of Artibonite Valley will have improved their livelihoods and lessened their vulnerability to shocks because they actively influence improvements in the production and marketing system in the national rice value chain, and through improved local, national and international policies and practices.

1. Production
   - Introduction of new techniques and technologies and their extension by men and women producers.
   - Access to agricultural services
   - Producers are prepared to face disasters and are less vulnerable to risks related to water
   - Protection of investments and crops against disasters and for the purpose of climate change adaptation
   - Capacity building for CBOs and cooperatives
   - Women’s participation in the organizations and economic initiatives

2. Processing and Marketing
   - Rice processing, storage, and marketing
   - Strengthening of business development and management
   - Access to credit for women members of partner organizations
   - Training in management of small agricultural businesses for female credit clients

3. Capacity-building and Advocacy
   - Professional establishment and structuring
   - Training on advocacy for FENAPRIH
   - Reinforcement of women’s leadership to support their economic autonomy and reduce gender-based violence

4. Policies
   - Campaign to influence the State to better support the rice sector, including climate change adaptation
   - Awareness-raising and advocacy on water management (risk to producers)

5. Campaign targeting consumers
   - Awareness campaign on consumption of local products (Port-au-Prince and smaller cities)
   - Awareness campaign on local rice varieties and on the need for climate change adaptation

6. US Advocacy
   - Development of a rice policy, outlining what the Haitian and US government need to do to improve rice farmers’ livelihoods in Haiti
   - Modify US laws, restrictions on US aid
   - Push for continued US funding for Haiti, track aid flows, share good practices, show the difference US aid can make in strengthening Haitian government’s capacity and reconstruction efforts.
This evaluation has been commissioned to measure how well the PIP objectives were achieved in order for Oxfam, partners and funders to be able to effectively measure the program outcomes and identify lessons learned. It specifically focuses on:
- How relevant and effective the partnership working strategy is, identifying its strengths and weaknesses as specifically related to the capacity of the Artibonite Department Local Emergency Response Team (ELRUDA);

- How sustainable program activity outcomes are and, objectively, what are the impacts of the different program activities and particularly what changes have occurred or are occurring in the quality of life of primary change agents.

At a deeper level, the analysis focuses on:

- the approach taken and the participation process;
- community ownership of projects and actions and involvement in project management;
- the level of involvement of women and youth in the various actions;
- the scope of technical innovations and the quality of final products;
- lessons learned.

GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE

Three (3) geographic departments - Ouest, Nippes and Artibonite - are covered by the programs with stronger focus on specific municipalities. Overall, both PIPs were implemented in about ten municipalities (see table 2 for details) across these departments.

Table 1: Geographic Coverage (Municipalities Focused On) of the PIPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PIP</th>
<th>Thematic Areas Covered</th>
<th>Regions Covered</th>
<th>Communes Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Livelihoods</td>
<td><strong>Rice value chain</strong>: Support to production, processing and marketing</td>
<td>Artibonite</td>
<td>Verrettes, Marchand, Saint Marc, La Chapelle, Petite Rivière, Saint-Marc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Vegetable value chain</strong>: Support to the production, conservation and marketing of onion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRR/Humanitarian Preparedness</td>
<td><strong>Ouest</strong>: Housing reconstruction</td>
<td>Artibonite, Ouest, Nippes</td>
<td><strong>Artibonite</strong>: Verrettes, Marchand Dessalines, Saint Marc, Petite-Rivière, Grande Saline, Desdunes Ouest: Gressier Nippes: Anse-à-Veau, Arnault, Petite-Rivière de Nippes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Nippes</strong>: Cholera response / WASH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Artibonite</strong>: Cholera response / WASH, climate change, access to irrigation water and flood risk mitigation (dredging, drainage), institutional support to SNGRD, emergency preparedness.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other advocacy-related actions have been implemented in complement to the above activities. National in scope, they are intended to create leverages at the sector level. Key stakeholders include the Plateforme Haïtienne de Plaidoyer pour un Développement Alternatif (PAPDA), the Centre de Recherche, de Réflexion, de Formation et d’Action Sociale (CERFAS), “Solidarite Fanm Ayisyèn (SOFA), the Coordination Nationale de la Sécurité Alimentaire (CNSA) and the Fédération Nationale des Producteurs de Riz Haïtien (FENAPRIH), among others.
ACTIVITY BACKGROUND

Socioeconomic Situation

Nearly 60% of Haitians live in poverty, 24% of them on less than US $1.23 a day. (World Bank and ONPES, 2014) Also, another estimated one million people would fall into poverty if a new shock was to occur (ibid.).

Migration is one of the major alternatives for Haitians in response to increasing impoverishment. Diaspora remittances have been steadily growing for years. A significant number of Haitians, including their offspring, live as irregular migrants, mainly in Caribbean and North American countries. To address the rapidly increasing number of Haitian people with this status in the Dominican Republic, the Dominican authorities have taken strong regulatory measures. Along these lines, in September 2013, the Dominican Constitutional Court issued a ruling depriving of their citizenship an estimated 400,000 people, including 300,000 people of Haitian descent, 250,000 of which were allegedly undocumented (Government, 2015). The deadline for the regularization process was set for June 15, 2015 with a moratorium extending until early August. The number of people who were deported from June 1 to December 4 amounted to 49,217 (IOM, Sitrep 4th December 2015). 64.8% are men and 35.2% are women, with 770 unaccompanied minors and 28,713 voluntary returnees.

"Natural" disasters

Haiti is regularly subject to important shocks, both natural and man-made. Their occurrence further weakens an already vulnerable population and destroys the limited development efforts. Haiti ranks 5th among the countries most exposed to disaster risks (hurricanes, floods, droughts, earthquakes, etc.). 98% of the population is exposed to at least one risk. Earthquake, hurricanes, floods, droughts and epidemics are all events that have hit Haiti over the past five years. They had diverse consequences and affected a wide variety of areas. They have worsened compared to earlier periods as a result of increased people's vulnerabilities: soaring population growth, uncontrolled population settlement, growing urbanization and lack of urban development, political and economic, and other, crises faced by the country over the past decades. Although the data are not comprehensive, Table 2 shows how alarming the situation in Haiti is in terms of the damage (people affected, deaths recorded and economic value of damage) caused by natural disasters over the past 20 years.

Table 2: Loss and damage from natural disasters in Haiti 1995-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disaster type</th>
<th>Events count</th>
<th>Total deaths</th>
<th>Total affected</th>
<th>Damage (000 USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tropical storm</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3,965</td>
<td>956,629</td>
<td>535,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earthquake</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>222,570</td>
<td>3,700,000.00</td>
<td>8,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drought</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,035,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flood</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3,153</td>
<td>556,358</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epidemic</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6,998</td>
<td>588,125</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>236,686</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,136,112</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,536,620</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Haiti has rarely been hit by major earthquakes even though two large faults (Enriquillo in the South and Septentrional in the North) run through the territory. The data on earthquakes presented in Table 1 refers only to the 2010 earthquake. This is the only earthquake that caused damage over the 1995-2015 period. This earthquake is considered the worst disaster and has generated the greatest
humanitarian crisis in the 21st century, in terms of lost human lives, people affected, destroyed and/or damaged infrastructure and the loss of livelihoods by the populations concerned. It resulted in: 1.5 million displaced people, i.e. 15% of the population, over 220,000 deaths, 2.3 million people living under temporary shelters, 88% of school infrastructures destroyed or damaged in the departments of Ouest, Sud-Est and Nippes, 105,000 homes totally destroyed and over 208,000 damaged, overall loss estimated at 120% of Haiti's 2009 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Government of Haiti, 2010).

The housing sector was one of the most affected by the earthquake of January 12, 2010. Extensive damage was caused to small buildings. 175,000 homes were affected in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and repair, upgrading or reconstruction work was required in the regions of Les Palmes and Sud-Est. (UN-Habitat, 2012). This aggravated the housing deficit that existed before the earthquake. For most actors, damage to buildings is due to the lack of compliance with construction standards resulting in very low-quality buildings that cannot resist the impacts of earthquakes and hurricanes.

Landslides are events that also occur more or less frequently in the country. Geological materials (underground) are likely to trigger such events just about everywhere in the country. In terms of occurrence, they are not too disastrous and no major event has been recorded over the past two decades as they remain very localized and cause relatively little human and material loss. The hurricanes, floods and droughts that repeatedly hit the country are at the root of the worsening living conditions of many Haitians. For example, the damage caused by hurricanes Sandy and Isaac in 2012 pushed nearly 3 million Haitians into food insecurity.

Epidemics frequently affect the country and sometimes cause enormous damage. Fecal waterborne epidemic diseases such as cholera are mostly caused by the failure of health services (sanitation, drinking water, etc.) The October 2010 cholera outbreak is the largest ever faced by the country. Following the initial identification in the Artibonite and Centre regions, in a few days, the disease had spread across the country and beyond. Statistics from the Ministry of Public Health (MSPP) indicate that 735,000 cases and 8,900 deaths have already been recorded. The situation remains alarming as new outbreaks occur, especially during rainy and bad weather (flood) periods. The statistics presented on Figure 1 show that the number of cases of cholera has clearly declined from 2012 to 2014 with outbreaks during the cyclone season between August and October. During the first 4 months of 2015, the number of reported cases and deaths (14,461 and 122 respectively) exceeded the number recorded for the same period in 2013 and 2014 (MSPP, cited by OCHA).
Figure 3: Number of cholera cases and deaths recorded since 2011

Source: MSPP, Data recorded until epidemiological week 48 of 2015, cited by OCHA in Humanitarian Bulletin # 56, November 2015

To address the havoc caused by the epidemic, a 2013-2022 elimination plan has been adopted and is being implemented. The case management strategies (UTC, CTC) adopted since 2010 were complemented over the past two years with mass immunization campaigns as a preventive measure. The withdrawal of partners and the decrease in dedicated funding negatively impacted periodic outbreaks. In some communities, the risk remains high especially during rainy periods due to the lack of basic social infrastructure that could generate structuring and sustainable effects in reducing the prevalence of the epidemic.

Food Insecurity

Food insecurity has been a chronic issue for over a decade. The number of people living in chronic food insecurity has remained more or less the same, about 200,000 people, since 2006. Compared to economic weaknesses and other forms of vulnerability in the country (low productivity, low production, low storage capacity), food security remains highly sensitive to external (climate, political and economic) shocks. This has been the case for the 2014-2015 drought, the 2008 and 2012 hurricanes and the 2015 soaring inflation, among others.

Response to Humanitarian Needs

Humanitarian Funding

The 2008, 2010 and 2012 post-disaster periods have been marked by a strong humanitarian presence in Haiti. This humanitarian assistance has sharply declined over the years. From 2010 to now, appeals (Flash Appeal, CAP, HAP) for funding launched by the UN system under OCHA's coordination helped address people's humanitarian needs. In 2015, the UN system replaced emergency appeals with a 2-year planning process (Transitional Appeal/TAP) aimed at building resilience and strengthening the capacity of national institutions while also addressing residual humanitarian needs. Figure 3 gives an
idea of how appeals for funding and disbursements have evolved from 2008 to 2013 under OCHA’s coordination.

Figure 4: Evolution of humanitarian funding in relation to appeals 2008-2013

Source: OCHA/ HAP 2014

From 2008 to 2014, a total of USD 2,493 billion has been raised through appeals for funding. Operations have been underfunded and a total of USD 1,625 billion was disbursed (funding rate varying from year to year), leaving certain humanitarian needs unmet. In years of crisis, appeals receive greater attention from funders for humanitarian work in Haiti. During those years, funders increase their financing volume (e.g. 2008, 2010) and gradually reduce it later. In 2015, focus was placed on development and support to state institutions through the Transitional Appeal (USD 401 million target).

Along with UN mechanisms, responses by bilateral agencies, other multilateral agencies and NGOs helped address a number of needs and improve people’s humanitarian situation. However, there is not enough data to provide a real and comprehensive picture of the funding raised. Encouraging results have been achieved in terms of improving the humanitarian situation. They are due to combined efforts by international and local actors and the Haitian government.

Internally Displaced Persons

The number of internally displaced persons (IDP) living in camps has significantly decreased between July 2010 and June 2015. It fell from 1.5 million in July 2010 to 60,801 (14,970 households) in June 2015 and the number of camps decreased from 1,555 to 45 (IOM, DTM, June 2015). These results are due to support from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in terms of reconstruction and relocation, donor supported relocation grants and voluntary and/or forced relocations (evictions). During this period, some displaced persons were subject to violations of their rights (right to assistance, right to housing, ...) and their consequences were mitigated through advocacy by civil society organizations and NGOs working to promote the right to housing.
Cholera

More structuring health, water and sanitation-related emergency responses, such as immunization, awareness-raising and infrastructure development have helped reduce the prevalence of cholera. Effects are more visible during dry periods with localized outbreaks during rainy periods. This is why development measures are important to eradicate cholera under the Haitian state’s responsibility.

Livelihoods

Efforts in agriculture through livelihood support, "Cash for Work/CFW" and “Cash for Assets/CFA", social safety net programs, have helped contain food insecurity prevalence. In 2012, these activities helped restore the situation following the dramatic food insecurity rise caused by hurricanes Sandy and Isaac.

Institutional and sectoral restructuring efforts

In this context of strong, mostly international, humanitarian assistance, the regular institutional coordination environment was replaced by UN coordination mechanisms (clusters). These existed until the last one was deactivated in December 2014.

State authorities gradually took back the lead of sector coordination in a transition process from humanitarian to development work. Sectoral tables were revived and others were created (sectoral and thematic table on risk and disaster management, sectoral table on environment, etc.) along with numerous working groups, including the Food Security and Nutrition Technical Group (GTSAN), under the leadership of the National Food Security Coordination Unit (CNSA), the Public Education and Awareness Thematic Group (GTESP) under the National Risk and Disaster Management System (SNGRD). Some operate more effectively than others among those in operation while others exist only in name. Most of the sectoral tables set up as part of the External Aid Coordination Framework for the Development of Haiti (CAED) are dysfunctional.

In parallel to institutional mechanisms, state institutions have made commitments and/or initiated processes to meet new requirements and address long forgotten key issues (e.g. seismic risk) for a better adequacy/adaptation to the context. These initiatives aimed at revitalizing the sector from a social, environmental, institutional, territorial and economic perspective are in line with the Haiti Strategic Development Plan (PSDH), which focuses on institutional rebuilding as a national priority.
Agriculture

The publication of new statistics from the General Census of Agriculture (RGA) already initiated prior to the 2010 earthquake by the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (MARNDR) provides new bases for decision-making at the social, economic, environmental, etc. levels. The RGA paints a gloomy picture of Haitian agriculture (credit access rate: 5%, UAA: 0.92 ha, irrigation: 12.9%, use of low technology, use of family labor: 96.6%). This situation shows how complex and challenging it is to revitalize the sector and improve its productivity and competitiveness. The RGA has nevertheless put women back at the center of the agricultural economy, especially in terms of participation, as nearly 25% of heads of farm are women with an average UAA of 0.74 ha, while men have 0.99 ha. They account for 44% of family and wage labor (about 4.4 million individuals). Their work includes market work (tasks performed on the farm, whether paid or unpaid) and non-market work (household chores and caregiving).

On the political level, MARNDR framed all the sector's commitments and strategic directions following the earthquake. The key sector priorities are defined through the 2010-2016 National Agricultural Investment Plan, the Three-Year Investment Program (2013-2016), the Three-Year Agricultural Recovery Program (2013-2016) published in 2011 and the 2011-2016 Agricultural Extension Master Plan, published in 2011, all aligned with the PSDH.

Housing and building reconstruction, disaster prevention

Following the earthquake, the building condition assessments conducted by the Ministry of Public Works and Communication (MTPTC) enabled humanitarian agencies to appraise the magnitude of the needs. 400,000 assessed buildings were classified using three color codes: [green (safe to live in), yellow (limited access due to safety issues and in need of repairs before they can be considered safe to live in) and red (not safe to live in or access] (ONU Habitat, 2012). The results of these assessments were: 46% green, 29% yellow, and 25% red (ONU Habitat, 2012). In response, a number of approaches were taken by the agencies based on emergency shelters, transitory/transitional shelters, rental grants or permanent shelters. The latter relate primarily to rehabilitation/repair, upgrading or reconstruction works.

Reconstruction efforts have taken place from 2010 to now to facilitate the reconstruction of safer infrastructures and also homes. A good part of the homes that were rebuild were used to relocate the people who had lost their homes to the earthquake. In order to better protect the people and reduce the impacts of future events, initiatives have been undertaken by NGOs, educational institutions, state regulatory bodies and cooperation agencies. Efforts already made include:

- The adoption of the seismic roadmap, the National Housing Policy and publication of the Haiti National Building Code (CNBH).
- The promotion of good construction practice in formal (vocational training centers, universities, trade unions) and informal sectors (training of masons) through training and the provision of tools;
- Risk awareness and prevention through hazard mapping, seismic risk monitoring, prevention work, etc.;
PRIMARY CHANGE AGENTS AND KEY STAKEHOLDERS

The Livelihoods program has relied on local organizations (producer, water user and other social organizations, Haitian NGOs, microfinance institutions, producer network) as key stakeholders for program implementation. Collaborations have been developed with state institutions at the local, regional and, to a lesser extent, central level to seek leverages. These include decentralized institutions of the Ministry of Agriculture, such as the Communal Agricultural Bureaus and the Artibonite Valley Development Agency. Higher research and technical support institutions were involved to facilitate technique popularization through research and technical support to implementation partners and producers. These include faculties of agronomy, research units attached to the Ministry of Agriculture and the Lévêque Training Center as a service provider. At the operational level on the ground, local (production, advocacy) organizations, in synergy with the above-mentioned decentralized state institutions and OUS, helped deliver project activities with producers, consumers and policy makers.

The implementation logic was similar for the DRR/Humanitarian PIP, but an approach combining direct implementation by OUS and implementation through local partners was adopted. On the ground, the program builds on the experiences of local NGOs and federative structures, such as ELRUDA, local actors (local associations, local authorities) and state and quasi-state actors (DINEPA, Health Administration, Civil Protection Directorate), international NGOs, such as the Albert Schweitzer Hospital (HAS) for program implementation and management. On the ground, local populations, including schools, have been key actors in conducting projects.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM’S THEORY OF CHANGE

The Livelihoods program has envisioned improving the quality of the rice produced by Artibonite Valley producers through enhancing the production and marketing system at the value chain level. This change was based on assumptions that producers’ income and food security will improve. To achieve this, the program relies on facilitating access to services (credit, irrigation water, processing infrastructures and techniques) for producers; developing better working relationships between producers, producer organizations and state actors; improving local consumption policies and US business practices; improved state responsiveness in favor of local rice production.

The DRR/Humanitarian PIP is in line with disaster risk management and adaptation to climate change based on a long term vision for reducing physical and socio-political vulnerability on one hand and, on the other, an inclusive disaster risk reduction policy. Intended outcomes include building the capacity of local and communal Civil Protection Committees, raising awareness among local authorities and municipalities to make them accountable for risk management and increasing OUS crisis-response capacity. Such changes are part of a process involving threat and vulnerability mapping, local mitigation initiatives, training and equipping Communal Civil Protection Committees and based on coordination with state actors and other partners, prioritizing work on water and sanitation and food security during emergencies.
EVALUATION DESIGN

KEY QUESTIONS

In accordance with the ToR, the key questions for this evaluation were built around six (6) main criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, participation, impact and sustainability (see Table 3) Other questions and criteria were added by the evaluation team, then validated by OUS to ensure a greater appreciation of program impacts and quality (See Annex 3: Detailed Methodology Document for details on all criteria).

Table 3: Summary of Key Criteria and Related Questions in accordance with the ToR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Key questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Relevance    | Action’s relevance to the issues addressed, geographic priorities, specific expected outcomes in coherence with the actual issues and needs voiced by beneficiaries, integration and embedding in Oxfam-led global food security program.  
  - To what extent are the action goals still relevant given the evolving context?  
  - Are activities aligned with project goals and objectives?  
  - Are activities aligned with expected project impacts?  
  - To what extent have the objectives and processes addressed the specific needs of the most vulnerable communities in a gender-sensitive manner? |
| Effectiveness| Extent to which the planned changes are achieved:  
  - Has the program met its stated objectives?  
  - What factors have influenced the achievement of objectives? |
| Efficiency   | Analysis of objectives against invested funds:  
  - Have the activities been cost-efficient?  
  - Have the objectives been achieved on schedule? |
| Participation| Extent to which the various beneficiary groups have participated in the different partnership structures.  
  - Multi-level participation (Oxfam-partners, Oxfam-primary change agents, partners-primary change agents);  
  - Involvement of deconcentrated state bodies;  
  - Do women have equal access to information and resources as men? |
| Impact       | To what extent has this program achieved the intended objectives?  
  - What has changed in the lives of women and men in terms of practices, ideas and beliefs?  
  - Have there been any unexpected, positive or negative, changes in the lives of men and women?  
  - What are the lessons learned from the projects regarding implementation? |
| Sustainability| Measures taken to ensure that the positive outcomes of the activity are sustainable and viable over time.  
  - To what extent will the benefits and changes generated by all these actions continue without Oxfam’s support?  
  - What factors have influenced the sustainability of the actions?  
  - To what extent have the outcomes contributed to changes in the sources of inequality among the different groups (men, women, marginalized people).  
  - Has the relationship between citizens, community-based organizations and state institutions changed? Is there greater dialogue between these actors? Is there greater commitment? |
TEAM

The mission was conducted by a mixed, multidisciplinary team consisting of a team leader, expert in humanitarian and development program evaluation issues, an agricultural engineer for all issues related to environmental and agricultural (crop and livestock) production aspects and an expert in humanitarian work and social communication. This team was supported by three (3) junior specialists (an agricultural engineer, a sociologist and an agro-economist) especially for data collection (see Annex 10 for details).

METHODOLOGY

The methodology used is based on the key criteria set out in the Terms of Reference (ToR) plus additional criteria (coherence, coordination and synergy, accountability, participation) proposed by the evaluation team through their service delivery tender and validated by OUS. The Detailed Methodology Document can be found in Annex 3. The criteria previously established in the ToR are the following:

- relevance of the strategies, actions and activities chosen;
- implementation effectiveness and efficiency (partnership working strategy);
- the strategy adopted and the participation process - involvement of women and youth in the various actions.
- the (direct and indirect) effects of actions;
- community ownership of actions and involvement in project management and outcome sustainability;
- viability of the outcomes and impacts of the different actions.

The findings, recommendations and lessons learned as to the criteria used are part of this document.

IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY

Both PIPs were evaluated in parallel. The working approach was mostly participatory using data from interviews with program stakeholders. The participatory component was complemented by a quantitative dimension focused on data collection from formal surveys (Livelihoods PIP) with primary change agents. This approach served to address the dimensions covered by the evaluation at different institutional and non-institutional levels - to understand the outcomes in terms of changes in individual, institutional and community practices in the areas of work - to frame lessons learned - to identify good practices and propose recommendations for future improvements and adjustments.

DATA PROCESSING TOOLS, METHODS & TECHNIQUES USED

The following tools and methods have been used to carry out the mission.

In-Depth Literature Review

The literature reviewed includes project documentation (periodic and detailed reports, evaluation reports, training materials, study reports, etc.), sector-related documents (policy documents, macroeconomic guidelines, normative documents, etc.) reports from other actors (agencies, NGOs, state institutions) working on the issues (agricultural production, reconstruction, aid effectiveness, disaster risk management and emergency response, water, sanitation and hygiene, etc.) addressed in
the PIPs.

Key informant interviews and focus group discussions

Key informant interviews were conducted with state and/or non-state actors, PIP stakeholders (see Annex 6: Key Informant Interview Guide for details on the issues addressed). Key relevant actors were:

- Regional bodies (ODVA, OREPA, Departmental Technical Civil Protection Coordination Unit, ELRUDA);
- Local state bodies (Verrettes and Petite-Rivière BAC, TEPAC);
- Local state (BAC, TEPAC, Health Administration) and civil society (SOFA) institution officials;
- Local authorities (interim agents, Communal Board of Directors or CASEC, Communal Assemblies or ASEC) in target areas;
- Implementing partner organization steering committee members (FENAPRIH, PRODEVA, SOE, ITECA, APPEL, CERFAS, PAPDA, APDAL, AIDMRD, MAFLPV, AILA, RACPABA, etc.);
- OUS team members involved in project and activity monitoring, implementation and support in Haiti and in the US.

Focus Group Discussions (FGD) and semi-structured interviews were conducted with actors involved in the implementation and management of actions included in the PIPs. The data collected were formulated in relation with intended outcomes and evaluation criteria (see Annex 5: Focus Group Discussion Guide for details on the questions). The actors interviewed include:

- Non-state and quasi-state organizations such as SOFA;
- Local and communal risk and disaster management structures (CCPC, CLPC) strengthened and/or created through the DRR/Humanitarian PIP;
- Primary change agents involved in responses provided through the PIPs (housing beneficiaries, producers supported, irrigation workers who are Cash for Work beneficiaries, business credit clients, etc.);
- Local management structures created by the project (WASH Works Management Committees: Health Committees, Source and Well Management Committees, Community Latrine Management Committees, etc.).

Formal Survey and Data Processing

The questionnaires developed focus on relevant aspects of the program (see Annex 4 for details on the questions). Formal surveys were conducted with primary change agents who receive support through the Livelihoods PIP (rice value chain). In agreement with OUS, targeting prioritized rice producers supported by local partners (APDAL and AIDMRD) and surveys focused mainly on SRI extension in the Artibonite Valley.

These surveys were conducted with a view to compare the pre- and post- implementation situations, to appraise individual-level effects and to get insight into current trends. Interviewees were selected using stratified purposive sampling (by sex) based on the lists provided by partners. Within strata, individuals were chosen randomly. The samples collected account for about 20% of all the producers who receive support within each population group. In total, 119 producers (52 men and 67 women) were interviewed.

The data collected were entered into an MS-Access relational database. They were statistically processed using SPSS and MS-Excel. The evaluation team's direct observations and data from FGDs and key informant interviews provided a basis for bias reduction and complemented the analyses. The findings and observations are presented by criteria in this evaluation report.
Targeted Field Visits

They consisted in direct observations on the ground with a view to improve the quality of data analysis, for example:

- the quality of its execution: selecting partners, techniques/technologies, primary change agents;
- the effects and changes at the institutional level and in the living conditions and practices of beneficiary families;
- the relevance of the techniques and technologies disseminated and supporting strategies used.

Stakeholder Coverage

In data collection, particular attention was given to the views of different actors on how PIPs are perceived in relation to the criteria under study. This approach was used to help stakeholders take a stand on the information for its final validation and inclusion in the report. Table 6 presents the actors interviewed for each PIP during data collection, the collection methods used and the evaluation criteria that were analyzed.

Table 4: Actors Interviewed, Collection Methods Used and Criteria Covered

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relevant PIP</th>
<th>Actors Interviewed</th>
<th>Data Collection Methods</th>
<th>Criteria Covered</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Livelihoods</td>
<td>▪ Local authorities (Communal Board of Directors/CASEC, Communal Assemblies/ASEC)</td>
<td>▪ Key informant interviews</td>
<td>▪ Effectiveness</td>
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<td></td>
<td>▪ Project Officers</td>
<td>▪ Focus Group Discussion</td>
<td>▪ Efficiency</td>
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<td></td>
<td>▪ Local implementing partners (PRODEVA, SOE, MAFLPV, AILA, AIBMRD, RACPABA, APPEL,</td>
<td>▪ Formal survey</td>
<td>▪ Sustainability/viability</td>
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<td></td>
<td>APDAL, FENAPRIH, PAPDA)</td>
<td>▪ Direct observations</td>
<td>▪ Outcomes/Impacts</td>
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<td></td>
<td>▪ Primary change agents (water users, producers, youth, traders)</td>
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<td>▪ Relevance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>▪ Partner sectoral institutions (ODVA, BAC)</td>
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<td>▪ Participation</td>
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<td>▪ Key informant interviews</td>
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<td>▪ Focus Group Discussion</td>
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<td>▪ Targeting and coverage</td>
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<td></td>
<td>▪ Direct observations</td>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Coordination and synergy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRR/Humanitarian Preparedness</td>
<td>▪ Primary change agents, CFW workers</td>
<td>▪ Key informant interviews</td>
<td>▪ Effectiveness</td>
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<td>▪ Departmental Civil Protection</td>
<td>▪ Interviews</td>
<td>▪ Efficiency</td>
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<td></td>
<td>▪ RDM structures CCPC, CLPC, Project Officer</td>
<td>▪ Focus Group Discussion</td>
<td>▪ Sustainability/viability</td>
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<td>▪ Local authorities</td>
<td>▪ Direct observations</td>
<td>▪ Outcomes/Impacts</td>
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<td></td>
<td>▪ Local implementing partners: ELRUDA, PRODEVA</td>
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<td>▪ Relevance</td>
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<td>RDM Humanitarian preparedness:</td>
<td>▪ Key informant interviews</td>
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</table>
The evaluation team collected information from different categories of stakeholders on the three regions covered by the PIPs. Priority was given to the main projects and focus areas in order to have the most objective and comprehensive picture possible of the implementation outcomes. The data collected is not intended in any way to cover all the activities and/or micro-projects implemented. Data collection focused primarily on the Lower-Artibonite area, where most PIP activities have been taking place. This strategy was used by OUS with a view to provide the most integrated response possible for the benefit of the primary change agents receiving support. In complement to the intense data collection work in the Artibonite Valley, the 2012 post-hurricane reconstruction and response efforts have not been ignored. Table 5 presents the geographic coverage of data collection for each PIP and the number of people interviewed by sex and by PIP.

### Table 5: Evaluation mission's (geographic and individual) coverage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Relevant PIP</th>
<th>Communes Covered</th>
<th># people interviewed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artibonite</td>
<td>Livelihoods</td>
<td>Verrettes, Marchand-Dessalines, Saint-Marc, La Chapelle, Petite-Rivière</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DRR/Humanitarian</td>
<td>Verrettes, Marchand, Saint-Marc, Petite-Rivière, Grande-Saline, Desdunes,</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouest</td>
<td>DRR/Humanitarian</td>
<td>Gressier</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nippes</td>
<td>DRR/Humanitarian</td>
<td>Anse-à-Veau, Arnault, Petite-Rivière de Nippes</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Data processing

The data collected from different sources (secondary sources, key informant interviews, focus group discussions, formal surveys, in-situ direct observation) were triangulated to ensure that the information obtained is relevant and valid. Once triangulated and validated, they are included in the document. Technical and evaluative appraisals by team members facilitated the analyses. Finally, these analyses have been reinforced by those derived from reflection sessions (workshops) bringing together evaluation team members, OUS team members, implementing partner organization leaders, sectoral state institutions (Health Administration, BACs, ODVA), local authorities (CASEC, ASEC, mayors/interim agents) and relevant primary change agents.

Qualitative and quantitative questions and indicators were used for collecting data and analyzing the PIPs’ retrospective and prospective dimensions. They served to assess their outcomes in terms of achievements, benefits and ownership by local actors.
WORKSHOPS FOR DISCUSSING, FEEDING BACK AND VALIDATING FINDINGS

They bring together key partners, the OUS team involved in implementation, primary change agents, sectoral institution members and local authorities. The aim is to share with them the results and findings, key recommendations and lessons learned to obtain viewpoints and critical insights into them while also reflecting together on possible improvements.

EVALUATION LIMITATIONS

The conclusions of this report do not capture all the details about performance or counter-performance of all the activities implemented. Given the volume of partners and activities involved, a prioritization exercise was carried out. Therefore, this does not allow for a comprehensive set of observations, conclusions and recommendations at all levels.

As some projects ended over a year ago, it has been difficult to engage a number of actors on the ground in discussing and further developing certain issues.

Moreover, the purpose of this mission was not to evaluate technically the techniques and technologies disseminated and the infrastructures built. So, the report does not contain any technical assessment details. It does highlight, however, how outcomes are appraised by local actors.

In light of this, the report is not meant to replace any technical evaluation and/or implementation document produced previously. It should be seen as a complementary tool that summarizes PIP achievements, such as the outcomes, the quality of implementation, ownership of results by local actors, good practices and lessons learned.
EVALUATION FINDINGS

This section presents key observations made by the evaluation team. They are organized according to the key criteria covered by the evaluation, i.e.:

- Coherence and alignment
- Targeting/coverage
- Relevance
- Effectiveness
- Outcomes/Impacts
- Efficiency
- Outcome sustainability/viability
- Participation, accountability and respect for rights and dignity
- Coordination and synergies
- Lessons learned.

PROGRAM COHERENCE AND ALIGNMENT

To evaluate the consistency of development and humanitarian policies on one hand and, on the other hand, the links between both PIPs in light of national and regional development strategies and plans and sectoral plans.

The 2010 earthquake and cholera epidemic resulted in a redefinition and redirection of sectoral policies and priorities in Haiti in the areas of agriculture, disaster risk management, especially prevention and community preparedness, and housing and public infrastructure reconstruction, among others.

The findings about the PIPs have shown that there are strong links between them and sectoral priorities regarding reconstruction, cholera response, risk and “natural” disaster management and livelihoods. The strategy of developing partnerships with national institutions and civil society organizations while supporting them in defining specific directions helped ensure coherence among activities. Internally, the PIP review has shown that there is internal coherence between both PIPs and OUS priorities in Haiti.

Livelihoods

Oxfam USA’s (OUS) work is aligned with state priorities in a number of areas, including agricultural production, processing and marketing as defined in the agricultural recovery plan and agricultural investment plan, among others. It enabled some partner (state and non-state) organizations to consolidate their experiences and to develop new skills related to their area of work/mandate.

- FENAPRIH in the area of advocacy for advancing the local rice value chain for the benefit of local producers and consumers;
- Community-based organizations (CBOs), water user associations such as the Association des Irrigants du Bas-Maître Rive Droite/AIBMRD, Asosyasyon Iriyan Lyankou-Latibonit/AILA, Association des Planteurs pour le Développement de l’Agriculture dans l’Artibonite/APDAL, the Réseau des Associations Coopératives pour la Commercialisation et la Production Agricole du Bas-Artibonite/RACPABA, Verrettes et Petite-Rivière Communal Agricultural Bureaus (BACs) in the areas of production, support to agricultural services to producers, processing and marketing in the rice value chain;
- The Service Œcuménique d’Entraide (SOE) in the provision of services related to onion production, preservation and marketing and grain marketing support;
The Association Haïtienne pour la Promotion d'un Développement Autonome (PRODEVA) in the areas of livestock production and irrigation works maintenance, recovery and protection.

In most cases, activities implemented in the targeted agricultural value chains are aligned with the mandate of partner organizations like BACs, the Artibonite Valley Development Agency (OVDA), water user organizations (AILA, APDAL, AIBMRD and PRODEVA) and others like the Faculty of Agronomy and Veterinary Medicine (FAMV). Through these activities, public institutions like FAMV, ODVA and the BACs could play a key role in initiatives that seek to increase farm productivity through providing research services and facilitating access to factors of production, e.g. irrigation water and technical support.

OUS partnership enabled other organizations to engage in areas different from their own. This provided new opportunities to these organizations.

- The Mouvement d'Aide aux Femmes de Liancourt Payen Verrettes (MAFLPV), specializing in credit but framed as a partner in the Livelihoods PIP (rice value chain), could develop a strong expertise in rice production;
- The Association des Parents et des Professeurs d'École de Liancourt (APPEL), in the area of vocational training in agricultural mechanics;
- The Institut de Technologie et d'Animation (ITECA) in housing reconstruction.

Livelihoods support is concerned with the key lead value chains (vegetable/onion, rice) prioritized by the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (MARNDR) as set out in the agricultural recovery plan. In that sense, the value chain approach taken as a work strategy remains consistent with that which MARNDR has been promoting over the past decade. The choice of target areas is also in line with the priority established by sector authorities.

The value chain approach taken (from production to marketing) addresses different levels of sectoral priority as defined by MARNDR: training, funding, technical support, processing and marketing. This working approach seeks to promote a more productive and profitable agriculture as a potential key driver in the economy in general and that of producers in particular.

In some cases, OUS activities that need to be institutionally anchored and sustained over the long term are in advance of sectoral priorities. In that sense, they are not part of initiatives and/or policies of national institutions that could take over upon completion. This undermines any institutional effect they may have. For instance:

- Training in agricultural mechanics is not yet considered among the trades included in the vocational training program headed by MARNDR and regulated by the National Vocational Training Institute (INFP). This choice poses a serious challenge in terms of the possibilities of seeking institutional anchoring.
- System of Rice Intensification (SRI) extension goes beyond the technique promoted by MARNDR, which is the Improved Rice System (SRA for its acronym in French). This production technique is used by a large number of producers supported by OUS and partners, but not yet included in MARNDR's policy. The fact that SRI is not included in State strategic directions and sectoral policies hinders its incorporation into MARNDR as the national bearer of the Haitian agricultural policy. MARNDR actors are nevertheless aware of SRI's potential technical performance (improved productivity).

**DDR/Humanitarian**

The 2010 earthquake and other disasters that occurred over these past years have contributed to make state institutions more sensitive to disaster prevention, preparedness and response work. Prevention, mitigation (flood risk reduction, access to water, sanitation and hygiene - WASH), preparedness, emergency response (natural disasters, cholera epidemics) and reconstruction actions implemented by
OUS are generally informed by the current context and aligned with sectoral priorities established mostly after 2010.

As a result of these actions, partner structures such as communal and local risk and disaster management committees, partner organizations/NGOs such as the Fondation Dessalines 2004 (FONDESSA) were able to better position themselves as actors of local risk management. They could thus build their capacity and skills to improve local risk governance in keeping with their mandate. Collaborative work with the Departmental Technical Civil Protection Coordination Unit helped align stakeholder actions with annual action plans while also giving OUS a key role in the region and sectoral leadership in its areas of work.

The working approach based on building partnerships with state institutions contributed to increase OUS’ influence in defining regional-level strategic directions (regional action plans in risk and disaster management/RDM for CP) and in prioritizing commitments for the sector. These annual operational plans established by the SNGRD identify RDM needs (priorities) to be addressed and provide a framework for all actions undertaken by sectoral partners. Through this approach, once annual action plans are validated, OUS’ priorities are automatically included. In that sense, OUS actions build bridges with the sub-regional level sectoral priorities validated by the National Risk and Disaster Management System (SNGRD).

In the Nippes region, water system rehabilitation work is deemed inconsistent with the National Directorate for Water Supply and Sanitation’s (DINEPA) strategy. At the area level, DINEPA’s strategy is based on the implementation of new Drinking Water and Sanitation/DWS systems (with water conveyance lines for urban supply), differing from that taken by OUS for cholera response.

TARGETING/COVERAGE

The need to reach a large group of people exposed to crisis (natural hazard-related disaster, food shortage, etc.) risks.

People’s vulnerabilities stand out as the basic element/key criterion that guides OUS actions in its target areas (individual targeting, geographic targeting). This strategy is consistent with and relevant to humanitarian preparedness/response work. In addition to the needs to be addressed and people’s vulnerabilities, geographic targeting is based on strategic prioritization by OUS. Based on discussions with stakeholders, these parameters were adopted primarily for the DRR/Humanitarian preparedness PIP and for some activities of the Livelihoods PIP. Through emergency responses, vulnerabilities are assessed based on how much they affect individuals and communities.

With a multiple aim of addressing food insecurity, strengthening livelihoods, building resilience to shocks and improving production, processing and marketing for producers, the Livelihoods PIP bases most of its (individual and geographic) choices on productive potential for targeted actions.

The targeting strategy used for implementing both PI PPs may prove to be ineffective if OUS plans to rely on an approach integrating both programs (Livelihoods and DRR) to generate more structuring and viable outcomes in target communities.

Livelihoods

If we look at the food insecurity prevalence map based on IPC’s 2013 calculations (see figure 5), OUS target areas are not the most affected by food insecurity in the Lower-Artibonite region. Therefore, this work is conducted in areas that are either subject to food stress or to low food insecurity (see figure 6). Geographic targeting is especially justified by the agricultural production potential in the areas and
capacity to supply other local markets with a view to promote food sovereignty and combat food insecurity. Beyond the capacity of families that are not necessarily the most vulnerable to food insecurity in the country, such choices remain justified as this work is not meant to address food crises but to prevent them.

Figure 6: Haiti Food Security Map, IPC, October 2013

Overall, needs coverage remains low despite intensified action by local actors over the years. This applies both to geographic and individual coverage relative to the scale of needs. Given the range of needs and people’s increased vulnerability, priority areas have been selected by OUS. Within strategic areas of work, coverage is deemed insufficient by local actors given the number of producers supported over the total population and the volume of services (credit, seeds, training, equipment, materials, etc.) offered.

Individual and geographic coverage, however, remain coherent as the actions implemented by OUS and partners are only pilot initiatives aimed at promoting a new approach among local producers and supporting organizations through more effective techniques and technologies. These are part of an effort to revitalize the agricultural production sector.

One of the program’s weaknesses in terms of targeting/coverage is the lack of documentation on the criteria and reasons for choosing these priority areas. Targeting criteria are still poorly documented and little known by local actors.

Normally, in a vision of development through an integrated approach, coverage could remain low. Following are some of the points raised by stakeholders:

- Needs coverage is deemed too low by a number of program partners, such as Verrettes and Petite-Rivières BACs, APDAL, AIBM RD, MAFLPV and AILA;
- The program’s support to MAFLPV enabled them to support producers from two (2) of the seven (7) production blocks placed under the organization’s leadership;
In the production blocks supported by MAFLPV, with the program’s assistance, only 60% of 666 potential clients were granted loans using the credit funds made available to them (service credit for rice production). As for business credit, 340 potential clients are yet to be covered, including 40 men.

The amounts of the loans granted to producers do not meet their funding needs. This has increased the risk of fungibility of these loans among the clients receiving support.

The choice of all the service credit clients within a production block provided the programs with multiple benefits that are critical for the intended outcomes in the middle and long term:

- A potential for generating multiplying effects - an asset for replication;
- Better acceptance by implementation partners;
- Higher visibility of the program, techniques and technologies promoted;
- Opportunities for following up and building on outcomes;
- Increasing social cohesion among producers within production blocks;
- Greater compliance with the crop calendar by producers receiving support.

DRR/Humanitarian

OUS’ selection of strategic areas of work limits the possibilities of including in our programming certain areas (cholera risk exposure, weak WASH systems, flood risk exposure, among others) with pockets of high vulnerability and “natural” disaster risk exposure. Examples include Bocozelle in Saint-Marc, l'Estère, La Chapelle, through the work (awareness raising, cholera response, access to water, etc.) of the Artibonite Department Local Emergency Response Team, nevertheless considered to be highly vulnerable areas.

For emergency response, the targeting (of actions, primary change agents) is in line with the principle of impartiality that should guide any emergency response. The Damage Assessment and Needs Analysis (DANA) carried out with the participation of local actors, such as Civil Protection structures (communal committees and risk and disaster management committees), local authorities and community-based organizations, is used as a basis for targeting beneficiaries. Vulnerability and the level of impact noted when identifying damages to property (housing, livestock, gardens) and human life (injuries, deaths) have guided emergency and reconstruction operations. The pre-identification of beneficiaries using DANA data is completed with an in situ cross-check by partners and OUS to reduce the risk of instrumentalization, misappropriation and targeting issues. This strategy served to ensure an effective response by matching the needs of the people affected with those of the people actually targeted by the response.

For cholera-related risk management, awareness-raising on environmental protection, drinking water and sanitation, targeting beneficiary schools and communities based on clear vulnerability criteria known by local partners helps address the actual needs of needy, health-risk sensitive people.

Within households, the targeting of beneficiaries in post-disaster emergency response focuses primarily on women according to the CTD strategy. Once identified as actually affected based on the DANA findings, beneficiaries receive pre-designed tokens enabling them to participate and to have access to the sites where (food and nonfood) items are distributed. To reduce any possibility of tokens being falsified, members of the Communal and Local Civil Protection Committees (CCPC and CLPC) are mobilized on the distribution sites when tokens are given by other committee members to the people affected to welcome them. Such strategy, however, is likely to exclude single-parent households headed by affected (and vulnerable) men in need of assistance.

Overall coverage is relatively low compared to risk and disaster management needs in target communities. It is mitigated through regional coordination efforts by the National System to ensure a better distribution of thematic actors on the ground. With respect to the prevailing needs and
vulnerability, OUS' logic of operating through strategic priority areas did not facilitate the consideration of certain areas highly exposed to "natural" disaster risk.

**Good Practices/Lessons Learned**
- The geographic and individual targeting of actions, guided by individual and community vulnerabilities, enabled partners to reduce the risk of frustration within and between communities.
- The system set up by the Lower-Artibonite Departmental Technical Coordination Unit (CTD), which focuses on tokens awarded only to women, enabled them to effectively participate in post-crisis response and to be safeguarded from potential community violence.

**RELEVANCE**

Assessing the correlation between PIPs and local needs and priorities
- Action's relevance to the issues addressed, geographic priorities;
- Action's relevance to specific expected outcomes in coherence with the actual issues and needs voiced by beneficiaries and their interrelations at all levels;
- Integration and embedding in Oxfam-led global food security program.

Overall, OUS' work with support from local partners served to address local needs and priorities through different types of responses: emergency, risk reduction, reconstruction, support to production, processing and marketing. The actions carried out resulted in either of the following:
- Meeting urgent needs faced by communities and addressing local humanitarian and/or development priorities;
- Enabling them to develop the tools and/or skills needed for their social, environmental and economic well-being;
- Restoring people's livelihoods and dignity following distress situations (health crisis, "natural" disasters);
- Increasing the capacity of local organizations (communal agricultural bureaus, educational institutions, ODVA, RDM structures, producer organizations) to provide outreach services.
- Restoring sector leadership and linkage building between state regulatory and support agencies and local communities.

**Lesson learned**
As needs were identified and actions were planned based on participatory assessments carried out with local actors, the responses provided were more appropriate to the actual needs/priorities of the target communities.

Considering the changing implementation environment and the emergence of new local needs and priorities in target areas, implementation monitoring teams provided some flexibility in the projects, but to varying degrees. The close relations created by OUS with its partners helped develop some flexibility during project implementation. Indicative of this is the fact that new local (emergency and/or development) needs were addressed and the planned response was adjusted to match on-the-ground realities. The degree of flexibility, however, depends on the team in charge of monitoring project implementation. These observations were made by actors and stakeholders involved in both PIPs. Moreover, OUS team's flexibility helped develop further synergies between both PIPs on the ground, which had not been defined during the planning process.

**Livelihoods**

The responses and support provided by the program reflect for the most part their appropriateness to the needs identified by local actors/stakeholders. More in-depth feasibility and/or identification
assessments remain necessary for a more successful implementation of certain activities (see Persisting Needs section next page).

In terms of gender promotion, according to information provided by stakeholders, the assistance provided to women involved in the rice sector matches their needs. By seeking to strengthen and enhance the economic role of women engaged along the rice value chain, the program attempted to provide solutions that meet women’s specific needs. Through credit, it addressed the priority need (access to credit) of women within the target area. According to women, they are better perceived and valued at the social, economic, community and family levels. This perception would be sustained through improving their access to credit and providing greater opportunity for them to participate in the public sphere.

**Key Remark**
Through designing differentiated solutions for women and promoting gender mainstreaming as an institutional policy across all actions by partner organizations, the program has helped build women’s technical capacity as agents in the agricultural (rice and onion) value chains in the areas of production, processing and marketing. Women thus play an effective and active role just like men.

Building women’s leadership both globally (societally) and in terms of funding marketing activities is about to impact positively on women’s role as actors in agriculture and community development.

With respect to training, the information received from the different actors on the ground served to establish the evidence between the needs expressed by partners and producers prior to project implementation and the training offered by the program. The following figures (7 and 8) illustrate this relation between the needs expressed and the training received by local actors. They don’t show all the needs expressed and all the forms of assistance received.

**Figure 8: Training needs expressed by farmers prior to project implementation (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Needs</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Processing techniques</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water management - Credit Management - Production techniques</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water management</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit management</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit management - Production techniques</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit management - Production techniques</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 7: Training provided by projects (% producers)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Provided</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Processing techniques</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production techniques</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water management - Credit Management - Production techniques</td>
<td>21.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Water management</td>
<td>26.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Credit management</td>
<td>16.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Credit management - Production techniques</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management - Production techniques</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Lesson learned**
The use of a value chain approach was the basis for the added value of PIP actions as compared to other similar initiatives carried out by other actors. It enabled:
- Partner organizations and producers to develop technical potential (including production technique, advocacy and business management skills) that is useful for improving sector efficiency;
- To make operators (partner producer organizations) visible on the production value chains supported;
- Decision-makers to show some responsiveness to possible improvements in technical performance in a context of climate change, resource scarcity and trade liberalization.
The social, technical and physical capital made available to partners allowed them to position themselves as potential actors supporting these lead value chains within the target areas and capable of addressing needs expressed across these value chains. Actions combining support to social/organizational structuring, processing and, to a lesser degree, marketing of agricultural produce (rice and vegetables), technical and vocational training, support to production processes (materials and equipment, credit, technical monitoring, access to water, storage, processing, transportation facilities, organic rodent control) have addressed the differentiated needs of actors on these production value chains.

**Program's Flexibility**

Changes made during implementation have provided evidence of the program's flexibility and OUS team's responsiveness to develop actions that address emerging needs and challenges in order to provide appropriate responses to the populations we serve. For instance:

- A change in the credit management policy with a view to increase its effectiveness and ensure its viability for the benefit of local partners and clients;
- The development of synergies during implementation with the DRR/Humanitarian PIP for enhanced impact with an effort to mainstream RDM into the PIP activities;
- The search for solutions adapted to local conditions, such as drought, soil type, etc. through livestock activities.

**Persisting Needs**

Relevant needs persist in the areas of work, undermining the intended impacts. Some initiatives could not solve actual issues faced by communities sometimes due to a lack of needs assessment and feasibility study. ¹

**Key persisting needs**

- Lack of locally based technicians to carry out maintenance and repairs of the farm machinery made available to partners together with a high demand for such services on the part of producers and CBOs.
- Limited access to seeds (use of grains) and fertilizers (supply, affordability/price, availability), lack of agricultural equipment (tractors and tillers) hindering farming operations (ploughing, seeding, fertilization) in quantity and in quality.
- Access to market/marketing (a real bottleneck for the rice value chain in the current context due to competition with large private companies and state-subsidized imported rice) is hardly covered by project activities. Such support has been identified as a real need by producers and producer organizations.

It has also been noted that some of the activities planned could not be implemented. Other activities that were carried out did not target all of the intended beneficiaries, thus limiting the scope of the solutions provided. At the same time, they had an impact on measuring the effectiveness of certain aspects of the program (see 7.4 for details). These planned activities were not conducted due to technical feasibility issues and/or because they were not adapted to the local context. For instance:

- The location of the rice processing center provided to MAFLPV is not highly valued because of its distance from the production block;

¹ Technical, financial and environmental feasibility study
• Equipping the houses that were rebuilt in Gressier with a bio-digester model requiring a pig farming unit in view of the waste supply problem;
• The setting up of an onion preservation center by SOE in Bocozelle, where agricultural production during the harvest season does not require storage for producers (early harvest, profitable agricultural price, sales without any significant impact on income);
• The type of livestock chosen for the commune of Marchand whose adaptation to the local micro-context is a challenge;
• The chlorine-based water treatment system used for community wells requires monitoring work that exceeds local organizational capabilities;
• The occupational integration of young people trained in agricultural mechanics is blocked due the lack of links with local employers and the lack of vocational development of trainees.

**DRR/Humanitarian**

Communal and local risk management structures (CCPC and CLPC), including CBOs and ELRUDA, still need sustained support, especially in terms of logistics and internal management skills development, to increase their operational capacity (response) in normal times and in times of crisis. Without such responses, their operational capacity in local risk and disaster management will remain blocked.

Mitigation actions have addressed critical needs of families and producers exposed to flood risks (crop and house protection, recovery of plots). These actions have provided solutions to local priorities of producers. While these actions did address problems upstream, they did not provide solutions to these same problems downstream at the household and farm levels.

Awareness raising and the building of wells in schools and communities in order to contain and/or prevent cholera address local needs and priorities. These activities were complemented by local WASH capacity building initiatives (training and mobilization of health officers, setting up of local WASH infrastructure (water points/sources, toilets) management committees. These activities, according to

Community well providing people with access to water. Credit: Oxfam USA
local actors, tackle the root causes of cholera. Awareness-raising and training activities for local actors addressed the lack of knowledge of good practices in hygiene and access to drinking water, which are necessary to combat cholera and other fecal waterborne diseases. The strength of implementing this type of activities lies essentially in targeting based on objective criteria:

- Geographic location/difficulty of access to target areas and sanitation infrastructures (remote communities with no access to water points and sanitation facilities)
- Educational institutions (public and community schools) serving children from poor families with no access to drinking water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) facilities.

**Program's Flexibility**

The OUS team has shown flexibility in considering new contextual data, especially the new needs created by crises. This was noted in responses to cholera outbreaks and in the damage caused by the 2012 hurricanes.

Specifically, this flexibility was expressed through:

- combining the emergency response (cholera outbreak, hurricanes/floods) in the Artibonite region with more structuring responses to address new needs and sustain the interest of local actors in other (more structuring) projects.
- re-designing the housing construction project: simplifying the housing construction project taking out the "equipping houses with biodigesters" component, a costly option whose technical effectiveness and sustainability are likely to be low.

**Persisting Needs**

Relevant needs persist in the areas of work, undermining the program's intended impacts. Despite the actions implemented, the extent of local needs and the lack of focused, structuring responses at the sector level by other state and non-state actors are the reasons why certain needs persist. These are not being addressed by OUS, its partners and other actors working in the target area.

**Key persisting needs**

The evaluation team was able to identify persisting needs and challenges faced by local risk management structures and primary change agents.

- ELRUDA's needs for capacity building in leadership development, budget making and management, project cycle management (PCM), conflict, gender, crisis communications, shelter and life-saving management, and Damage Assessment and Needs Analysis (DANA).
- ELRUDA and Civil Protection structures lacking the local technical, administrative and logistical capacity they need to be operational (office and response supplies and equipment, training, female leadership, equipped storage facilities, crisis communications system, a better adapted and more effective early warning system).
- Unaddressed community health issues caused by a lack of sanitation and hygiene resulting in mosquito population increase.
- Little support from state authorities and other sectoral actors and tense relations between CCPC and CLPC members and municipal and local authorities, slowing down their operation;
- Local structures lacking the logistical and financial capacity to conduct operations and/or responses on their own before the arrival of external actors.
- The need for risk management committee and ELRUDA members to receive training and capacity-building in RDM and lifesaving skills.

The PIP actions have addressed basic needs and issues that hindered the dynamic operation of the deconcentrated RDM structures. They allowed them to address some of their actual needs (materials, training, warning system, evacuation...), including the needs of their community. In terms of strengthening, they did not contribute to better working relationships between the local authorities and
the other RDM structure members nor to effective crisis response and prevention capacity without external support.

**Lesson learned**
OUS actions, while providing responses focused on reducing people’s vulnerabilities, should be reinforced by those of other sectoral actors in order to further build community resilience.

**EFFECTIVENESS**

*Measuring the extent to which the project objectives have been achieved in light of the project outputs.*
- Extent to which planned changes are achieved;
- Effectiveness of capacity-building support provided by OUS to the various partners;
- Effectiveness of the technical and methodological support provided by OUS;
- Effectiveness of support to production, market access, actions targeting weak socio-economic groups, e.g. women.

The goals sought by OUS in both PIPs remain somewhat very ambitious given the complexity of the context and the implementation timeframe. It should be noted that the context is one of high political volatility and significant institutional weaknesses. In such a context, the timeframe is relatively short to achieve sustainable structuring effects. The multidimensionality of the outcomes desired exceeds the actual capacity of partners and sector regulatory bodies. The evaluation team, however, was able to note real changes at the **organizational, individual, community** and even **sector** levels for the different projects assessed. Such changes also concern socio-economic groups with specific needs, including women, especially heads of households, and youth.

Through both PIPs, commitments have generated dynamics and changes that go beyond community level. Through coordinated support and work with state operational structures, the PIP actions brought about changes at multiple levels:
- **Individual level:** financial and technical capacity building of producers in the areas of production, processing and management, behavioral changes in relation to natural and health risks;
- **Institutional or organizational level:** improvements in partners’ capacity to negotiate, in producer credit management and technical support, revenue-generation potential, internal cohesion, enhancement of women’s role in production and organizational management processes, empowerment of local operators and organizations in agricultural development and risk management dynamics;
- **Community level:** revitalized solidarity approaches (coubite, solidarity groups) for local development initiatives (e.g. road infrastructure rehabilitation) benefitting the community, empowerment of local people in local PIP-related local works management structures (source management committees, latrine management committees, etc.);
- **Sector level:** Need to study the comparative advantages of SRI over other techniques currently promoted that are likely to create long term multiplying effects, awareness of state-and water user management of dredging and drainage work through the implementation of a stakeholder responsibility MoU for irrigators and state actors, changes in increased US aid effectiveness.

Investments made in sustainable agriculture value chain projects (provision of equipment, implementation of a suitable funding system), housing reconstruction and risk management projects have strengthened the capacity of the people and partners supported by the programs.

Whenever possible, the PIPs have worked towards the stated outcomes and goals. In some cases, outcomes exceed expectations, as is the case for community awareness of sanitation, increased rice yield through SRI, agricultural extension, credit, irrigation canal dredging, drainage for soil recovery, disaster risk reduction. Overall, these initiatives have contributed to improve producers’ income as a
result of agricultural diversification and the use of new production, preservation and processing techniques, improved local production and yield capacity leading to a better resilience to food insecurity. In RDM, they have helped to better protect crops and houses from flood risks and provided local communities with improved capacity in this area and improved access to WASH services and protection for households vulnerable to health risks.

These actions have provided useful support to primary change agents without any major deviation from initial objectives. However, the lack of a strong technical monitoring system prevents access to data that could give a clear indication of the changes brought about at different levels. This is why it is difficult to establish whether or not certain objectives - such as improved quality of husked rice, increase in the price of SRI-produced rice compared to other variants, the volume of water used per unit area with SRI, financial advantages of SRI over other techniques, the impact of advocacy work on (national-level) policy measures and differentiated effects of actions on women - have been achieved.

Building the capacity of local actors in local risk management, including aspects related to response, risk mitigation, awareness-raising and disaster risk preparedness, has provided communities with the institutional structures and local expertise they need to safeguard lives and property.

**Key Impacts on Women**

The socio-economic position of women has been strengthened through production initiatives. They feel they are treated as actors equally as men in the functioning of their households (funding of expenses) and in community-based organizations. Prioritizing the inclusion of women as a quality criterion in projects has enabled partner organizations to more strongly promote women's engagement and participation in social and economic initiatives. This has yielded positive results (economic, social and technical weight, stronger public stand) despite the lack of a consistent gender policy at the organizational level.

*Partner organizations have become more gender-sensitive.* The team could note some gender sensitivity among partners. This change has been going on for about three years and is primarily due to the partnership developed with OUS. Women have become more active at different levels. For some partner organizations, their role has changed significantly from being beneficiaries to being...
actors/decision-makers in program implementation. Women's participation is now being promoted at different levels (activities, organization management). Overall, women have been strongly targeted at different levels of operations (reconstruction, risk reduction, emergency response, agricultural production, processing and marketing, credit, training, partner structure management, etc.) as beneficiaries.

**Gender training activities have strengthened female leadership and helped women develop effective skills to play a key role in social and economic development activities such as agriculture, trade and CBO operation.** Gender-specific training allowed for some deconstruction of the role of women in the areas of work. It had an impact on gender stereotypes within households and helped women develop self-confidence. The evaluation team noted that women were motivated to participate in decision-making in the different partner organizations as opposed to what was the case prior to project implementation. A positive view of women is developing at the community level. This goes beyond mere reproductive or housework functions or having to feed the workers in the fields. Their contribution to household production is thus better valued. This reflects a clear change in women's role from the private to the public sphere. Results vary, however, from project to project and from partner to partner. More needs to be done to consolidate achievements and engage all partners in working in that direction and encourage them to adopt a real gender policy.

**Livelihoods**

Overall, the assistance provided by OUS has been considered useful by primary change agents. With respect to livelihoods (rice value chain) support provided via AILA, the processing center (mill) and dredging activities are considered the most useful by producers. For partners (AILA, MAFLPV, APDAL, AIBM RD, BAC) that benefitted from equipment (e.g. processing centers, transportation and ploughing facilities), these forms of support are very useful. According to users, processing centers allow them to save on the time they used to spend carrying out these operations.

In AILA, producers using the services of the processing center said that "Jodia nou fyè, moulen an pote chanjman, nou pa deplase ale byen lwen ankò", which means "today we are proud, the mill is bringing us change and we don't have to travel long distances to access these services". Furthermore, credit, transportation facilities and training are considered by them as the most useful part of the support they have received. This change is deemed similar by other partners receiving that support, such as the Petite-Riviè re BAC and AIBM RD. The rice processing center (housed by AILA, see photo on the right) provided by the program to MAFLPV is practically unused. This is because it has been implemented on an inadequate site. This prevents it from being profitable and from demonstrating its added value for this CBO and the producers who should make use of its services. Presently, this center is only very rarely working. It is also undersupplied because of its distance from production blocks.
Supplies brought to the AILA-MAFLPV center with tricycles provided to the project. Credit: OUS

The multi-dimensional trainings provided to partners and their members are one of the main foundations of the changes achieved at the community level (improved production techniques, improved yield, water management, compliance with crop calendar, improved living conditions or primary change agents, especially women). Producers and other actors along the value chain supported by the project expressed how useful the trainings received have been based on the changes and results they were able to achieve in their operations. Figure 8 provides an appraisal of the usefulness of these trainings. The information on Figure 8, however, shows that the trainings on credit management, production and processing techniques were considered the most useful by producers.

**Figure 9: Appraisal of the usefulness of the different types of training**

![Bar chart showing the usefulness of different types of training.]

Credit is identified as a tool for strengthening women's role and for leveraging agricultural production activities with improved techniques and technologies, especially on the rice value chain with SRI. In some cases, when credit is granted to men, these redistribute part of it to their wives for petty trade. Petty trade gives women confidence and esteem for their contribution and support to cover family (household) needs. Inversely, part of the business credit granted to women is reinvested in agriculture for diversifying income-generating activities (agricultural production). Business credit allows women to use profits to actively contribute to cover consumption needs, such as feeding and educating children while also reinforcing their image as economic actors.

Seeking solutions to ensure a more effective credit fund management brought better results to partners. **Introducing a financial intermediary helped improve portfolio quality: better repayment rate than when funds were managed by partner organizations.** Financial intermediation helps ensure the security (loss and theft risk reduction) of the partner organizations' funds and staff.
intermediation led to less flexible and more stringent lending procedures (longer disbursement time) with impacts on the late start of the agricultural season while offering the benefit of providing security.

The repayment of loans remains a challenge for most partners in each production season. This situation could be improved through an effective awareness-raising strategy aimed at supporting the ownership of the system by producers, a shift in their perception and the development of their credit culture. Such strategy could reduce seasonal impacts and instrumentalization by political actors.

**Important remark**
The credit system provides a number of benefits to local actors:

- a more appropriate repayment schedule;
- a loan term better adapted to the crop cycle;
- more profitable interests for producers and traders compared to their "usury" credit;
- increased and diversified income-generating sources for partner organizations;
- the development of a credit culture among partner organizations;
- improved producer credit coverage through revenues from loan interests.

In terms of technical efficiency, the processing centers provided to partner organizations helped improve technical capabilities in rice production. The husked rice that comes out of these processing centers is of better quality and almost similar to the rice produced by larger operators such as Ti Malice. These centers have led to the release on the market of rice with a lower breakage rate than usual and that can compete with that of large operators. This is also a form of security for consumers. Other forms of support provided along the value chain, such as the provision of drying and storage areas for farms and processing centers, helped bring higher quality products to market (waste, rock disposal, etc.). The situation is similar for the onion value chain. More work needs to be done to better control production in the processing center and the mechanization of other field and post-harvest operations for more substantial quality improvement. While producers and partner organizations all agree on quality improvement, they cannot establish whether or not the rice placed on the market showed a rising price differential that is favorable to them.

**Good practice and lesson learned**

Financial intermediation provides partners with a better control of loan applications through prior analysis, loan security and a reduced portfolio at risk in an environment where partners' actions can be easily exploited politically.

According to producers, the System of Rice Intensification (SRI) is an advantageous and powerful production technique. Its introduction has been one of the most successful aspects of the program at the community level. This new technique, although recently introduced, is already used by a large number of producers with the project's support. Figure 11 shows the proportion of female and male producers supported by APDAL and AIBMRD who use the technique. It has been adopted by a much larger proportion of men (more than 59% have at least one plot sown using SRI) than women beneficiaries (about 50% of the people surveyed). This can also be explained by the fact that women are mostly supported through other services provided by the program to the value chain (e.g. business credit).

The number of producers using SRI is indicative of its benefits. It is an indication of how they need new, more efficient production techniques. Their motivation is a key factor that can generate multiplying effects in the long term with adjustments to the technique and the creation of a friendly production environment (access to fertilizers, farming equipment, seeds, credit, irrigation water flow control): Of all the producers interviewed, 60% have sown at least one plot using SRI. Over 91% of these producers have less than 1 hectare under SRI. The small size of the plots makes it more difficult to produce sufficiently to address the food availability gap and compete with imported rice, even though the SRI technique’s performance has been demonstrated.
Figure 10 shows the trend in the utilized agricultural area (UAA) developed using the SRI technique compared to the total UAA of the producers interviewed and supported by APDAL and AIBMRD. About 73% have a UAA of less than 1 ha and 53% use SRI on at least one plot. SRI is implemented essentially with support from external partners. Some producers manage to experiment the technique on other plots without funding from OUS or other actors. In the different areas, a number of producers supported by partner organizations have adopted it.

The adoption rate of SRI has remained acceptable since it was introduced by OUS in 2012. This was facilitated by:
- research conducted (although interrupted) at the Mauger experimental farm, placed under the Ministry of Agriculture for research purposes;
- field experimentation at production blocks expanding over several production blocks.

**Pros and cons of SRI according to local actors**

The stakeholders interviewed say that SRI brings them many benefits compared to the other two techniques used (SRA or Improved Rice System and SRT or Traditional Rice System). The data collected show that **introducing the SRI technique in the Artibonite region led to a significant increase in rice yield per hectare (which doubled in certain farms)**, improved irrigation water development and use, saving on seed and fertilizer volumes and costs per unit area (sown UAA). It also has cons.

**Pros of using SRI**
- Higher productivity: significant increase in yield/unit area;
- Reduced seed volume per unit area;
- Reduced fertilizer volume per unit area;
- Improved irrigation water development and use.

**Cons of using SRI**
- Increased weeding;
- Increase in maintenance costs and subsequent need for available and appropriate credit funds;
- Creation of a suitable credit offering to facilitate implementation.

Introducing SRI and SRA would have enabled producers to increase their yields, which vary a lot between production blocks and even within one production block. At the Mauger experimental farm, the average yield obtained with SRI is 5 tons/ha. In contrast, the yields obtained by the Petite-Rivière
Communal Agricultural Bureau in Artibonite are about 4 tons/ha and 6.5 tons/ha respectively for the La Crête and TCS10 varieties. These yields are relatively lower than those obtained in the commune of Verrettes with support provided to partner CBOs, of up to 7.46 tons/ha (see table 6 below). There is little consensus on these figures, particularly since the monitoring system is not robust enough to guarantee the accuracy of such information. Some producers have an estimated yield of up to 8 MT/ha (which is significantly higher than that achieved on the experimental farm under MARNDR). A rigorous, continuous and consistent system to monitor yield levels is lacking. Yield in most of the plots reviewed is about 5 MT/ha.

Table 6: Comparative Yield Performance Under Different Rice-Growing Systems by Production Block

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Production Block</th>
<th>Minimum Yield MT/ha</th>
<th>Maximum Yield MT/ha</th>
<th>Average Yield MT/ha</th>
<th># of Plots Reviewed</th>
<th>Technique used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Castera</td>
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<tr>
<td>Haut-Zen</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>6.75</td>
<td>5.85</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>SRI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poterie</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>6.42</td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>SRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>10.37</td>
<td>7.46</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>SRI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source, Monitoring Report, Verrettes BAC, December 2014

From the figures in this table, the evaluation team noted that SRI led to an increase in yields compared to the traditional rice system. This refers to a production system in which there is little compliance with the technical package (crop calendar, water inflow control, dosing of fertilizers). If we refer to the baseline data provided by key stakeholders interviewed, the yield per hectare before SRI and SRA were introduced was between 2 and 3 tons/ha at the area level (against 5 t/ha in average with the project):

ODVA remains skeptical about the choice to prioritize SRI over SRA with producers. The single experimental trial conducted on the Mauger farm with OUS’ support is not sufficient to convince people to switch from old techniques to SRI. Its positioning can be changed by explaining the financial benefits of using SRI. According to ODVA managers, the yield differential of SRI over SRA, which they are promoting, is not sufficient to justify a policy choice without measuring its impacts and financial returns and considering monitoring in the longer term.

Dredging and drainage operations have raised discussions around social water management. The current irrigated land management model based on labor intensive activities funded by state and non-state projects is being challenged. Pilot empowerment actions through solidarity "coumbite” initiatives as a new model are being tested. This solidarity work model constitutes an initial distribution of responsibilities between ODVA and water user organizations for conducting works on the different types of canals (primary, secondary and tertiary). At the moment, ODVA and the water user organizations are in the process of signing a memorandum of understanding for responsibility sharing.

Benefits of and Changes in Dredging and Drainage Work

Dredging and drainage work have provided a strong basis for the success of the support offered in the area of agricultural production. They have had multiple effects:

- ....reduced flood-related disaster risks: improved protection of fields and crops, on one hand, and of houses, on the other;
- ....facilitating flows of water to plots for planting crops: improved access to irrigation water;

2 Coumbite: A way of organizing solidarity work with non-monetary compensation in the form of food and beverages.
As a result of the program's work, communities were provided with decentralized RDM structures (through creating local committees and revitalizing communal committees, equipping them and building their technical capacity). In the target communities, these structures have become easier to mobilize during a crisis and capable of conducting evaluation, awareness-raising and evacuation work and facilitating the work of other partners through sectoral damage and needs assessments. The diverse range of trainings (conflict management, damage management, DANA, etc.) they received enabled them to be operational and to develop local human resources to conduct rapid response work. The post-Sandy and Isaac response, during which evaluations were conducted and relief operations were facilitated, demonstrated the added value of OUS RDM support in the Artibonite Valley.

Despite the lack of logistical and financial resources for conducting ongoing, especially relief, operations, some local and communal RDM committees remain operational. The level of operational capacity varies from structure to structure and their role is mostly evident during a crisis. In emergency situations, they are activated and most members are engaged in awareness-raising and rapid damage and needs assessment activities, as well as in facilitating the planning and implementation of emergency responses by humanitarian actors. In normal times, they mainly engage in public awareness raising (their activities slow down). They also provide support in conducting the extensive evaluations needed for designing post-emergency responses.

ELRUDA's rapid response capacity, 72 hours after crisis during the 2012 post-Sandy response with OUS support (evaluation, post-crisis emergency response) has been one of the elements that demonstrated the structure's technical effectiveness. The fact that the technical expertise developed within ELRUDA is complementary to that of the risk and disaster management and DINEPA structures (TEPAC: Communal Water and Sanitation Technicians) is an asset for enhancing the quality of WASH interventions in the communes served. Their capacity to control water quality remains necessary to support the work carried out by DINEPA's deconcentrated structures. Moreover, they are a key actor with an innovative approach (e.g. the theory of the six waste collection bins) to raising awareness on sanitation in schools and communities.

ELRUDA's environmental awareness, water point installation and cholera prevention work in schools and communities. A few examples:
- Awareness-raising in 30 vulnerable communities with a total of 400 households/community, i.e. 12,000 households, and 50 schools, i.e. about 9,000 school children, resulting in behavioral changes at various levels (school children, schools, community members).
- Providing households with non-food items against cholera as part of awareness-raising enabled a change in drinking water behavior;
- School children's understanding of the messages promoted by ELRUDA as part of community awareness-raising is expressed by them through poems and songs. At the family level, they are the primary means for raising awareness of parents and other family members;
- In facilitating access to water by constructing water infrastructure, ELRUDA could bring their expertise to bear for the benefit of communities: 19 operational wells.

**Lessons learned**

Raising awareness on water and sanitation, using a technique based on the theory of the six (6) waste collection bins, i.e. one bin for each type of waste, as a strategy for raising awareness on water
management in communities and schools and conducting simulation activities have facilitated behavioral changes in schools and communities.

Response activities in Nippes region have helped reduce cholera in the target communes. According to the local actors interviewed, OUS’ strategy to respond to cholera in the communes of Anse-à-Veau, Arnault and Petite-Rivière in the department of Nippes, is considered the most appropriate compared to that of other actors involved in the cholera response in the area. Before OUS arrived, the responses that focused on distributing water treatment items were unable to tackle the root causes (lack of toilets/latrines, use of river water for drinking) of the epidemic and generate sustainable outcomes.

The strategy based on setting up a team of health officers, training and raising public awareness, installing chlorine dispensers at water treatment sources, preparedness activities (distribution of kits, water treatment items, hand-washing points), building community latrines and rehabilitating water points, among others, have helped address the root causes of cholera in the target areas. There are now very few cases of cholera despite the lack of locally accessible care facilities.

Specific comments on the effectiveness of PIPs
It should be noted that the changes sought through some actions are limited and sometimes due to programmatic, political and institutional risks. We would like to highlight the following findings:

a) **It remains a challenge to integrate young people who are trained in agricultural mechanics even though there is a potential market.** As agricultural mechanics training for youth is not certified by a competent institution, this hinders their integration in the formal employment sector. Only three (3) trainees (selected based on technical capabilities) out of 25 have been placed in an institution (ODVA/Taiwanese Technical Mission). This initial training has a strong focus on theory and remains very limited on the practical level. Overall, the placement of trainees would remain ineffective without complementary promotion work with public and private sector actors working in the region and/or networking partner producer organizations to create market opportunities (a demand for these services) and support in practice.

b) **The challenge of complying with the crop calendar because of constraints due to delays in granting (disbursing) loans is not beneficial to SRI practice.** The slow disbursement of loans for service credit to producers is a constraint to compliance with the crop calendar and a threat to SRI practice. Moreover, this problem is due to delayed disbursements and payment defaults recorded in the system. During the evaluation mission, the portfolio at risk was very different among partners. For some partners, the default rate was about 20%. For others, the portfolio increased after a few cycles.

c) **Market access is the main bottleneck for partner organizations involved in production and processing support activities.** The arrival of Ti Malice in November 2013 opened a new potential sales market for paddy rice (TCS-10 variety) offering more competitive prices to producers than partner organizations. This competition directly affects partner organizations that support producers through loans for production activities that are repaid from paddy rice sales. The main impact is felt in the supply of paddy rice to the processing centers made available to partner organizations.

d) **Repeated changes of mayor and a volunteer-based working approach that creates a conflict of interest between the political, economic and civil protection agendas hinder the effective operation of local and communal structures.** Within communal structures, civil protection actions tend to be politically controlled. The operational capacity of local and communal structures varies from area to area and is hindered by the grip of local authorities.

e) **The construction technique promoted, although of better quality than traditional rural techniques for small individual constructions, is not aligned with the confined masonry technique promoted by construction actors (MTPTC, INFP, TFPs).** Conducting training
under a scheme that is not anchored in local institutions did help develop local human resources but further development remains very limited in time due to the lack of institutional support in terms of vocational training. This would reduce linkages with national institutional actors of vocational training in construction. The technique used by the project, unlike the confined masonry technique used by ITECA in other projects, enabled local artisans (boss masons) to diversify their expertise in relation to hurricane and earthquake-resistant construction techniques and good practices.

OUTCOMES/IMPACTS

Intended and/or unintended, positive and/or negative, micro, meso and/or macro level social, economic, technical, cultural and environmental impacts on individuals, gendered relations, age groups, communities and social and institutional dynamics.

PIPs have had differentiated impacts at many levels: community, individual and organizational. These are social, economic and even political impacts both at the individual and at partner organizations level, and to a lesser degree at sub-sector level. They vary from one PIP to another. Support provided along the agricultural value chains enabled the families participating in the program to increase their cash revenue and, consequently, their food security. In DRR, it contributed to facilitate people’s access to basic services, to reduce their exposure to disaster risk and to make local RDM structures available to work on emergency preparedness, response and risk prevention.

Livelihoods

Impacts have been noted at many levels, including some positive and other negative related to undesired outcomes.

Individual and behavioral impact

Introducing SRI has improved the technical performance of farms. Measurable behavioral outcomes can be perceived in the conduct of crop-related activities: compliance with the crop calendar, early transplanting, improved fertilizer application control, improved irrigation water control, transplanting spacing, etc.

Among producers, the trainings have created a culture of entrepreneurs committed to ensure a better control of the production process (compliance with the crop calendar). As a result of the training on more powerful production techniques such as SRI and support for improved water control, producers have seen their yield increase due to their using all or part of the technical package made available to them. The equipment (tricycles, tillers, shovels, hoes, boots, mills, etc.) made available to partner CBOs has enabled them to provide ploughing, storage and improved processing services.

Through the program’s credit component, producers are less at risk of undercapitalization resulting from usurious practices, such as the “plàn”[3] of their UAA (land) and the sale of standing crops and livestock to repay usurious loans. They improve the capacity of clients to pay for their children’s education, to stock up with provisions for consumption and also to wait for the best market price for selling.

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[3] Plàn is a form of indirect tenure by which the owner of a plot makes it available to someone with full rights to use it subject to the payment of a fixed amount. The owner can recover it at any time, except when the plot is sown, through paying back the amount received from the user.
Development of a credit culture among producers and partner organizations.

The credit culture is a real constraint that hinders the financial inclusion of economic actors by finance institutions. This issue is all the more important in Haitian rural areas, where agriculture is the primary household income-generating activity. Producers are exposed to climate, economic, political and environmental risks. As this reduces their ability to pay, many financial institutions are reluctant to provide them with financial services. This is also important in the Livelihoods Program’s target areas, where credit culture is not well developed.

For partner organizations and producers, the loan management strategy enables them to diversify their expertise through promoting a credit culture and gain the trust of finance institutions.

Technical and economic impact

The two rice production techniques (SRI, SRA) promoted by the project have had similar impacts on production, as reflected in an increase in yield per unit area. The question remains as to whether this yield increase differential is sufficient to justify the large-scale dissemination of SRI instead of SRA. The latter appears to be technically more accessible to producers under current conditions.

Through SRI practice, producer save on fertilizer costs (from 40 to 50%) and on seed costs (from 30 to 35%). This is a real motivating factor for producers. It has allowed them to increase their income although there is no data to determine by how much.

Preservation techniques enable farms to counter the effects of an overabundant supply during harvest periods while also having better conditions for selling their production. This strategy offers producers better conditions for storing and preserving their produce. This way, they have been able to generate over a short (2-month) period financial profits with revenues increasing from 750-1000 HTG during harvest periods (overabundant supply) for each bag sold in February to 4000-5000 HTG in onion sales two months later (lean season).

With the credit funds created, producers and traders are less exposed to risks connected to credit access issues and improve their access to inputs and their farming operations. These credit products result in clients/borrowers resorting less to usury that could often lead to their undercapitalization. As they stated themselves, "nou pa pran ponya ankò", which translates as "we no longer resort to usury". This decline in the use of usury is felt in terms of volume (lower number of borrowers) and in terms of value. More work needs to be done to consolidate program impacts and ensure broader geographic and individual loan coverage.

1 USD = 56 HTG
Figure 12: Impacts of credit on the living conditions of families

![Bar chart showing impacts of credit on onion value chain]

**General comment**

With the support of the livelihoods project, primary change agents feel that there has been some reduction in poverty at the grassroots level and in the food insecurity they were experiencing.

**Institutional Impact**

The credit funds made available to partner organizations and managed by financial institutions (MFI) as intermediaries in portfolio management have generated multiplying effects on the onion value chain. In that sense, SOE’s relations with the Caisse Populaire Solidarité de Verrettes/CAPOSOV and changes in portfolio quality have contributed to attract this MFI’s investment in the value chain. Interested in the profitability of this production due to the new strategy developed by the project, this MFI has increased its financial contribution to the value chain from 10% to 20%. However, there probably is a more interesting comparative financial advantage on the onion value chain than on the rice value chain.

Through their role in monitoring client loans, partner organizations develop other types of relationships with their members and internal credit management capacity. This is necessary to increase the performance of the credit products they manage independently, such as equipment credits and business credits.

**Impact on women**

The support provided as part of the PIP has strengthened women’s role. Women play a greater part in the household economy by engaging actively in field labor as producers and in other income-generating activities such as the marketing of rice and onion, the storage and marketing of other types of grains. As they say, “koulye a mesye yo pa rele nou ata gaz pou lanp ankò”, which translates as “now men no longer call us, they even have to pay for the kerosene used in lamps”. This clearly shows how training and specific forms of support have influenced a shift in how men perceive women and their impact on women’s social and economic empowerment.
For women, who are often subject to usurious loan interest rates, the credit made available to them is seen as a form of deliverance. So, they no longer sell their livestock early or "plant" their piece of land. They claim to be able to resist market competition by storing until prices rise in order to make more profit on their production.

**Organizational Impact**

The support provided also enabled partner organizations to build their social capital through developing their capacity to negotiate with other (state and non-state) sectoral actors, e.g. water user organizations with ODVA or with the BACs. The partnerships that the organizations establish with financial institutions make them more visible and credible to them. It makes it easier for them to access credit/funding for their production activities.

Building the capacity of partner organizations, especially for the Livelihoods PIP and for ELRUDA in the DRR/Humanitarian PIP, provides them with a long term revenue generation potential. This should be sought through the investment made in production and processing infrastructure and equipment, office infrastructure and equipment and through the new technical expertise developed. They now have the potential to offer and sell quality services to third parties. These infrastructures providing support to the organizations may help them diversify their sources of income to be able to operate and become self-sufficient. In that sense, the actions planned in the PIPs contributed to increase the economic capital of partner organizations and that of the producers they support. This is likely to continue provided these organizations consolidate their achievements and their capacity to generate income in the value chains in which they operate. Moreover, such income may be complemented by credit funds made available to them to support the production value chains in which they invest.

**Undesired outcomes and impacts**

- Producers receiving support face higher labor costs. This is due to the fact that program participants are perceived negatively by farm laborers, who view them as advantaged community members with more financial capital than other actors in the community. They view program participants as people who receive funding from the state to develop their land. This rise in service prices is mostly reflected in ploughing work by mechanical equipment operators (tractors, tillers).
- Development of new local technical expertise in the mixed use of fertilizers and compost. Introducing such a technique provides a safe alternative to the volatile prices of chemical fertilizers, which may ultimately reduce the costs incurred by producers to purchase chemical fertilizers and their dependency on such fertilizers. This strategy is likely to produce lasting effects in addressing environmental protection and climate change. It needs to be scaled up, however, to generate a critical mass of organic fertilizers to meet the potential demand. To date, production remains very low and largely insufficient to meet local demand.
- Increase in time devoted by producers to field maintenance work, especially weeding. Producers thus face increased land maintenance costs they were not used to.
- The refocusing of competencies in certain organizations to areas of work they are not familiar with may create new challenges for them (as funding is very limited) and even prevent them from consolidating competencies previously in place.
**Table 7: Summary of outcomes/impacts of introducing techniques and technologies and their dissemination by rice producers, and of facilitating access to credit and inputs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intended impacts</th>
<th>Stated impacts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| The use of the newly introduced techniques and technologies and their dissemination by producers contributes to improve yields and diversify produce. | - New onion preservation techniques adopted with gains on the sale of crops, reduced post-harvest losses while awaiting a price increase;  
- SRI dissemination and replication by hundreds of producers (over 3,000 farmers trained) resulting in higher yields than with other techniques, reduced chemical fertilizer and seed expenses, improved irrigation water control, increase in the workload of producers;  
- The research partnership on SRI and/or pest control developed with regional-level state and higher education institutions is an asset that can help better organize efforts among partners;  
- The lack of framework for collaboration on SRI with central institutions hinders experimentation based on research findings and the scaling up of results;  
- Ongoing genetic improvement (improved performance of local cattle and goat breeds in terms of beef meat and milk production, goat meat production) of cattle and goats (100 native-breed cows and 100 native-breed goats and 40 Brown Swiss bulls distributed).  
- About ten research papers (agronomy theses) produced on SRI with Haitian universities |
| Rice producers have improved access to credit for agricultural inputs through strengthened cooperatives and CBOs | - Granting of agricultural credit (over 40 million HTG, more than 3,500 farmers) facilitating access to inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides), agricultural services (ploughing, provision of labor for weeding) and marketing;  
- Greater visibility of partner organizations through the relationships of trust built with microfinance institutions (MFIs), increase in the share of agricultural funding from these MFIs.  
- Access to credit, especially for women, facilitating the diversification of products and economic activities, reducing the risk of undercapitalization resulting from usurious loans, reducing the use of usury and sale of standing crops for repaying loans, increasing stockpiling capacity for selling at high prices and feeding the family during the lean season;  
- Strengthened capacity of partner organizations to provide services through building 4 processing centers/facilities, implementing 2 onion preservation centers, distributing 22 tillers for ploughing and 5 tricycles for transportation, rehabilitating 4 cooperatives, establishing a farm input store, an equipment pool, a repair shop (35 students trained in agricultural mechanics, 3 of them hired) and a conference center.  
- Ensuring the sustainability of the credit funds with the existing capacity of partner organizations will be a challenge when OUS moves out. Access to seeds and fertilizers are real bottlenecks despite the creation of credit funds. |
Table 8: Summary of outcomes/impacts in terms of disaster preparedness and crop and investment protection, gender, production, processing and marketing (quality)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intended impacts</th>
<th>Stated impacts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduced vulnerability of producers to shocks (disaster preparedness of producers, reduced vulnerability to water-related risks; crop and investment protection against disasters and CC adaptation)</td>
<td>- Over 70,000 LM of irrigation canals dredged (secondary canals in partnership with ODVA, tertiary canals with water user associations and other CBOs resulting in improved production over more than 700 ha every year (improved flows of water to plots, better protection of crops and houses))&lt;br&gt;- Over 5,000 jobs created in various areas, 90% of them for non-qualified workers through Cash for Work (very short-term temporary jobs)&lt;br&gt;- New water user and partner organizations involved in social water management led by user committees, a pilot initiative to revitalize solidarity work planned;&lt;br&gt;- Training on climate change and hands-on application of organic compost-based fertilizer techniques (this has not yet been scaled up);&lt;br&gt;- Producer awareness of the importance of dredging canals to prevent flooding of their crops and homes;&lt;br&gt;- Lack of capacity to cover canal maintenance costs without external support in a context where the absence of irrigation taxes undermines the achievements made and does not help overcome dependence on external actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's participation in organizations and economic activities, access to credit and capacity to manage small businesses improved through training</td>
<td>- Women's role as actors in production value chains strengthened (developing their skills in pest control, agricultural mechanics, a traditional male job, 5 women out of 30 trainees), as well as their role in training and technical support to producers (e.g. 9 female SRI trainers in MAFLPV) and in marketing;&lt;br&gt;- Women are beginning to be viewed differently in their households (they are viewed as actors and not as weak beings, incapable of financially covering any basic family need);&lt;br&gt;- Number of women growing rice (access and training facilitated, service provider role strengthened) increased;&lt;br&gt;- Women's increased participation in the leadership of the organizations and different project activities (targeting criteria encouraging women's participation, loans to partner organizations supporting women's role in the rice value chain, marketing through business credit);&lt;br&gt;- Women's increased awareness of their capacity and right to participate in planning and development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice producers have the capacity to better process and market locally-produced rice: improved rice quality, reduced post-harvest losses, increased market share.</td>
<td>- Improved milled rice quality (improved yield, reduced breakage, improved drying and steaming) through implementing 4 processing centers benefiting 500 women and men and an equipment pool;&lt;br&gt;- Materials to facilitate better drying and steaming of rice distributed and used near the fields and in processing facilities and transportation facilitated;&lt;br&gt;- Increased market share and improved prices remain an assumption that cannot be confirmed due to lack of data. The creation of new markets remains one of the key concerns of primary change agents.</td>
</tr>
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Table 9: Impacts of advocacy, FENAPRIH, public policies, consumers and USA policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intended impacts</th>
<th>Stated impacts</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| Rice producer organizations and federations have more influence on state and donor decisions because they are better organized, with better capacity to advocate for their interests | - 15 regional coordination body members trained and informed about the rice value chain in Haiti;  
- Over 2,000 rice producers have improved their farming techniques and increased their yield.  
- 350 rice producers, 35% of which are women, are informed about rice production and exportation issues, government policy for the rice sector and are trained in rice intensification techniques.  
- Improved knowledge and analysis of the concerns raised by rice producers across the country informing advocacy efforts undertaken with the FENAPRIH. |
| Advocacy efforts will influence the Haitian government to better support smallholder rice farmers at the local and national levels and to promote and facilitate Haitian rice production. | - Reflections on the sharing of responsibility for dredging works between ODVA and water user associations in support of rice production in the Artibonite region (MoU developed) underway; |
| Haitian consumers are better educated on the importance of consuming locally produced food and have reduced their consumption of imported produce, especially rice. | - Initial behavior change among producers and consumers in the rice value chain with greater attention given to gender and involvement of rural women;  
- Women’s role as social and economic actors is strengthened through the work on the rice value chain |
| Advocacy by Oxfam and partners will help influence the US Government so that US policies and practices promote and facilitate rice production by small farmers in Haiti => reduced dependence on imported rice. | - Oxfam’s recommendations resulting from the findings of the follow up research on the Feed the Future West/WINNER project are adopted by USAID as a standard for monitoring their programs and improving their quality to the benefit of primary change agents in Haiti;  
- Initial behavior change among farmers and farmer organizations in terms of their position on the issue of US aid effectiveness. |

**DRR/Humanitarian**

Awareness-raising initiatives on water, sanitation and hygiene have provided a strong basis for communities to prevent cholera and protect the environment. Implemented at school level and at the broader community level, these initiatives have contributed to behavior change both among children and youth and among adults and elders within the program's target areas. The schools involved are more effective in protecting their immediate environment from unhealthy practices and solid waste. Impacts, however, remain limited because of a lack of practice as schools do not have the sanitation infrastructure that supports the application of the principles promoted through awareness-raising activities.

Now, people have a good knowledge of the causes of cholera and the measures to be taken to prevent it. Beyond NFI support provided by OUS for treating water, people are able to select the water they use for domestic purposes. Before using any water, they apply treatment products to increase its drinkability. Many community members stated that they no longer drink untreated water, "koulye a nou pa bwè dlo kri ankò". In the communes of Anse-à-Veau, Arnault and Petite-Rivière, people have contributed to reduce the prevalence of cholera even after project closure and despite the lack of local health facilities to address cholera.
Partner organizations and other community structures supported by the project developed operational capabilities through awareness-raising and training on risk and disaster management and WASH (drinking water, natural hazards, etc.). This is the case of ELRUDA for water quality control. The behavior changes that begin to happen at the community level (comments, reports from community members) still need to be reinforced through practical training and awareness raising to further consolidate efforts.

As a result of the training activities provided to the local and communal committees, communities have access to local risk management structures. They are easy to mobilize and able to respond effectively in terms of educating people and supporting urgent actions. They help to better manage warnings in case of adverse events, especially of hydrometeorological origin, evacuation of at-risk populations and emergency shelter management. Within these structures, meetings are held with some regularity without local support from the CTD. The most active committees, despite huge logistical and financial challenges, are now able to conduct autonomously awareness-raising activities during hurricane seasons without any external funding.

The water user organizations that were created and those that were strengthened have taken greater ownership of water distribution management (main d'eau, canal gate control) in irrigated areas. They ensure more effective social management of irrigation water through greater involvement by community actors, i.e. water users. The actors involved (producers, water users and ODVA) are becoming aware of the need for a different approach to conducting dredging and drainage operations and managing their costs. This commitment will materialize through the signing of a multi-stakeholder MoU establishing the joint responsibility of all actors (producers, water users, state bodies). In a context of declining international assistance, such a MoU is likely to generate structuring effects within the sector. However, the roles and responsibilities of the different stakeholders need to be clearly defined.

The reconstruction of homes has restored the dignity of the families and created a sense of equality among all beneficiaries at the community level. According to participating families, the reconstruction of their home helped restore their dignity following the earthquake. This event has pushed them to live in tents for some time under extremely difficult conditions, without any real protection from exposure to sun and rain. It should be noted that those families living in hard-to-reach mountains have been highly affected by the earthquake. The emergency assistance they received allowed them to take refuge in makeshift tents that were inadequate to protect them from sun, wind and rain. The house model provided, which was the same for all families, helped offset the intra-community inequalities that prevailed before the disaster. Now, there is a sense of equality in the community among the 29 beneficiaries (twenty-nine 40 square-meter housing units reconstructed), which helps raise the profile of ITECA's reconstruction work in the area, as this work supplements similar initiatives implemented by ITECA with funding from other institutions, including CARITAS Switzerland.

Housing reconstruction has facilitated networking (intra-community relationship building) among the people participating in the project through the creation of informal community groups. These have helped develop and restore some form of long-gone intra-community "coumbite" solidarity through 3 solidarity groups created to facilitate project success. These groups, made up of beneficiaries, facilitated project implementation (collecting local materials, preparation, earthworks and laying of foundations, transportation of materials provided by the project, road rehabilitation, etc.) and larger scale works (rural roads). They benefited all participants, especially widows lacking labor force. It should be noted that these structures could not exist beyond the project even though their members are still active within the community.
The houses that were built enable beneficiaries to improve their capacity to deal with drought (families having access to water) and to reduce the risk of erosion related with roof rainwater harvesting. Rainwater harvesting enables families to cope in times of water shortage in an environment where family access to water for domestic use is one of the most critical issues, especially during the dry season (adaptation to drought). This technique helps reduce soil leaching by rainwater coming from roofs, whose impact would not be insignificant as houses are located on slopes. The sizing of rainwater harvesting tanks, however, remains inappropriate to guarantee continuous supply to families during a relatively long dry season. Given how vulnerable families are, the deterioration of tanks with a relatively short lifespan, especially considering their replacement, may limit these impacts over time.

Building local capabilities in safe construction practices. The project has built local capabilities through disseminating a safe, disaster-resistant (hurricanes, winds) construction technique and training of local artisans. The creation within communities of new local expertise (building technicians) mastering good construction practices (safe construction) is an asset for preventing disaster risks at community level resulting from poor quality building work. Through a combination of theoretical learning and practice, boss masons in the community were able to improve their technical skills. Nevertheless, local artisans are not well versed in certain aspects, like roofing, which makes it ultimately difficult to access qualified labor among project participants for maintenance and repair work. Since their training is not part of the regular construction worker certification system, this could ultimately hinder their employability in the formal sector.
Table 10: Summary of outcomes/impacts in terms of building the capacity and potential of CCPC, CLPC and CBOs for emergency response and cholera risk reduction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intended impacts</th>
<th>Stated impacts</th>
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</table>
| Communal Civil Protection Committees and CBOs are involved in developing their own capabilities and are ready for effective emergency response (capacity-building of local actors, municipalities and CCPCs, strengthening of early warning systems, improving operational capacity of CCPCs and CLPCs. | - Limited level of women's participation in cholera awareness activities;  
- Operational capacity of CCPCs, CLPCs and ELRUDA is strengthened (provided with office materials and equipment, emergency response equipment, emergency stock and contingency plans in place);  
- 12 CCPCs created, re-constituted and equipped with emergency response materials. The technical and response capacity of CCPC and CLPC members has been strengthened;  
- CCPC/CLPC's technical capacity strengthened through RDM training modules: WASH, victim management plans, community evacuation and warning system  
- Community members are aware of the precautions to be taken in the event of disasters and know different sounds in the event of floods or disasters through media spots. |
| Municipal and local authorities are sensitized on human casualties and socio-economic losses resulting from disasters and take ownership of local initiatives and adequate actions (RDM support plan, mitigation activities). | - Mayors, Communal Board of Directors (CASEC) and Communal Assemblies (ASEC) mobilize people for awareness-raising meetings and have participated in planning meetings and in the distribution of material and equipment.  
- The DPC has facilitated a better distribution of work on the ground.  
- The DPC participates in coordination and distribution activities and supports local authorities (Mayors, CASEC, ASECs); |
| Earthquake and cholera-affected people organized at the local and national levels with a clear social agenda to address recovery and reconstruction challenges =>focus on incorporation and empowerment of affected people. | - 4 water supply networks rehabilitated in Nippes, including 3 in Petite-Rivière and one in Arnaud with several distribution points;  
- Rehabilitiation of 19 wells (19 rope pumps) strengthening of 30 well management committees, awareness raising across 30 schools and 30 communities;  
- 26 chlorine dispensers damaged and swept away by Sandy have been re-installed and 20 new dispensers have been installed and 16 family latrines have been built in Nippes.  
- 10 new source management committees have been created, trained (201 members) and equipped for handling chlorine dispensers, mixing chlorine solutions and repairing the dispensers;  
- Over 20,000 hygiene and cholera kits distributed in Nippes and Artibonite + 70,000 Aquatabs distributed to CTC and UTC;  
- Eighteen school hygiene committees have been set up (108 people, including 42 girls) have received training on epidemic disease prevention awareness techniques.  
- 9,850 students from 40 schools in Lower-Artibonite are reached by WASH awareness work;  
- Three school hygiene committee platforms have been created and trained - 7 awareness sessions on public hygiene practices in schools have been held;  
- About 125,000 people have been educated on cholera, water and sanitation through spots, radio programs and sound mobiles; |
Table 11: Summary of outcomes/impacts related to reconstruction and climate change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intended impacts</th>
<th>Stated impacts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| The civil society network "observatory" monitoring reconstruction policies and initiatives is supported, and discussion on reconstruction is influenced in favor of long-term development. | - 28 families affected by the earthquake of January 12, 2010 **have a house** with 3 rooms and a porch of 41 sq. m., equipped with a latrine and a 1000-gallon water tank.  
- Findings of research on re-housing, communication and awareness-raising materials are disseminated to more than a thousand actors and organization managers;  
- Research: Documents on "Housing Delivery and Housing Finance in Haiti: Operationalizing the National Housing Policy" and the post-earthquake relocation of displaced persons have been produced and serve as reference documents that can inform discussions and strategic directions in the field of reconstruction  
- The Observatoire des politiques publiques et de la coopération internationale has been reinforced to conduct advocacy on reconstruction;  
- The three solidarity groups created have revitalized mutual aid as a mechanism for conducting construction and community infrastructure (e.g. roads) projects and enabled local people's participation in reconstruction activities;  
- Local artisans have been trained in earthquake- and hurricane-resistant construction techniques. |
| Local people are informed about climate factors.                              | - Over 25,000 students are trained and educated on the issues of risk management, adaptation to climate change and environmental protection in more than 100 schools in the Lower-Artibonite region. |

**SUSTAINABILITY**

*Measuring whether the activity's benefits are likely to continue once the project is completed*

- Measures taken to ensure that the positive outcomes of the activity are sustainable and viable over time for all PIPs;
- Sustainability in relation to economic viability of husked rice production and marketing businesses (viable without support from project funds) and the risk and disaster management structures implemented

As stated in the document, impacts like social and economic capital building have been generated at the individual, organizational and community levels. The question is, in most cases, how to consolidate them to ensure sustainability.

The trainings on agriculture, organizational management WASH, gender, risk and disaster management and on cholera, among others, have certainly helped develop within the organizations a critical mass of trainers, trained persons and technicians who should implement and replicate the techniques learned. Given the context in which partner organizations currently operate, this is not sufficient to guarantee that the initiatives will continue autonomously (without funding). This expertise is not networked and initiatives are not anchored in national institutions.

In some cases, local actors have relative ownership of the techniques and/or technologies disseminated during projects. The poor strategic management of partner organizations is an impediment to setting long term directions. It also undermines the consolidation of the program's achievements. It is unclear whether the impacts will continue after funding ends.
WASH and Livelihoods support activities in the Artibonite Valley have contributed to strengthen the internal governance of partner organizations. They enabled them to gain a set of capabilities and expertise that can be mobilized for the operation of goods and service production activities. Considering that these structures depend on external funding to ensure the full operation of their facilities, a huge challenge is to continue revenue-generating activities, improve the return on investment and reinforce their positioning as service providers.

Livelihoods

Program impacts include opportunities, but also challenges to their sustainability. These are presented below.

Continuation of SRI practice

The capacity to replicate the SRI technique without support from OUS and other donors is still limited despite the local expertise developed and the training provided. The technique is just beginning to be mastered even though a good number of producers are trained in its use and apply it. Its adoption may be hindered by the apparently high operational costs involved, which would require an appropriate credit system and technical rigor in terms of complying with farming operation requirements. Of all the producers supported by APDAL and AIBMRD, only 13.4% (i.e. 16 producers out of 119) said they had at least one plot under SRI developed without the project's support. Furthermore, SRI is applied on small areas: 93.8% of sown plots are less than 1 ha.

Table 12: Level of SRI use without the project’s support at APDAL and AIBMRD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UAA developed</th>
<th>Number of producers</th>
<th>% Proportion of supported producers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 0.25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 1 ha</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5 &gt; UAA &gt; 0.25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>86.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The use of SRI is highly dependent on program funding. Some producers apply it independently from the program's financial support by taking ownership of production techniques (knowledge gained, on-site technical support received) but this level of autonomy is still very low. Through the trainings provided as part of the program (SRI technique, credit management, organizational management, gender, water management), local actors believe they can continue activities independently, as is reflected in this statement taken from a focus group discussion: "Oxfam montre nou kòman pou nou peche, li pa selman fè nou kado pwason", meaning "OUS has taught us how to fish and did not only give us the fish". SRI applications without the project's support are still insufficient to confirm this assumption.

Important remark

Producers’ responsiveness to SRI after noting the benefits of the technique (minimizing certain production costs, except maintenance costs, increased benefits and revenues) is conducive to achieving sustainable results and producing multiplying effects.

At the organizational level

The capacity-building of partner CBOs is very significant in terms of financial and administrative management and of logistic and infrastructure capacity. The lack of strategic management in these CBOs hinders the cost-efficient use of equipment, machinery and other assets made available to them. The creation of a management committee by some partners may help ensure coordination between
producers and continue to monitor achievements. Initiatives are underway within CBOs to ensure greater social cohesion and create their own mechanisms to finance income-generating activities (IGA). This is the case of solidarity credit groups, mutual assistance funds and cooperatives.

**Lesson learned**

The material capacity-building (provision of capital assets, equipment, machinery) of partner organizations is insufficient to guarantee their sustainable financial and economic potential without assisting them in defining strategies to secure returns on these investments in the long term.

**Credit management**

The credit portfolio made available to partners may facilitate the continuation of SRI (guarantee the middle and long term follow-up of activities) by producers and other actions on the rice value chain after project closure provided producers continue to repay their loans. However, loan repayment can be jeopardized and the system driven to bankruptcy if a major weather or biological disaster happens. Moreover, no agricultural insurance scheme was implemented under the program.

Despite the use of a financial intermediary for the granting of loans, portfolio management performance needs further improvement for certain partner organizations and specific credit products. Using financial institutions as intermediaries would have helped develop partnership relationships between CBOs and financial institutions. It makes CBOs credible and visible to financial institutions. The credibility partner organizations enjoy with finance institutions may facilitate continued institutional partnerships (CBO-finance institutions) when the program ends.

**Lesson learned**

- Granting credit to producers according to the crop calendar is key to the conduct of operations and to increasing technical performance.
- Producer awareness combined with the accountability of a strong credit operator acting as financial intermediary (for granting loans) is critical to ensure the sustainability of credit funds and continuation of loans.

**About the retention of paid officers by partner organizations**

Training trainers and using them as facilitators/trainers and/or creators of awareness has been an appropriate strategy to foster greater involvement by partner organizations in the conduct of field operations. Many members have been hired as trainers, facilitators or creators of awareness, and even as administrative officers in some cases. The wage costs of hiring them that are supported by the program exceed the financial capacity of partner organizations. The fact that the salaries of facilitators and trainers are entirely funded by the project makes it difficult for partner organizations to take over when funding ends. The capacity of partner organizations is largely insufficient to maintain the same dynamic with monitoring officers, facilitators and trainers without external support.

**Lesson learned**

The payment of salaries for members of partner organizations and the strategy used to turn them into employees paid by the program instead of promoting volunteering may undermine the interest of CBOs to continue providing services to producers without being paid and hinder the consolidation of the program's achievements.

**About the search for appropriate and affordable solutions**

The use of local materials for the construction of onion pallets/preservation centers not only reduced implementation costs but also helped local actors master the technique. The simplicity of the technique and low implementation costs are a guarantee of its continued application by local actors without external funding.
Lesson learned
The simplicity of a technique makes it easier for local actors to embrace it (to take ownership of it) in the current context of low financial potential of partner organizations and technique users.

DRR/Humanitarian

Community well management is ineffective in some communities. The chlorination techniques applied are locally inappropriate because, on one hand, they are volatile and, on the other, they require monitoring to ensure product replacement and regular supply. Maintenance and repair costs (spare parts, minor and major repairs) are covered by projects despite the existence of local management structures. The reluctance of users to pay for the services received is not conducive to the smooth operation of works. Local ownership could therefore jeopardize the provision of this service to communities. Despite ELRUDA’s technical expertise, they depend on external projects and funding to operate and carry out activities. They do not have the financial capacity to cover wage costs of staff that is essential when there is no project or to facilitate activity implementation. They are not able to create partnerships that could help them sell services and generate funds to be able to operate and become self-sufficient.

Important remarks
- The fact that no clear exit strategy has been defined by OUS with partners during implementation limits their potential to reflect on innovative measures that would ensure autonomous operation in the middle and long term.
- The fact that OUS did not clarify how partners would become autonomous and that no long term partnership was established may weaken the program's achievements.  

Within local and communal risk and disaster management committees, the lack of effective, transparent management of resources (especially materials) by local authorities, particularly mayors, is the main source of conflict and disincentive among members undermining any sustainable structuring effect. The issue of poor governance affects the materials delivered both by the government and by partners, including OUS.

Lesson learned
The difficulty for local authorities to connect the political agenda with the civil protection agenda is a challenge to the sustainability of initiatives aimed at strengthening the committees, opens the way for local authorities to control these structures and prevents other members from participating effectively.

The structure created in the Lower- Artibonite region to coordinate the work of RDM operators has not been operational since project closure, including most committee-led awareness and training activities. Efforts by communal and local structures to protect the people exposed to risks and natural hazards are now halted. The responses provided by those that are operational (a large number are not) appear to be insufficient to effectively address local priorities and the actual needs of communities after external funding ends.

Lesson learned
It is difficult to consolidate support efforts if committees and other operators are not allocated specific and structuring funding by the State independently from international assistance projects.

According to local actors in Nippes, people are not yet able to address cholera on their own in a sustainable manner. Eradicating cholera remains a challenge in a context where target communities

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5 Partnerships with local organizations are sometimes linked with very short-term projects (3-6 months).
lack health care facilities (UTC and CTC). The challenge lies in the local capacity to supply clean water for domestic use.

For those water sources/points that were rehabilitated and equipped with chlorine-based treatment materials, the community-based management approach taken seems to be appropriate according to some local actors. Some source management structures are still operational and maintain linkages with other institutional actors to ensure the supply of chlorine dispenser for water treatment. In some areas, chlorine dispensers are still operational but have disappeared from most sources as a result of floods. Those that were identified by the evaluation team are found in the commune of Anse-à-Veau. The supply of chlorine products for water treatment at those sources that still have dispensers depends on projects. The relationships between source committees and health centers helped address a large part of this need.

The team was unable to visit any facility despite their insistence. It has therefore been impossible to assess which facilities are still operational. DINEPA has not really taken over the work done by OUS because of a lack of institutional anchoring. The lack of local awareness focal point makes it impossible to effectively continue to promote good hygiene practices. Discussions with the evaluation team revealed that large numbers of people return to old practices, which makes them more vulnerable to cholera and other fecal waterborne diseases. According to DINEPA, sustainable changes within communities are related to a change in people's behavior that resulted from awareness-raising work. Some people buy chlorine-based products to treat water for domestic use and less and less people use river water for this purpose. The implementation strategy used for the construction of toilets has increased people's dependence, which has made it difficult to apply a viable management strategy since project closure. The latrine beneficiary households have not taken over their management. Some latrines are in very bad conditions and even unusable. Following project closure, latrines have been poorly maintained.

PARTICIPATION, RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DIGNITY

**Appropriateness to local culture and customs, participation and accountability, measures to ensure that operations are respectful of people**

- Extent to which the various beneficiary groups have participated in the different partnership structures.
- Analyzing multi-level participation (Oxfam-partners, Oxfam-primary change agents, partners-primary change agents);
- Involvement of deconcentrated state bodies;
- Ensuring gender equity

Where possible, PIP actions ensure the participation of local actors: target populations, implementation partners, local authorities, sector regulatory and/or support institutions. Levels of participation, however, vary from one project to another depending on the partner or team implementing it. In some cases, participation is mostly limited to consultation. Local actors manage to participate in decision-making at key stages in project cycle management. This involves planning (through needs identification workshops, selecting production blocks and target areas, information sessions prior to implementation), identifying beneficiaries, evaluating and monitoring implementation (workshops with partners, information sessions on target population, selection of beneficiaries, evaluation, addressing complaints, local empowerment, etc.). For the different projects, local partners (CBOs and partner networks, agricultural bureaus, local and communal RDM committees, Departmental Technical Coordination Unit, local authorities, state sector institutions representatives, etc.) participate in needs identification.
**Lessons learned**
The stakeholder participation and responsibility-based approach allowed OUS to harness their knowledge of the context (needs, constraints, opportunities, primary change agents) and their experiences to provide a more appropriate response and go beyond outputs in terms of planned volume.

**Livelihoods**
Some partner CBOs have been little involved in designing the type of institutional partnership established between them and OUS, resulting in their lack of participation in strategic choices, in identifying end beneficiaries such as producers and in prioritizing needs and ways to address them despite the relevance of the responses provided. According to local partners, OUS seeks to empower them but they have little involvement in the definition of related strategic directions. No long term partnership framework has been established and no exit strategy has been disseminated to partners.

In credit operations, partner CBOs are involved in targeting clients within production blocks. Furthermore, program clients participate, in support to the CBO, in identifying other potential clients based on their knowledge. The group credit strategy applied by SOE helps build community trust, strengthen social cohesion within solidarity groups and improve portfolio performance.

Willingness and motivation for community participation has been noted in some projects. This the case of MAFLPV's participation in building their own office space (finishing work, outdoor planning, construction of complementary space, among others) with the program's support.

MAFLPV's community participation in the construction of their premises helps reinforce the organization's ownership of the activity, ensure optimum use of the space and enhance the partner's social prestige.

The participation efforts of local actors through specific operations helped exceed expected results. Community participation in the canal dredging activities conducted by the Petite-Rivière de l'Artibonite (PRA) BAC enabled the dredging of about 50% of linear meters more than was initially anticipated. The same is true for the credit activities conducted by MAFLPV and SOE. It also served to revitalize specific forms of solidarity organizations (coumbite, solidarity groups) that used to prevail in Haiti’s rural areas, in the fields of dredging, in the Artibonite region, and construction, in Gressier.

**DRR/Humanitarian**
A sense of participants being actors and not beneficiaries has been noted in some projects by the team. This was the case of the housing reconstruction work carried out in Gressier by community support structures (solidarity groups) with the participation of local actors. In this hard-to-reach environment, their participation facilitated project implementation for all categories of participants equally. There was a lack of participation in the choice of construction techniques by the partner organization. The technical choices in terms of construction response were not adequately disseminated in the community. This has caused some frustration among project participants as is reflected in the complaints expressed by participants during the FGD. The issues raised include:

- the failure to equip houses with solar power as had been promised previously together with a lack of communication between the partner organization and project beneficiaries;
- the choice of locks, which raised security concerns;
- the design and type of structure that was inconsistent with local expertise.

In the area of DRR/humanitarian preparedness in Lower Artibonite, the participation of the Departmental Technical Risk and Disaster Management Coordination Unit (CTD) in the geographic
targeting of actions enabled a better distribution of activities in terms of coverage of on-the-ground needs by sector partners.

**Lessons learned**

CTD’s participation in the program’s decision-making spaces helped reduce the risk of duplication and ensured complementarity between the actions implemented by the different sectoral/thematic operators and a better coverage of local needs.

The participation of local committees, communal committees and ELRUDA in assessing loss and damage during a crisis enabled an effective and efficient response. With their technical capacity and the logistics deployed, they provide a needs-based response, thereby ensuring a reduced risk of instrumentalization, misappropriation and targeting of affected people based on actual needs. This is important for promoting and developing their know-how at the local level.

**COORDINATION AND SYNERGY**

A failure to build systematic synergies at the design and launch stages of the Livelihoods and DRR/Humanitarian Preparedness programs has been noted. Corrective measures have been taken during implementation to ensure the best possible complementarity and synergy between both programs. The main mitigation actions have been implemented from a risk management perspective for the Livelihoods PIP actions to be successful. In that sense, RDM is mainstreamed in the Livelihoods PIP.

Overall, at the Artibonite region level, **OUS has a high profile and a good reputation with sectoral state institutions for our approach based on coordination with different actors.** OUS’ support to sectoral institutions (RDM and agriculture) helped operationalize coordination initiatives/spaces. These coordination efforts allowed us to better frame responses in the areas covered by other partners, e.g. livestock support provided with FAO and ODVA. They help reduce the risk of duplication and facilitate the coherence and alignment of actions.

RDM activities (preparedness and prevention) with the decentralized RDM structures are coordinated at the sub-regional level with the departmental coordination structure that brings together all sectoral partners. OUS coordination with Civil Protection is focused on consultation, information and joint decision-making about the areas of work of the different partners and the directions of OUS’ actions.

Mitigation (dredging, drainage) work and actions in support to the production value chains (agricultural services, training, etc.) coordinated with and led by ODVA have facilitated responsibility sharing and linkage building between ODVA and local actors (producers, water users).

Connecting ELRUDA with institutions like DINEPA, the MENFP, health centers and the MSPP is potentially conducive to the creation of public-private institutional technical partnerships. At the local level, CCPCs and CLPCs lack awareness of ELRUDA’s activities. This is due to a coordination problem between these two types of actors who should work in complement and in coordination with each other. At present, some CCPCs and CLPCs have no relationship with ELRUDA.

On the ground, OUS seeks more to coordinate with NGOs and state institutions. At partner CBO level, there is not much networking. A lack of coordination between partner CBOs hinders the promotion of good practices among two or more organizations working on similar issues.

ELRUDA’s specialization (in WASH) helps ensure complementarity with the work done by local and communal RDM committees and DINEPA. This strategy has spared this inter-communal structure from substituting for other institutional actors working on WASH (structuring response, emergency response) in performing their work. This effect is mitigated by ELRUDA’s member selection model. It is worth
noting that members are chosen from the different organized structures (CBO, foundation, network of cooperatives, Communal RDM Committees). They act as representatives (supervision, reporting, rendering of accounts) of ELRUDA's actions/activities to their organizations.

ACCOUNTABILITY

Since projects are implemented by a range of partners, accountability mechanisms are not always clearly defined. They vary from partner to partner. There is no systematic complaint mechanism in most partner organizations, projects and activities, except for receiving complaints related to agricultural production, credit and housing construction activities.

Livelihoods

Discussions with primary change agents on the ground revealed a relative lack of interaction and information between partner organizations and OUS. Therefore, it is not clear what funding will be available to define longer term commitments.

Certain mechanisms created by certain partners to receive and process complaints have contributed to improve the effectiveness of certain activities. The implementation by MAFLPV of a credit client complaint strategy followed by outreach visits has helped enhance awareness and understanding of the challenges faced by clients-members, follow up on their complaint and find appropriate solutions that facilitate loan repayment and, consequently, improve the health of the portfolio.

Partner organizations' efforts are not sufficient to ensure quality actions based on accountability. Selection criteria (areas of work, primary change agents, types of actions) are little known to local actors. The lack of systematic accountability can fuel conflict between primary agents on one hand and between primary agents and partner organizations on the other. The main challenge for now is to mainstream institutional multi-level accountability mechanisms: partner CBOs, primary agents, donors, public sector institutions, for communication and participation both for receiving and processing complaints, and related feedback.

In the area of production, informal mechanisms exist on the ground between technicians and producers. Addressing (receiving and analyzing/providing feedback) the complaints of producers through operational mechanisms for ongoing dialogue on the problems experienced during farming operations has helped solve technical issues. This is not the case between these actors and partner organizations.

DRR/Humanitarian

As part of the reconstruction project, ITECA uses specific communication techniques with participants and the community in order to ensure transparency, especially in the selection of beneficiaries. The list of participants/beneficiaries and selection criteria is published in public spaces. This strategy is a certain form of self-esteem for project participants. It helped them take ownership of the actions and contributed to successful project implementation in a complex rural environment.

Some partner organizations have systems of reporting and accountability to their members but they are not systematized. These systems complement the regular management-committee-to-member communication systems in place in the organizations. In the specific case of ELRUDA, members also play a role of supervising and reporting on its work to the bodies/organizations they represent. For some partner organizations, the closeness between primary change agents and the project implementation committee gives them the opportunity to meet and receive their complaints. In risk and
disaster management structures, management lacks transparency in most cases. It suffers from being controlled by local and municipal authorities, particularly interim executive officers.

EFFICIENCY

Measuring the qualitative or quantitative results achieved against the resources deployed.

- Analyzing the objectives in relation to the funds invested: overall PIP administration and management of the funds actually invested;
- Analyzing overall budgets: administration and management costs, personnel involved (budget, task distribution);
- Analyzing the funds actually invested in partners’ activities.

Livelihoods

Investment spending on building the processing center for MAFLPV, which has hardly been used since its initial operation, has been an unjustified choice. It should be noted that the mill used to be in operation up to two days/week in periods of peak production. Operation costs are much higher than revenues, making it impossible to guarantee the system’s cost-effectiveness, especially since it is in operation 0 day a week. Investments in farming equipment (tillers, tricycles, mill, etc.) may prove beneficial in the short, middle and long term for some organizations and not for others. Partner organizations need to be provided support to ensure optimal management and use of equipment. Some equipment is already inoperative because of its low quality (inappropriate to local conditions) and partner organizations’ capacity to manage and maintain it. The tricycles chosen were of poor quality and are almost inoperative (100% broken down at the time of the evaluation for some partners). 100% of the equipment in some organizations was already inoperative at the time of the evaluation. It should be noted that because of the model chosen, partner organizations are repeatedly faced with repair issues (frequent breakdowns) that exceed their financial capacity. The issue is especially complex considering the limited access to local skilled technicians who can service and repair equipment in the long term. The choice of SRI through trials conducted in different areas is positive due to its technical efficiency that is within reach of the producers. It is likely to be continued by them, provided they have access to appropriate financing.

DRR/Humanitarian

The awareness-raising work conducted by ELRUDA has proven to be efficient. ELRUDA’s initiatives have reached 9,000 school children in 50 schools, each equipped with waste bins (1 per school) for collecting waste/trash in 5 communes. Let's recall that the initial plan was to reach 7,000 school children. The technical choice to equip houses with biodigesters turned out to be costly and ill-adapted to local realities. As the same time, building rural houses on this model including a biodigester makes it harder to replicate. As its operation requires having a pig farming unit near the house, this remains a challenge for families who feel uncomfortable dealing with the smell of pig waste. The house model chosen, as it is designed, seems more appropriate to rural areas than to an urban environment, where the small size of the lots is a challenge. It is, however, important to note that a pig farming unit would have enabled families to reduce their economic vulnerability through the sale of livestock products.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section presents the main conclusions and recommendations drawn from the evaluation exercise. It is based primarily on observations made in the field with stakeholders and the evaluation team’s judgments.

KEY CONCLUSIONS ON THE LIVELIHOODS PIP

Producer trainings on SRI as a technique for intensifying rice production is driven essentially by members of the organizations who are trained at project start-up. This training driven by male and female trainers generates multiplying effects, increasing its efficiency. Partner organizations have operational focal points at local/community level on the different production blocks, which is not the case at the broader institutional level (particularly at the state level). For example, for MAFLPV, nine (9) women are SRI trainers and promote the technique with producers.

Even though a large number of producers have an interest in SRI because of its benefits, the continued use of this technique at the local level is highly dependent on external funding support for its proper application. The diligent application of the technical package requires technical support, increased access to inputs and the continued offering of adapted credit products, among others. Despite the interest in SRI, certain producers and state actors are nevertheless reluctant to adopt it. For producers, the increased frequency of weeding and implementation costs are two key constraints to the adoption and continued use of the technique. However, the likelihood that the technique will continue to be used without a project remains high. It could be facilitated by the local expertise available, while focusing on how SRI technical performance is valued by producers. We should not expect a 100% adoption rate by all producers supported by the project even over a relatively long period of time. For state actors, ODVA in particular, SRI deserves to be tested over a relatively long period of time, during which technical and financial performance reviews will be performed. Once the comparative advantages of this technique over SRA and STR are demonstrated, it could be included in a sectoral policy document to facilitate its broad replication/dissemination.

Despite the lack of national policy conducive to promoting SRI as a novel production technique, the results achieved from 2012 to now by the producers who accepted to test it are very encouraging (increased yield, improved use of water, savings on chemical fertilizer costs), including the number of farmers who applied this technique. For example, the number of producers who started up with MAFLPV increased from 30 in 2012 to 300 in 2015. Furthermore, the multiple similar initiatives implemented with other state and non-state partners in the Artibonite region and in other rice-producing areas in the country with the FENAPRIH are an asset for scaling up the technique. The lack of a formal partnership with MARNDR and of work synergies with other actors inhibit their institutional anchoring and can eventually undermine the program’s achievements (incorporating the technique in policy documents).

Youth vocational training in agricultural mechanics is seen as a relevant and critical focus area for boosting rice production but ineffective in terms of the market opportunities created by the program. Training in agricultural mechanics addresses a real need but trainees are hardly networked with employers and lack the know-how and market knowledge they need to empower themselves. The strategy used to train and integrate young people has not been successful. As this training was not accompanied by any effort to make key institutional clients aware of such services, the young people trained could not develop a strong know-how and integrate into the (formal and informal) labor market.
Except for APDAL, organizations with extensive experience in credit management (SOE, MAFLPV) are those who had the best portfolio performance for production and marketing activities on one hand. On the other hand, solidarity credit provides a healthier portfolio than individual credit. Along with providing loans to producers and traders, MAFLPV seeks to use the income earned on these loans and other funding sources to expand client coverage. Presently, between 75-80% of active clients are covered with OUS’ support and 20-25% are covered with MAFLPV’s own funding. For SOE, individual coverage increased from 220 clients during the period with project to 330 during the period without project with a credit portfolio of about 5.2 million gourdes. The solidarity credit strategy (shared responsibility among the members of a same solidarity group) was successful in securing a healthy credit portfolio for vegetable production. The repayment rate (about 100%) is also influenced by the profitability in the vegetable chain compared to cereal chains. This profitability and the fact that this chain is relatively less exposed to hazards compared to cereal chains, especially rice, has been an incentive for CAPOSOV (financial intermediary for credit operations between OUS and partner organizations for rice and onion production) to invest in it (with its contribution increasing from 10% to 20%). The health of the portfolio appears to be due to solidarity credit considering that the repayment rate for business credit to Mothers’ Clubs is also around 95%, which is much higher than the rate for individual credit in the rice chain (default rate of up to 20% of the portfolio).

Partner organizations have been strengthened at different levels (improved technical capacity, higher revenue generating potential, more visible to their members, state institutions, the community and finance institutions, increased and diversified capacity for service provision to members and the community), but they show a limitation in their ability to continue providing services in a sustainable manner without external funding. The support provided to partners had an impact at different levels: internal management capacity building (existence of some financial and administrative procedures, creation of human resources with expertise in their area of work), improved capacity to support primary change agents, linkage building with state institutions, increased profile at community level, social prestige, membership, transparency and accountability, and facilitation of their work at the local level. Capacity building activities have helped build social cohesion within the organizations. The equipment and infrastructure (office, processing centers, transportation and drying materials, ploughing equipment, etc.) are assets that can enable organizations to generate income and provide the services needed to operate autonomously in the long run. This support was key in building economic capital in partner organizations through a strategy of service provision by these partners to the communities. The effective management of this equipment can thus help make the organizations sustainable.

Their work has helped enhance women's role as economic actors in trade and agriculture and as social actor in their household, community and organization, while also helping partner organizations to become more gender sensitive. OUS' strategy has made partner organizations more sensitive to women's participation. Gender training has contributed to more balanced power relations between men and women within the organizations and at the household level. Women are more involved as beneficiaries of the activities as well as in the leadership of some partner organizations. Targeting women has enhanced their role in the production and marketing process. They are involved at all levels in the production chain as full players just like men. Supporting their income-generating activity helps build their capacity to make decisions within their households and the family's economic potential. The program's outcomes can be weakened by the lack of a real gender policy in partner organizations.

SRI has improved the technical capabilities of rice producers, as expressed in increased farm yields and a change in their behavior. The use of SRI has resulted in producers complying better with the crop calendar, shifting from late to early transplanting for stronger growth and having better control over fertilizer application (volume of fertilizer used per unit area) and irrigation water.

The development of organic fertilizer chains (piloted by some partner organizations like APDAL and GRIAC) is an innovative initiative for organizations and producers to better adapt to climate
change and recurrent shortages (lack of supply, continuous price increase) of chemical fertilizers. Such experiments are at an incipient stage and do not receive any significant support from the project. Nevertheless, key parameters for their functioning remain largely unaddressed, including creating potential demand (creating awareness among farmers and community organizations, advocacy with state institutions), support (training in the use of the technologies, support to the implementation of production units) and supply to meet the new needs.

Access to seeds and inputs is an ongoing need. The program could not provide viable solutions to the problem of access to seeds and fertilizers, which is a real bottleneck to building technical capabilities in the rice value chain. In that sense, producers have to face market uncertainties to purchase seeds and inputs, sometimes of a lesser quality and unsuited to their actual needs.

Technical support (technical training, equipment and materials) in rice processing (drying, milling) has helped improve the quality (reduced waste, reduced breakage rate) of the milled rice put on the market by partner organizations.

Dredging and drainage work have provided a strong basis for the success of the support offered in the area of agricultural production along with improved risk management at community level. The initiatives implemented have helped reduce flood disaster risks (protection of fields and crops, protection of houses). They facilitate flows of water to plots for planting crops (improved access to irrigation water, dredging control). They help recover long unused land because of salinization (about 12 ha of salinized land were recovered and state authorities are now determining how they will be used). Finally, they provided cash income for local people (water users, producers, workers) through the creation of temporary jobs within communities. This contributed to make local actors aware of the importance of community empowerment and participation in this type of work.

MAIN CONCLUSIONS ON THE DRR/HUMANITARIAN PIP

Disaster preparedness and response structures that are easy to mobilize to provide rapid crisis/natural disaster emergency response have been created. Through the knowledge gained by local actors, local response structures could be implemented: ELRUDA, communal and local risk and disaster management, source management committees, health officers. These actors provide a potential for communities to better address disaster risks through the preparedness, emergency response and prevention activities in which they participate.

ELRUDA’s awareness raising of school children (9,000 in 50 schools) and communities (30 vulnerable communities, about 12,000 families) on risk management, drinking water, sanitation and hygiene has brought about behavioral changes (responsible behaviors) at various levels (school children, schools, community members). In that sense, these actors are developing responsible attitudes to protect themselves from risks such as health risks (especially cholera and other fecal waterborne diseases) and helping to disseminate this information and bring about behavioral change among other members of their community, directly resulting in a decline in cholera outbreaks.

Awareness-raising work conducted by the CCPCs and CLPCs is proving useful to communities for better local risk management. The new skills developed through capacity building facilitate people’s awareness in the event of a hurricane alert. These CCPCs and CLPCs are easier to mobilize. Their post-disaster engagement in the damage and needs assessment in affected communities is an asset for the planning and operationalization of response actions by humanitarian actors as well as for in-depth analysis of long term responses.

Through training, a critical mass of human resources capable of managing natural and health risks has been created in the communities. The current logistic and financial capacity of the local
structures makes it difficult for them to be able to conduct operations on their own during a crisis. As mentioned above, their work (awareness-raising, community mobilization, evaluation) remains complementary to that of humanitarian actors during a crisis. Their response equipment is insufficient to conduct operations after a major hydrometeorological event and they have no stock (of food and nonfood items) on site as a contingency measure for addressing the urgent needs of affected people.

CCPC and CLPC civil protection structures have been put/put back into operation (capacity to meet, members trained) and are more inclusive of women, but internal operating constraints remain to be solved. Building harmonious relationships between local authorities (elected officials, interim executive officers) and other members of CCPCs and CLPCs hinders their effectiveness. In that sense, some control by local authorities acting as coordinators leads to a lack of transparency in CCPC and CLPC management. This reflects the difficulty for local authorities to connect their political agenda with the civil protection agenda for the benefit of communities.

The works (sources, wells, latrines) constructed increase the availability of basic services (access to drinking water, access to toilets) for vulnerable communities where the services provided by state institutions are insufficient to meet people's needs. Involving communities in responses helps them take ownership of managing these works on a basis that is not necessarily sustainable. The fact that communities have limited financial resources and that no self-finance strategy has really been explored hinders the effective management of these works and increases the risks that their sustainability is weakened at project closure (inability to ensure sanitation, water treatment/chlorination product supply, to maintain and repair community sources and wells).

The participation of local actors in managing the goods and services provided by the project is the first step towards community ownership. Community ownership initiatives have contributed to revive solidarity at the community level (solidarity groups and coumbite), facilitating labor-intensive work and the implementation of community infrastructure (rehabilitation of irrigation canals, canal dredging, rehabilitation of rural tracks) without funding from external state and non-state actors. The same applies to the management of works provided by the program at the sources, wells, etc.

The houses built and delivered to people affected by the 2010 earthquake have helped restore the dignity they may have lost during the disaster and develop a sense of equality within the community. They guarantee the right of earthquake-affected beneficiary families to decent housing. Along with these benefits, the housing model provided seems more appropriate for replication in a rural setting than in an urban setting. The biodigester system that is part of it needs to be completely rethought to ensure its feasibility and the roofing model needs to be adjusted to fit with the human resources (artisans) available locally.

The expertise developed within ELRUDA provides a strong basis for its empowerment and subsequent sustainability. This income-generating potential remains untapped and unexplored to date. It can be harnessed for the benefit of the organization through defining a strategy for providing services to sectoral actors. The partnership established with OUS is based on short-term projects and ELRUDA's dependence on these projects to operate are an impediment to defining empowerment strategies in the absence of specific support for exploring opportunities to position itself as a service provider.

The support provided in the communities has slowed cholera outbreaks. It has greatly contributed to address the root causes of the epidemic by providing communities with improved sanitation conditions and water supply services to meet local people’s daily needs. The sustainability of service delivery remains fragile considering the type of hydraulic structures that were built. Their maintenance costs are relatively high (high frequency of repairs). Communities have difficulty in bearing such costs. Local management structures lack the capacity to take effective ownership of the structures and provide quality services.
MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE LIVELIHOODS PIP

In order to make projects more locally appropriate, it is necessary to improve the feasibility analysis of the technical options considered during the identification phase. To improve the quality of specific work, needs assessments have to be further developed. These feasibility analyses must be multidimensional: technical, financial, environmental, social, among others.

Seeking to multiply effects through training, multi-level awareness raising on SRI. It remains essential to reinforce producer training and awareness raising in order to generate an increasingly greater multiplying effect. These efforts must be complemented by advocacy with and support to local state actors to demonstrate the benefits of the technique. The results achieved in the fields and on the experimental farm must be reviewed based on a reliable financial and technical data monitoring mechanism. These results could finally be used to encourage state actors to make SRI the reference technique for improving the Haitian rice sector's performance through knowledge building work with all stakeholders.

Continuing to support women's empowerment at the community level and across partner organizations. The strategy for promoting women's participation at all levels in project initiatives must be continued. There is still a need for technical, institutional and financial support for partner organizations to consolidate achievements in terms of women's participation (mainstreaming gender, providing specific services like credit to women, training and raising awareness of organization managers to ensure gender is better addressed).

Support to partner organizations with operational infrastructure and production and processing equipment in order to develop an internal empowerment strategy; Livelihoods partner organizations need to work on establishing an equipment maintenance fund with clear mechanisms for replenishing this fund, collecting member contributions, amortizing equipment costs with a view to replace it when OUS’ funding support ends. Such funds can be replenished through regular membership fees in order to finance income generating activities, such as processing centers, and farming equipment. These mechanisms must be supported by initiatives to develop new skills for management committees and/or partner organizations to manage the funds raised in an effective and transparent manner. This includes, for example, the financing of replacement, maintenance and repair costs for farming and rolling equipment. For instance, it is imperative to support an organization like MAFLPV in developing the multifunctionality of its conference center. This will ensure optimum use of the organization's space (building) and increase the return on this investment.

Supporting the occupational integration of young people and helping them improve their know-how. There is a need to support networking among young people by creating an organization of agricultural mechanical technicians to raise their profile. This initiative will enable technicians to gain the legitimacy to be able to access credit, provide services, enter the market and improve their know-how. Such strategy may also be based on networking OUS partners, developing synergies among OUS partners and projects, and promoting quotas for hiring trainees among OUS partners, etc. This work is to be complemented with raising public awareness of the availability of skilled people in order to boost market demand (by producers who are not part of any association). Youth theoretical training should be combined with practical training to increase their know-how. Since producers use the services of these technicians individually, there is a need to raise their awareness to make those young people more visible to them and increase the demand. To help improve the know-how of trainees, support could be given to APPEL for operationalizing its maintenance center, which should be managed by an experienced mechanic and through an effective system of interaction between APPEL and producer organizations.

6 Such support should include building the financial and administrative capacity of management structures.
Seeking efficiency through the choice of equipment. Partner organizations need to be assisted in choosing the equipment they buy and trained in the use of this equipment (adapting loads according to load capacity, maintenance, etc.). This support should involve aspects related to market knowledge and understanding technical specifications to guide the choice of equipment and make sure it is adapted to local conditions. It should aim at improving the financial viability of the investment made in buying such equipment and at reducing repair costs for partner organizations.

Strengthening SRI research/extension partnership with MARNDR. A partnership with MARNDR needs to be established to facilitate the institutional anchoring of SRI. This partnership must involve multiple levels: MARNDR/Agricultural Innovation Department, BACs for operational implementation, development agencies like ODVA to facilitate research and provide other complementary services. A specific coordinating body and/or working group could be created to share good practices and the results achieved by the various actors with a view to consolidate achievements building on the experience gained. OUS should promote the institutional anchoring of the technique by continuing with the extension approach involving key actors in the value chain. This extension work should be based on the results of the experimentation process conducted through the BACs, implementation partners, educational and research institutions to make it easier for state institutions to take ownership of it. In addition, OUS and its implementation partners must continue to promote advocacy with state institutions in charge of defining sectoral regulations and policies and other actors involved along the value chain in order to facilitate the creation of institutional mechanisms to support the process. They need to develop synergies or strategic partnerships with technical and financial partners, such as IADB, FAO, IICA and AFD, that have the clout to influence sectoral policy-making in order to create leverages. Finally, combining bottom-up and top-down approaches gives them an opportunity to build on pragmatic initiatives that are likely to be scaled up more easily. Nevertheless, there is a need for more consistent efforts and investments in working with national institutions such as MARNDR to facilitate a bridge between the institutional and operational levels.

Reinforcing SRI research activities and continue disseminating the resulting findings at a broader scale. As a first step, the results of existing research conducted with universities and other research to be undertaken in the future should be made available to key sector stakeholders (BAC, DDA, research farm, producer organizations, ODVA, FENAPRIH, MARNDR, faculties of agronomy, etc.) to attract their interest in this technique. In that sense, there is a need to establish a clear communication strategy with dedicated tools to facilitate the dissemination of results. Technical results must be supported by research on the financial performance of farms that use SRI, including experimental farms and/or plots. This process will help understand the net income differential resulting from shifting from old practices to this new one.

Implementing a reliable yield monitoring system with partner organizations and producers. At the moment, there is not enough evidence to demonstrate that SRI is more beneficial for producers in terms of technical (yield) and financial (financial performance) results than the other two systems (SRA and SRT) used in the Artibonite Valley. The results achieved on the Mauger research farm are different from those of field experimentation initiatives conducted by producers. Evaluation findings show that among the various production blocks supported by the project, the yield achieved in many cases far exceeds that achieved in Mauger (questionable?). For some farms, SRI provides a better yield, which is not the case for others. This situation calls for extensive research and the implementation of a robust monitoring system. It is recommended that OUS implement a reliable plot monitoring and yield calculation system with producer organizations. Partner producer organizations should be supported and involved from the outset in the operation of this monitoring system so they can take ownership of it. Bridges need to be built between the partner organizations piloting the system and state structures to share monitoring results.

Partner organizations' support in building the organic fertilizer value chain and scaling up of initiatives piloted by APDAL and GRIAC. Access to chemical fertilizers has been identified as a bottleneck to the development of the rice value chain. Alternative solutions - use of compost, organic manure being tested by APDAL and GRIAC have to be encouraged. An experience-sharing framework
could be established for partner organizations to share the results achieved with these types of fertilizers. In that sense, APDAL’s and GRIAC’s expertise in composting and organic fertilizer production is a reliable opportunity. Among these techniques, vermiculture is one that can offer comparative advantages (affordability, rapid decay, etc.) to partner organizations. Using this practice will have the advantage of responding better to market disruptions (rising chemical fertilizer prices, reduced state subsidies, etc.). It will also make it possible to promote the creation of a new local market, adapt better to climate change, produce better quality rice and reduce the dependence of partner water user/producer organizations on chemical fertilizers. Also, developing the composting or other organic fertilizer chain will offer producer organizations a true potential for generating income in the near future when climate change impacts are likely to worsen.

**Helping develop credit management know-how among partner organizations.** With the creation of a credit fund for partner organizations in the rice and vegetable value chains, building their capacity in loan making, management and monitoring is fundamental. Experience exchanges could be arranged to share APDAL’s and SOE’s good credit practices with other partner organizations in order to try to have a more encouraging portfolio performance. At the same time, it is necessary to conduct a comparative analysis of the results achieved by each credit mechanism and methodology (granting and monitoring) implemented based on strength, weaknesses, opportunities and threats.

**OUS must continue to provide technical, administrative and financial support to agricultural advocacy partner organizations while increasingly encouraging the development of harmonious working relations with sectoral state institutions and local authorities.** To reduce the risks of obstruction resulting from the power game, linkage building between partner organizations and authorities from state institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and funding agencies must continue. It is necessary to continue building the capacity of partner organizations in the areas of research, organizational/institutional strengthening and training. To do this, the human resources and experts provided by OUS must work in synergy with partner organization members. Such a strategy could compensate the inability of organizations to conduct these processes autonomously and ensure continued action based on existing expertise. For an organization like the FENAPRIH, this will help build its technical, administrative and operational capacity to conduct advocacy work for the benefit of the agriculture sector and the rice value chain in particular. Such support must contribute to empower local organizations like the FENAPRIH while helping them to take ownership of relevant advocacy tools and develop closer ties with other stakeholders and especially with policy-makers. To further increase the effectiveness of this support to partner organizations in the agriculture sector, the development of harmonious working relations with sectoral state institutions and local authorities needs to be encouraged.

**MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE DRR/HUMANITARIAN PIP**

**Work to strengthen community management and ownership of wells by the communities served and local well management structures.** The wells that were built, despite their limitations, provide a much needed service to communities (access to water) even though some are available and not fed by groundwater. There is a need to further raise awareness among the communities served by the wells and local actors in charge of managing them to ensure greater community anchoring and ownership. This work with users should be driven by the management committees who already have close relations with them. Since the wells are operated under a different model from that of the water conveyance systems (managed by DINEPA), these committees should be networked in order to pool the resources and expertise needed for their operation with and without a project. Inter-committee / community experience-sharing can be promoted to share good management practices and encourage replication.

**Supporting the development of a capacity-building and empowerment strategy for ELRUDA.** ELRUDA has the technical potential to position itself as a key operational actor in the area of Water,
Sanitation and Hygiene. It should receive further capacity-building support to increase its potential through well-targeted training and logistic resources. This should give it the capacity to operate as a service provider in the areas of training, research, implementation and/or awareness-raising. Market penetration will enable it to generate cash revenues in addition to the fees that are (currently) being collected internally to be able to minimally operate. To do this, it is necessary to **support ELRUDA in developing institutional partnerships with sectoral actors to better harness its technical potential in the area of Water, Sanitation and Hygiene/WASH for the benefit of communities**. As ELRUDA has a good reputation with sectoral actors, support should include developing new forms of strategic and financial partnerships at sector level. Therefore, **public-private partnership is to be encouraged** especially through exploring perspectives with state institutions like MSPP, DINEPA and MENFP.

Help raise community awareness of works management, including incentives for user contribution in order to ensure the operation of those works with community funding. The amount of user fees must be defined in a participatory manner based on the most appropriate amount for users. The funds collected should be managed transparently through mechanisms that are defined and agreed upon beforehand by the community. They should enable local committees to carry out maintenance and repair work and to purchase water treatment inputs.

**Building synergies between ELRUDA and other sectoral institutional actors.** In an attempt to identify a locally appropriate solution in terms of what chlorination system should be used, ELRUDA should discuss with DINEPA as it is testing different techniques across the country. The comparative advantages of the different techniques/systems must be considered to be able to choose the method/technique that is most efficient and most accessible to communities.

**Supporting ELRUDA to increase the effectiveness of the existing warning, communication and response system.** ELRUDA is a competent and dynamic structure in the Artibonite region. Its work is truly complementary to that of DINEPA and local and communal civil protection committees. Improving its effectiveness requires assistance in strengthening its crisis response capacity and its regular operational capacity (work equipment, logistics). This will enable it to reach a larger number of people through disaster and risk awareness raising and to inform them in the event of any disasters. A similar approach should be considered with CCPCs, CLPCs and CBOs to allow for better integrated risk management at the local level.

**Supporting the strengthening of harmony and cohesion in local and communal RDM structures (CCPCs and CLPCs).** Ongoing training and awareness raising of mayors and other local authorities will make them interested in promoting the work of local and communal RDM committees. Seeking their involvement will guarantee a healthier and more transparent asset management by RDM committees and reduce the risk of internal conflict between them and the other members. Moreover, specific training in organizational management should be provided to the different structures with a view to create an institutional culture among them.

**Facilitating policy dialogue between water user organizations and ODVA to redefine a model of shared responsibility for dredging operations between ODVA and irrigation organizations to ensure effective social irrigation water management.** Progressive ownership of maintenance works will ultimately help address disruptions caused by previous activities, such as "Cash for Work", that are still ongoing. This could be facilitated by revitalizing community solidarity structures/mechanisms such as "coumbite", which can help move forward with work and more sustainably improve water efficiency in irrigated areas and/or production blocks, provided ODVA takes charge of major works that require using machinery.

**Making adjustments to the proposed house design to make it better adapted and replicable in different environments and/or contexts: rural and suburban.** These adjustments must include the type of biodigester used, roofing, etc. The biodigester model used is not easily adaptable to urban and suburban settings and makes this type of housing more typically appropriate for rural areas. An adapted
biodigester should be easy to install in a small space without causing sanitation issues. Furthermore, considerations are also needed on the type of roofing to facilitate its installation by local artisans. Once the adjustments are made, the Ti Boukan Gressier experience could become a best practice in housing, combining the participatory approach and the bottom-up/top-down model while also trying to promote the results through the dissemination mechanisms adopted. Devolution and dissemination workshops with other institutional players working on the housing issue must be planned.

Supporting the structuring of the solidarity groups in place in order to make them operational and provide communities with outreach organizational structures capable of initiating positive bottom-up change. This structuring requires providing technical support to consolidate these embryonic community-based organizations by formalizing their operation. Such support must be based on a financial and administrative management system that enables them to provide building (housing) services through their own and/or solidarity-based funding mechanisms, constructing and maintaining collective infrastructures (e.g. rural tracks). Once structured, solidarity groups could play a role in conducting other similar projects within communities and position themselves as a key community actor providing works (e.g. building) maintenance services, raising disaster risk awareness among community actors. In sum, such an approach may help establish endogenous development initiatives driven by local actors.

OUS and ITECA must document the working approach that values the development of local technical skills through training local artisans and enhancing women’s role in the construction sector as relates to the different tasks and steps involved in construction. This approach has the advantage of providing the community with the best value for money for future constructions. This approach is especially necessary considering that the demand for housing is far lower than supply in those communities. This gap is mostly due to the low coverage of reconstruction activities considering the number of housing units destroyed by the earthquake of January 12, 2010.
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